THE YUAN DYNASTY, 1272-1368 A.D.

⊙ Capitals of *lu* with more than 100,000 inhabitants

Capitals of provinces are underlined

Scale: 1:22,500,000

0 200 400 600km

0 100 200 300 400m

# *MONGOLIAN RULE IN CHINA*

## *Local Administration in the Yuan Dynasty*

*ELIZABETH ENDICOTT-WEST*

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*For Francis W. Cleaves*
*and*
*F. W. Mote*

# *Preface*

From the mid-1970's when I first began to study the history of the Yuan Dynasty up to the present, the road has been long. On the way, the two people to whom this volume is dedicated, Professor F. W. Mote of Princeton and Professor Francis W. Cleaves of Harvard, have consistently given me cheerful encouragement, thoughtful criticism, and good advice. What more could a traveler on the horizonless steppe ask for?

In the course of turning my doctoral dissertation into a publishable manuscript, I benefited from the suggestions of other scholars who were kind enough to read part or all of the manuscript. In particular, I should like to offer thanks to Professors Thomas Allsen, Ch'i-ch'ing Hsiao, Ruby Lam, and Denis Twitchett. For any errors remaining in this work, I of course take sole responsiblity.

A National Endowment for the Humanities Fellowship for College Teachers in 1985–1986 enabled me to revise and expand the manuscript, and I remain grateful to the Endowment for its support. Florence Trefethen, Executive Editor at the Council on East Asian Studies Publications, has been most helpful throughout the editing process.

To my husband, Jay, I again express gratitude for his insistence that the subject of the Mongols' impact on China could be discussed just as fruitfully on a walk into the hills as at one's desk. His perspective as an historian of Russia contributed immeasurably to my own rethinking of several issues in Yuan history.

And now, in the words of the Naiman watchman Qori Sübeči, "It is the time and the destiny of the Mongols."

Goshen, Vermont
August 1987

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ONE

# *Introduction*

The period of Mongolian rule in China, in its broadest sense 1206–1368, gives the historian an opportunity to examine the process by which two separate cultures and societies coexist, interact, and change one another. Neither China nor Mongolia emerged from the Yuan Dynasty unchanged by their century-long interaction. Chinese notions of rule and governance were greatly altered by over one hundred years of Mongolian overlordship. Similarly, one hundred years of exposure to Chinese culture and immersion in the day-to-day tasks of governing a large sedentary empire could not but have altered Mongolian concepts of rulership. The history and folklore interwoven in the later Mongolian chronicles note the importance assigned to the Yuan period in the Mongolian people's historical memory.

Compared to the Sung and Ming periods, the Yuan period has suffered from historians' readiness to skip over the period entirely[1] and from their tendency to ascribe the origins of the less appealing features of the late imperial Chinese socio-political landscape to a negative legacy bequeathed by the Mongolian emperors of China.[2] This book does not intend to paint a rosy picture of China under Mongolian rule; but it is "revisionist" to the extent that it seeks to air certain of the musty stereotypes about the nature of the Yuan political system and to see whether they can stand the test of exposure to fresh lines of inquiry.

While recent monographs on Yuan history have concentrated on

military institutions and legal codes, very little attention has been focused on civilian administration on the regional and local levels.[3] By examining the nitty-gritty, day-to-day workings of Yuan government, I believe that a more accurate assessment of some of the larger issues in thirteenth- and fourteenth-century Chinese and Mongolian history will evolve. And, by investigating the details of Yuan civilian bureaucracy in action, we may then seek to define the nature of Mongolian concepts of rule and how those concepts were reflected in the practical running of a large sedentary bureaucracy. In fact, only by studying government at the local level can we with reasonable confidence tackle the difficult questions of centralization, systematization, and effective control—questions historians of the Yuan have long been debating.

Because the input of both Mongolian and Chinese notions of rule determined the exact form the civilian local administration would take, the topic of Yuan local administration straddles both Chinese and Mongolian history. Mongolian practices of population management that were appropriate for the steppe obviously had to be compromised for governing the world's largest sedentary empire, China. Yet, the Mongols tenaciously clung to certain of their pre-conquest notions and practices, thereby producing sources of bureaucratic inefficiency and corruption that were new even to the Chinese. Thus, one must face the topic of civilian administration in Yuan China armed with a knowledge of both Chinese and Mongolian institutional practice. In addition, the Turkic contribution of such Central Asian peoples as the Qipčaq, Qangli, and Uiγur constitutes a third dimension.[4]

The key institution in the Mongols' administration of China on the regional and local levels was the office of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih,* a Chinese transcription of the Mongolian word *daruγači.* This office was created by the Mongols with the express purpose of controlling conquered territories; yet, during the century and a half of Mongolian rule in China, the office evolved from a military-conquest institution into a civilian bureaucratic institution. The substance of this book is devoted to an investigation of the duties of this office, the way in which they were carried out, and the individual *daruγači*'s interaction with local society. The *daruγači* institution is the key to a more exact understanding of the way in which Yuan government functioned, not only because it was a Mongolian institution grafted onto a Chinese-style bureaucracy, but also because the office and its occupants were involved in virtually every aspect of civilian government. It is difficult to find a set of Yuan documents on local government without mention of the *daruγači*'s involvement. In fact, as I hope this book will show, the history of Yuan local government can be written mainly through the history of the office of *daruγači.*



## *Local Government in China before the Yuan*

While those administrative institutions peculiar to the Yuan period alone will be the focus of later chapters, a chronological overview of the salient characteristics of pre-Yuan local governments in China will provide some sense of how the Yuan borrowed and diverged from earlier institutional practices. As will be seen, the Yuan owed more to northern conquest dynasties and far less to indigenous Chinese dynasties.

Starting with the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.–A.D. 220), we find a three-level system of sub-metropolitan government: the *chou,* the *chün,* and the *hsien.* In addition, a territorial-administrative unit called a *tao* was created to encompass non-Chinese populations in border areas.[5] Under the Han, the central-government capital appointed only the principal official of each of the local government offices; the principal official selected his own subordinates.[6] The staff of the average *chün* has been estimated to have numbered many hundred officials.[7] Although there is little information on the terms of office of Han local officials, we know that there was no established system of tenure, but that long terms, some more than ten years, were the rule.[8] Han local officials appointed by the capital were subject to a rule of avoidance whereby, for instance, inspectors (*tz'u-shih*) could not serve in their home *chou, chün* administrators (*chün-shou*) could not serve in their home *chün,* and prefects and chiefs (*ling, chang*) as well as their subordinates, assistants (*ch'eng*) and commandants (*wei*), not only could not serve in their home *hsien,* but also not in the larger *chün* of origin.[9]

Outside the *chou-chün-hsien* structure of Han local government were the fiefs or kingdoms (*wang-kuo*). After the uprising of the Seven Kingdoms in 154 B.C., the capital appointed all officials and personal staff of the kings, and strengthened fiscal control over the kings. This tension

between the regular bureaucracy directed by the capital and the personnel of fiefs, run by imperial relatives, is a recurrent theme in Chinese history. In the Yuan, however, Mongolian notions of population and territorial control were to add a different twist, as Chapter 4's analysis of the appanages (*t'ou-hsia*) will make clear.

During the period of disunion that followed the fall of the Han dynasty, military and civil officials were often one and the same on the local level, and territorial jurisdictions were not clearly demarcated. The system of staffing local offices under the Northern Wei dynasty (386–534) merits particular description as a precursor of Yuan practices. The Turkic Hsien-pei rulers of the Northern Wei instituted a system of triple staffing of principal officials at each of the three levels of regional-local government.[10] Each *chou* had three inspectors (*tz'u-shih*) of the 6th rank; one of the three was a member of the Hsien-pei tribe. Each *chün* established three commandery administrators (*t'ai-shou*) of the 7th rank; and each *hsien* established three prefects (*ling*) of the 8th rank. This system did not last long; a two-level system of *chou* and *hsien* was instituted, and triple staffing of principal offices was discontinued.[11] As a predecessor of the method of dual staffing of principal local offices in the Yuan dynasty, the Northern Wei attempt at triple staffing represents an institutional practice peculiar to the administration of Chinese territory by steppe peoples. Like the Northern Wei custom of reserving one of the three offices for a member of the ruling ethnic group, the Yuan government attempted to reserve the office of *daruγači* for Mongols; the extent to which Mongols actually filled the office of *daruγači* is analyzed in Chapter 3.

Another institution favored by "northern" dynasties during the post-Han period was the *hsing-t'ai* or regional administration.[12] The term *hsing-t'ai* can be traced back to A.D. 257 when, under the San-kuo Wei dynasty (220–264), it was used to refer to temporary branch administrations set up in local areas. The *hsing-t'ai* in the third to seventh centuries had predominantly military functions, and, in the Northen Wei period, the term came to designate the senior official in a military regional administration. The proclivity of "northern" dynasties towards dependence upon military arms of authority (with varying degrees of participation in civil administration) was shared by the Jurchen Chin dynasty (1126–1234) and the Mongolian Yuan dynasty, both of which attached the prefix *hsing* to temporarily established civil-military organs of administration.



In both the early Sui and early T'ang periods of consolidation, regional presidential councils (*hsing-t'ai shang-shu-sheng*) were created for a brief time but later abolished. In the T'ang, for instance, the *hsing-t'ai* represented military administrations that were abolished by the end of Kao-tsu's reign. It is only fair to point out, however, that the governments-general (*tu-tu-fu*) were far more important in early T'ang history as military commands set up over the organs of civilian administration than were the *hsing-t'ai*.

The unifying Sui and T'ang dynasties (581–617; 618–907) are usually credited by historians with initially concentrating unprecedented authority at the very top.[13] One major advance towards control of the localities by the capital did indeed occur in Sui and T'ang times: All appointed officials in civil offices were selected by the capital. The earlier practice of principal local officials appointing their own subordinates was thus ended.

The Sui dynasty reduced local government to a two-level system of *chou* and *hsien*, abolishing the *chün*. Local government regulations included a rule of avoidance, prohibiting local officials from serving in their places of origin. Short terms of office were instituted to prevent too much official involvement with local interests: three or four years for principal local officials, and four years for subordinate officials. Appointments to local office were made by the Board of Civil Office in the capital, and three times a year representatives of the *chou* attended assemblies in the capital at which local officials' performance in office was reviewed.[14]

T'ang T'ai-tsung followed the Sui dynasty precedent of simplifying the structure of local government by reducing the number of local-government units. The local government as constituted under T'ai-tsung consisted of *chou* and *hsien*. Circuits (*tao*) existed on paper, but had no administrative staff. On occasion, censors were delegated by the central government to carry out investigations within a particular circuit. The leading officials of the *chou* and *hsien*, the inspectors (*tz'u-shih*) and prefects (*hsien-ling*), were appointed by the capital, specifically by

the Board of Civil Office. The chief local officials were not permitted to serve in their *chou* of origin, and were subject to transfer about once every three years.[15]

Under T'ang Hsuan-tsung there were attempts to revitalize the system of circuits by redividing and increasing their number from 10 to 15, but it was not until after the An Lu-shan Rebellion of 755–763 that the circuit was recognized as a tier in government with its own staff.[16] As is well known, in the wake of the An Lu-shan Rebellion the T'ang Court resorted to the appointment of military governors (*chieh-tu-shih*), previously used only in frontier areas, in the interior. In order to retain the loyalty of areas under nominal Court control after the Rebellion, serious compromises were made by the Court: allowing the military governors long tenure in office, conferring legitimate office on usurpers, and asking local garrisons for their opinions concerning Court appointees to local posts.[17]

Among those subordinate officials appointed to the staffs of the late T'ang military governors were the *ya-ya* and the *tu-ya-ya*, whose duties were primarily those of high-level military administrators with great discretionary power in the management of affairs. The similarity in official nomenclature between the T'ang *ya-ya* (the primary meaning of *ya* being to affix a seal) and the Yuan Dynasty *daruγači* (one meaning of *daru-* being to affix a seal) makes it tempting to see the late T'ang office of *ya-ya* as an institutional precedent, diffused westward into Inner Asia, for the Mongolian *daruγači*.[18] Direct, connective evidence, however, is lacking. Nonetheless, it is worth noting certain similarities: Both offices began as military, not civilian, offices, and both gradually usurped aspects of civilian governance, although the Yuan *daruγači* took on far more substantial tasks than the T'ang *ya-ya* in the realm of civilian government. Also, it was quite common for the T'ang *ya-ya* to hold another office concurrently, while, to my knowledge, it was unusual for the Yuan *daruγači* to hold a concurrent post.

Staff members serving the post-An Lu-shan Rebellion military governors often encroached upon the civilian realm of local government. For instance, civil administration and civil legal cases often came under the jurisdiction of one such staff member, the *tu-yü-hou*, thus depriving



his civilian government counterpart, the *hsien-wei*, of his duties and authority.[19]

The militarization of local governments in North China was a trend that continued from late T'ang times through the Five Dynasties period to be weakened only by the Sung dynasty.[20] In the Five Dynasties period, the staff members of former *chieh-tu-shih* who had successfully established their own kingdoms became members of a central government bureaucracy. Thus the *tu-ya-ya* and *ya-ya*, for instance, took on central government civilian, military, and finance duties. Under the various kingdoms, the central government organization was virtually identical to local government organization, the main difference being that a self-styled emperor, as opposed to a *chieh-tu-shih*, reigned. The new emperors put defense commanders (*chen-chiang*) in charge of the territories under their jurisdictions.[21]

A coterminous development beginning in mid-T'ang times consisted of the growing power of large regional administrations imposed between the metropolitan and local levels of government. Robert M. Hartwell's research on demographic and administrative changes from mid-T'ang through early Ming times convincingly shows a trend (though by no means a steady one) away from central government dominance of regional and local levels of government, and towards the growing influence of these intermediary administrations. In T'ang China of the post-An Lu-shan Rebellion period, the military governorships and various intendencies and commissionerships were, in Hartwell's opinion, precursors of the regional administrations (*hsing-sheng*) of the Chin and Yuan governments. The Sung dynasty's centralizing tendencies, however, make the Sung an anomaly in this administrative evolution.[22]

After the period of disunion that followed the collapse of the T'ang, the Sung dynasty established a three-tiered system of local administration: at the top, the route (*lu*), which corresponded to the circuit (*tao*) of T'ang times; then, the prefecture (*fu* or *chou*), inherited from T'ang times and corresponding to the *chün* of Han times; and the county (*hsien*), the lowest unit. The total number of Southern Sung civil officials has been roughly estimated at 12,000, with 8,000 in capital offices, and 4,000 in local offices.[23] Thus, under a dynasty known by historians

for its "centralizing" tendencies, local officials were obviously thinly distributed.

Sung local government reflected the Court's concern about, and desire to avoid, the separatist rebellions and disorder that had plagued the late T'ang and the period of the Five Dynasties-Ten Kingdoms (907–960). Two institutions exemplify the Court's concern. First, the office of general controller (*t'ung-p'an*), which was established in the prefectures, represented the capital on the local level. Although nominally second in command to a prefect, the general controller was in fact a capital official who had the authority to memorialize the Throne directly concerning local officials' actions, and without whose signature no order of the prefect could be carried out. Second, capital officials were often given temporary assignments as "administrators of the affairs of x prefecture" (*chih . . . fu shih*); by this means the early Sung Court avoided the supposed dangers of appointing real prefects. This institution of ad hoc commissions has led one historian to write that the Sung did not have a real local government, but only capital-commissioned, temporary overseers of local affairs.[24] The Sung office of general controller was superficially similar to the office of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* in the Yuan, though the authority of the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* was far more extensive.

Along with the Northern Wei dynasty, two other non-Han dynasties of conquest, the Liao (907–1125) and the Chin (1126–1234), shared features of local government institutions similar to those of the Yuan. The basis of Liao administration was the five-capital system, borrowed from the Po-hai kingdom.[25] Each of the five capitals administered a circuit (*tao*) of the same name, and the circuits were divided into subprefectures (*chou*) and counties (*hsien*). What is of particular significance in the Liao administration is the lack of clear demarcation between civil and military functions in government offices. Each of the five capitals was administered by two sets of offices, the civil and the military. At the subprefectural level, subprefects were entrusted with both military and civil tasks.[26]

Such overlapping of military and civil duties is typical in the governments of conquest dynasties, and the Yuan was no exception. Although the Yuan rulers, particularly Qubilai (the Emperor Shih-tsu, ruled 1260–1294), attempted to separate civil and military functions, the military and civilian bureaucracies were never completely disengaged, as various imperial decrees translated in Chapter 2 make clear.[27] H. F. Schurmann's hypothesis that the political structure of the Yuan was based on "an essentially Mongol monarchy and military" and "essentially Chinese bureaucracy" needs to be refined.[28] Evidence from the Liao, Chin, and Yuan Dynasties supports the notion that, in dynasties of conquest, the military tends to encroach upon the civilian sphere with no clear separation between the two. It is precisely this lack of clear demarcation that is a distinguishing trait of the governments of conquest dynasties. The Chapter 2 description of the often military nature of the duties of the civilian bureaucracy's *daruγači* attests to the absence of a clear line separating the Mongolian military from the Yuan civilian administration.



In the early Chin period, as in the Liao, military and civil functions were merged at various levels of the administration. The *meng-an* and *mou-k'e,* the designations for Jurchen military units of thousands and hundreds respectively and also the names of the heads of those units, acted as local officials in newly conquered territory in the early Chin. At the same time, the *chou* and *hsien* of the Liao dynasty were retained by the Chin, and were staffed by Khitan and Chinese officials under the close supervision of Jurchen *meng-an* and *mou-k'e* personnel garrisoned in the localities.[29] Under the Chin ruler Hai-ling Wang (ruled 1149–1161), Chin territory was divided into 14 routes (*lu*), each headed by a general aministrator (*tsung-kuan*), always a Jurchen, who controlled the *meng-an* and *mou-k'e.*[30] There is no doubt that the Jurchen rulers, like their Khitan predecessors in North China, gave greater precedence to military than to civilian business.

One institution the Chin borrowed from earlier northern dynasties was the regional presidential council (*hsing-t'ai shang-shu-sheng*). As a regional arm of the Presidential Council (Shang-shu-sheng) in the capital the regional presidential councils were created to manage both military and civilian affairs, but gradually came under the aegis of military generals, until they were abolished in 1150. The *hsing-t'ai shang-shu-sheng* were revived with the shorter appellation *hsing-shang-shu-sheng* in the late Chin, particularly after 1195, to exercise military and civilian authority in areas considered unstable. The number of *hsing-shang-shu-sheng* increased as the war with the Mongols escalated.[31] It is clear th

the Chin *hsing-shang-shu-sheng* was the model for the Yuan *hsing-chung-shu-sheng*, or regional secretariats.[32] Like its Chin predecessor, the Yuan regional secretariat held both military and civilian authority. Since the Yuan regional privy councils (*hsing-shu-mi-yuan*) were established only for temporary purposes, the permanently established regional secretariats managed garrison troops on the provincial level.[33]

Even in such a brief overview of pre-Yuan local governments in China, the debt the Yuan owed to such non-Han dynasties of conquest as the Northern Wei, the Liao, and the Chin becomes obvious. The Northern Wei triple staffing of top offices, the overlapping of the civilian and military spheres in Liao and Chin times, and the use of "temporary" branch administrations (*hsing-t'ai*) in local areas, a practice dating from the third century, A.D. and further developed by the Chin dynasty, all were reflected in Yuan bureaucratic structure and practice. The following sections on the structure of Yuan local government and the position of the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* in that government will point to specific Yuan borrowings as well as to Mongolian organizational practices with no apparent precedents in Chinese history.

## *Overview of Yuan Local Government*

Any scholar familiar with imperial Chinese bureaucracy knows that the official nomenclature that inevitably carries over from one dynasty to the next does not necessarily reflect the continuation of the same functions and range of authority of each office. Thus, the fact that the Mongols employed an official nomenclature derived in large part from previous dynasties' terminology does not tell us a great deal beyond the formal structure of government. Each of the offices in the Yuan regional-local hierarchy of offices from the regional secretariat (*hsing-chung-shu-sheng*) down to the circuit (*tao*), the route (*lu*), the prefecture (*fu*), the subprefecture (*chou*), and the county (*hsien*) did indeed have its counterpart in earlier periods of Chinese history.

What is unusual about the Yuan is the sheer number of territorial-administrative units in regional-local government. Whereas previous dynasties used a two- or three-level system of sub-metropolitan administration, the Yuan, at its most complex, employed an unprecedented system: in descending order, regional secretariats, circuits, routes, prefectures, subprefectures, and counties, or in other words, 6 tiers. It should be pointed out that, while the routes (*lu*) always outranked the prefectures (*fu*), it is clear that the terms *lu* and *fu* referred to virtually identical administrative units. The *lu*, however, greatly outnumbered the *fu*.[34]



The complexity of the Yuan administrative hierarchy becomes obvious when one glances at the "Chart of Yuan Local Government" (Appendix A).[35] A *fu* might be linked directly to the regional secretariat with no intermediary offices intervening, or a *fu* might be responsible to a *lu* which in turn would be responsible to a *tao* which in some cases might be administered by a so-called pacification office (*hsuan-wei-ssu*). Why the Mongols felt it necessary to institute so many levels of administration is an important question. The multiplicity of levels of government is only one aspect of a tendency towards duplication and redundancy of functions and responsibilities which Mongolian government exhibited in China. Why the Mongols felt comfortable with such extraordinary arrangements is an issue to which we shall return. For now, it is important to stress the unprecedented and complex nature of Yuan regional-local government.

The pacification office in the Yuan regional-local bureaucracy merits a brief discussion as an office with both military and civilian duties. Located between the regional secretariats and local offices, the Yuan pacification offices administered a circuit (*tao*), although some *tao* were administered directly by regional secretariats. In their admixture of civil and military functions, the pacification offices were similar to the Liao dynasty's use of dual civil and military offices and to the Chin dynasty's *hsing-t'ai shang-shu-sheng*. The *Yuan shih* offers the following description of the pacification offices:[36]

> The pacification offices (*hsuan-wei-ssu*) manage military and civil affairs. They are divided by the circuits (*tao*)[37] through which they supervise the [subordinate] localities (*chün-hsien*). [Whenever] a regional secretariat (*hsing-sheng*)[38] handles an official order, then [the pacification office] proclaims it below; [whenever] the localities have a request, then [the pacification office] transmits it up to the regional secretariat (*sheng*).[39] When in the frontier areas there are military affairs, then [the pacification office] concurrently holds the head office of the military command (*tu-yuan-shuai-fu*); [the concurrent military

> title] next in rank then is only a military command (*yuan-shuai-fu*). In distant territories, there are also the *chao-t'ao*, the *an-fu*, the *hsuan-fu* and other commissions. The ranks and numbers of the personnel differ from each other.

The early Ming writer Yeh Tzu-ch'i also noted the presence of military and civilian aspects in the duties of the *hsuan-wei-ssu*:[40]

> The various routes (*lu*) of the Yuan established a myriarchy (*wan-hu-fu*).[41] The various counties (*hsien*) established a chiliarchy (*ch'ien-hu*).[42] That is the means by which they garrisoned (*ya-chen*)[43] the various places. As for the yearly movement and provisioning of the troops whom they commanded, the prefectures (*fu*) and counties (*hsien*) paid for it while the various circuits (*tao*) through their pacification offices' military commanders (*hsuan-wei-ssu yuan-shuai*) oversaw it.

The one major exception to the usual subdivisions of *lu/fu, chou,* and *hsien* under the regional secretariats (*hsing-chung-shu-sheng*) was the organization of the regional secretariat of Ling-pei. Ling-pei, which had Mongolia under its jurisdiction, was organized into a regional secretariat in 1307 with the designation "Regional Secretariat of Ho-lin and other areas (Ho-lin *teng-ch'u Hsing-chung-shu-sheng*). As such, it had only two appointed officials, a Minister of the Right (Yu-ch'eng-hsiang) and a Minister of the Left (Tso-ch'eng-hsiang). In 1311, the position of Minister of the Right was eliminated; and, in 1312, the Regional Secretariat was renamed "regional secretariat of Ling-pei and other areas." Ling-pei, which encompassed an enormous land mass, had under its jurisdiction only one (upper) route, Ho-ning *Lu* whose seat was Qara Qorum; no other administrative units or offices are mentioned.[44]

John Dardess has argued that Mongolia and the steppe region were absorbed into a "centralized bureaucratic system of government established in Peking," and that the "bureaucratization of Mongolia" is reflected by its incorporation into a regional secretariat in 1307.[45] The absence of any further administrative subdivisions below the *lu* level in this extensive territory, however, points to quite a different conclusion: Mongolia was far *less* bureaucratized on the local level than the whole of China. Mongolia, an economic backwater after the capital was moved from Qara Qorum to Ta-tu in the 1260's, was under a looser form of administrative control, probably because there were fewer resources to exploit than in China proper.[46]



The unusually large number of civilian offices in the Yuan government represents another Yuan departure from precedent, and the issue of numbers is also related to the multiplicity of levels of regional-local government. The *Yuan tien-chang* (Institutions of the Yuan Dynasty, compiled 1320–1322) gives the following figures, which for various reasons cannot be considered entirely accurate.[47] The total number of offices is given as 26,690, of which 22,490 had official "rank and title" (*p'in-chi*)[48] and 4,208 did not have "rank and title." Unfortunately, perhaps owing to clerical error, the two sets of numbers add up to 26,698, not 26,690. Of the total number, court offices (*ch'ao-kuan*) numbered 2,089, capital offices (*ching-kuan*) numbered 506, and offices appointed outside the metropolitan bureaucracy (*wai-jen*) numbered 19,895.[49]

These four categories of offices—court, capital, provincial, and those without "rank and title"—add up to 26,698, a figure that is over twice the estimated number of Southern Sung civil officials and even in excess of the approximately 20,000 civil service offices in sixteenth-century Ming China.[50] By category, court offices comprised 7.8 percent of the total, capital offices 1.8 percent, provincial offices 74.5 percent, and offices without "rank and title" 15.7 percent. These figures show a capital-provincial ratio quite different from that of the Southern Sung, in which roughly 66 percent of all offices were capital offices. The figures alone suggest that the Yuan government delegated far more administrative tasks and authority to non-metropolitan officials than did the over-centralized Southern Sung government.

The problem with these figures in the *Yuan tien-chang* is that each category is divided into Se-mu (Western and Central Asians) and Han-jen (Northern Chinese, Khitans, Jurchens, and Koreans), thus leaving out two of the four official categories of Yuan population—the Mongols themselves and the Nan-jen or "Southerners."[51] For instance, among court officials, Se-mu comprised 44.9 percent and Han-jen, 55 percent; among capital officials, Se-mu comprised 30.6 percent, and Han-jen 69.3 percent; and among provincial officials, Se-mu comprised 28.5 percent, and Han-jen 71.5 percent. The margin by which Han-jen outnumber Se-mu was much greater in the provinces.

The absence of Mongols in these figures may be accounted for by the Mongolian rulers' deliberate policy of secrecy regarding many facets of Mongolian civil and military administration. We know from an imperial decree of 1292, for example, that Qubilai forbade the organization of Mongolian troops into "communities" (*she*) under civilian administrators, since the offices of the population overseers (*kuan-min-kuan ssu*) would thereby know the number of Mongolian troops, and the number of troops "is the business of the military and the dynasty, and should be kept confidential."[52] In a similar context, a 1319 memorial by an administrator of the Privy Council (Chih-shu-mi-yuan-shih) states quite clearly that Han-jen are forbidden to count the numbers of palace guards and that even censors are forbidden to know the number of troops, adding that "this is the system of our dynasty."[53]

On the other hand, there is another possible explanation for the *Yuan tien-chang* use of only two of the four categories of nationalities. The term Se-mu might encompass not only Western and Central Asians but also Mongols, while Han-jen in this case might refer to both Han-jen and Nan-jen.[54] Whichever explanation one chooses, the *Yuan tien-chang* figures are best viewed as approximations, not as fixed and unchanging statistics.

Even admitting the unreliability of the *Yuan tien-chang* figures, however, the unprecedentedly large number of civilian offices points to a distinctly Mongolian mode of governing through the duplication of functions in order to prevent concentration of power in any one person or office. Such overstaffing of civilian bureaucracy was only one part of a strategy of a government of occupation on foreign soil.

Yuan regional-local government adhered to Chinese precedent in its "rule of avoidance," whereby officials were prohibited from serving in their places of origin. A Central Secretariat (Chung-shu-sheng) memorial dated 5 June 1291 explains why such a regulation was deemed necessary:[55]

> Officials who are transferred to another post (*ch'ien-chuan kuan-yuan*)[56] should be prohibited from serving as officials in their own areas. Sang-ko (Sangha)[57] and others, for the sake of taking bribes (*yao tu-p'i*),[58] defied an imperial decree (*sheng-chih*) [to that effect]. There have been instances of [officials] with [aristocratic] origins (*ken-chiao*)[59] who have served as officials in their own areas [because of bribing Sangha]. At present, this type of regulation (*t'i-li*) should be revised. If [officials] are transferred to other areas, then the common people will be spared.

An imperial decree authorized the proposal made by the Central Secretariat.

How Yuan regional-local government fit into the larger scheme of imperial administration is a topic that deserves elucidation. Using David Farquhar's helpful division of Yuan government institutions into five large categories, we find institutions relating to the Imperial Household; institutions relating to the regular civilian administration of the empire; surveillance and judicial agencies; the military; and agencies entrusted with administering "fiefs."[60]

Undoubtedly, the two categories that most affected the lives of the inhabitants of Yuan China were those of the regular civilian administration and the military (although the inhabitants of "fiefs" came under the aegis of local officials appointed within those "fiefs"). The regional-local administration that is the topic of this book fits into the category of the regular civilian administration. At the top of this administration was the Central Secretariat (Chung-shu-sheng), aided by its six subordinate Boards of Personnel, Revenue, Rites, War, Punishments, and Works. The chapters to come show that the two boards whose activities were most significant in terms of the appointing, promoting, demoting and disciplining of local officials were the Boards of Personnel and Punishments. Quite often the Censorate, branch censorates, or surveillance bureaus sent communications to their counterparts in the regular civilian administration concerning improper activities of local officials. The regional secretariats (*hsing-chung-shu-sheng* or *hsing-sheng*) were directly responsible to their namesake, the Central Secretariat, and the other organs of regional-local government fell in line under the regional secretariats, as the chart of local government in Appendix A demonstrates.

## *The Office of* Daruγači *in the Yuan Regional-Local Administration*

As stated earlier, the key to understanding Yuan regional and local government is the office of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* and that office's place in the system of dual staffing of principal offices at each level of sub-metropolitan government with the exception of the regional secretariats. Although this system was not unique to the Yuan—we have noted the short-lived triple staffing of the Northern Wei dynasty—it nonetheless represented a Mongolian innovation superimposed upon a bureaucracy essentially Chinese in derivation.

The system of dual staffing paired the *daruγači* with another official of equal rank and salary. For instance, at the level of the upper route (*shang-lu*), the rank (3a) and salary of the office of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* corresponded to that of the general administrator (*tsung-kuan*); at the level of lower route (*hsia-lu,*) the rank (3b) and salary of the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* was also the same as that of the general administrator; at the prefectural level (*fu*), the prefect (*chih-fu*) and *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* had the same rank (4a) and salary; in the upper, middle, and lower subprefectures (*shang-chou, chung-chou, hsia-chou*), the subprefect (*chih-chou*) and the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* had equal ranks (4b, 5a, 5b) and salaries; at the county level (*shang-hsien, chung-hsien, hsia-hsien*), the ranks (6b, 7a, 7b) and salaries of the magistrate (*hsien-yin*) and the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* were equal; and in the *lu-shih-ssu,* or districts under the direct jurisdiction of routes and prefectures, the *lu-shih* and the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* had equal rank (8a) and salary.[61]

Unlike the routes in China proper, the general administration (*tsung-kuan-fu*) of Ho-ning route in the Regional Secretariat of Ling-pei (Mongolia) seems to have had no *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih.* The absence of any evidence that *daruγači* were appointed to the Mongols' homeland strongly suggests that both the office and the system of dual staffing of offices were intended only for the administration of non-Mongolian ethnic groups and territories.



## *The Term* Ta-lu-hua-ch'ih (Daruγači)

Because the institution of *daruγači* was purely Mongolian in origin, the Mongols quite naturally devised their own term for it, rather than borrowing from Chinese bureaucratic terminology. The authoritative treatment of the etymoloigcal and philological background of *daruγači* was published over thirty years ago by Francis Woodman Cleaves ("Daruγa and Gerege"), and little can be added to his conclusions.[62] *Daruγa,* the form of the word found in Mongolian texts in the Uiγur and 'Phags-pa scripts from China, is a *nomen deverbale* (deverbal noun) of the verb *daru-* with the suffix *-γa.*[63] As Professor Cleaves has demonstrated, *daruγa* in form is a *nomen imperfecti* (imperfect noun) but functions as a *nomen actoris* (noun designating the actor).[64] *Daruγači* (*daruγačin*), the form that appears in Mongolian texts in the Uiγur and 'Phags-pa scripts from China, is a *nomen actoris* in *-či* (*-čin*), and a denominal derivative of *daruγa.*[65] The definitions of *daru-* include "to press; to oppress; to pursue; to subdue; to stamp; to print; to affix a seal."[66]

In bilingual texts, such as the *Secret History of the Mongols* (*Yüan-ch'ao pi-shih*), the Chinese equivalent of *daruγači* is *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih.* In the earliest bilingual text that mentions the office of *daruγači,* namely the *Secret History of the Mongols, daruγačin* (a plural in *-n*) is glossed as *chen-shou kuan-ming* (title of the official who defends and governs), and *daruγas* (a plural in *-s* of *daruγa*) is glossed as *chen-shou-ti* (he who defends and governs).[67] In §263 of the *Secret History of the Mongols,* we find that, after Cinggis Qan had finished his campaign against the Sarta'ul people, he appointed a father and son of the Qurumši clan of the Sarta'ul, Yalawači and Masqud, as *daruγas* in Central Asia and China because they were "skilful in the laws and customs of cities."[68] The context of this passage is clear: Činggis Qan, unfamiliar with sedentary, urban customs, delegated the authority to hold down and govern cities to men who were well-versed in such affairs; the appointment of two Khwarazmians—Yalawači and Masqud—foreshadowed the Mongols' later dependence upon Se-mujen in various branches of the civilian administration of Yuan China. In §§273 and 274 of the *Secret History of the Mongols,* the theme of establishing *daruγači* in newly conquered cities is the same.[69] It is also pertinent to

note that in the modern Kalkha dialect of Mongolian the word *darga* retains the meaning "chief, head official, commander."[70]

The term *daruγači* also must be understood in terms of the related meaning of *daru-*, "to press," in the sense of pressing or affixing an official seal.[71] Paul Ratchnevsky has written that the term *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* "désigne la mandarin qui détient le sceau," and that *chang-yin-kuan* is the "traduction chinoise du mongol *daruγači*."[72] Ratchnevsky is correct insofar as *chang-yin-kuan* (the official who manages the seal of office) is one translation of *daruγači*, but, as we have seen, it was not the sole translation.[73] Another Yuan-period translation of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* is found in the *Chih-yuan i-yü: hsuan-ch'ai* or "commissioner."[74] The *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* in early Yuan times did indeed serve as imperial commissioners, entrusted with duties and sent out by the ruler or imperial princes. In the documents in the *Yuan tien-chang* and the *T'ung-chih t'iao-ko*, general designations such as "population overseers" (*kuan-min-kuan*) and "senior officials" (*chang-kuan*) are sometimes used to refer to *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*, though at times they clearly exclude the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* and refer instead to the other principal local officials (prefects, magistrates).

### DARUγAČI *IN OTHER MONGOLIAN-ADMINISTERED LANDS*

As a Mongolian institution, the office of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* had its counterparts in other Mongolian-ruled regions of Eurasia, most notably in the Russian principalities and in Persia. The term *daruγa* and its Turkic equivalent, *basqaq*, both appear in Russian sources and in the literature of the Golden Horde (the qanate of Qipčaq), whose official language was Turkic. The exact equivalence of the Mongolian *daruγači* and the Turkic *basqaq* was definitively established long ago by the French scholar Paul Pelliot.[75]

The duties of the *daruγa* (Russian: *daruga*) and *basqaq* (Russian: *baskak*) in the *ulus* of the Golden Horde, established in 1243, have long been debated in secondary literature. Despite differences of emphasis, most researchers agree that tribute collection was the primary function of both the *daruγa* and the *basqaq* in the Russian principalities.[76] Although the term *daruγa* was used in Russian sources throughout the fourteenth century, and is found in fifteenth-century chronicles, the term



*basqaq*, and perhaps the office itself, disappeared in the early fourteenth century.[77]

The thirteenth-century Persian historian Juvaini mentions the *basqaq* in his description of the capture of Bukhara in March 1220. Činggis Qan asked the people of Bukhara who among them were "men of authority": "To each of them he assigned a Mongol or Turk as *basqaq* in order that the soldiers might not molest them, and, although not subjecting them to disgrace or humiliation, they began to exact money from these men . . ."[78] According to John Andrew Boyle, translator of Juvaini's history, the Turkic term *basqaq* was used as an equivalent of the Mongolian *daruγa* and of the Arabo-Persian *shaḥna*, that is, as the tribute-collecting representative of the Mongols in conquered lands.[79] The word *dārūġa* in Persian up to the seventeenth century encompassed the definitions of head of a city or region and head administrator of a department, a chancellery, or the police.[80] V. Minorsky notes that in Safavid times (sixteenth to eighteenth centuries) the term *dārūgha* was in common use to refer to governors, governors of the capital, and the head clerks in large government departments.[81] In a six-language dictionary, *The Rasulid Hexaglot: A Yemeni Polyglot Dictionary*, compiled by a fourteenth-century Yemeni ruler, the term *daruγa* is listed as the equivalent of the Turkic *basčaq*, the Persian *šaḥna*, and the Arabic *amīr al-balad* ("mayor").[82]

It is somewhat exceptional to find that, under Tamerlane's administration in late-fourteenth-century Central Asia, the *daruγa* neither supervised nor personally undertook tax collection.[83] Similarly, the tribute-collecting aspect of the *daruγa* institution as it existed at various times in Russia, Persia, and Central Asia was also not foremost in the office of Yuan *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih;* indeed, as the following chapters will demonstrate, from Qubilai's reign on, *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* were not directly involved in tax-collection procedures in China.[84]

### *SECONDARY LITERATURE ON THE YUAN* TA-LU-HUA-CH'IH

With a few notable exceptions, historians who have written on the Yuan have relegated the *daruγači* institution to brief footnotes. The prominence of a Mongolian title within the Yuan bureaucracy, however, has been difficult to ignore totally. Among Ch'ing dynasty scholars,

Chao I (1727–1814), in his *Nien-erh shih cha-chi* (Notes on the twenty-two histories), noted the difficulty the use of Mongolian titles of offices in the *Yuan shih* poses:[85]

> The *Chin shih* has one chapter (*chüan*) [entitled] "Kuo-yü chieh" [Explanation of the national, that is, Jurchen, language].[86] It translates Jurchen words, [thus] permitting one easily to understand them. The *Yuan shih* is without this. Moreover, the official system of the Chin used purely Chinese titles, whereas the Yuan in some cases used titles that continued their own [cultural] practices, and are all the more difficult to recognize and distinguish. Here we list [those titles] that the Annals and Biographies [*chi-chuan*, that is, of the *Yuan shih*] record, and which we can annotate and explain as follows: *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*: the senior official (*chang-kuan*) who manages the seals of office and attends to affairs. Without regard to whether the duties were civil or military, great or small, or whether in a route (*lu*), a prefecture (*fu*), a subprefecture (*chou*), or a county (*hsien*), all established this office. . . . In most cases Mongols were appointed to serve as [*ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*]; some Han-jen [that is, Northern Chinese, Khitans, Jurchens, and so forth] also held this office.

Although philological and textual problems in Yuan sources occupied the attention of various renowned Ch'ing scholars, an examination of the institution of the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* would have been outside the realm of their intellectual interests.[87]

In modern Chinese scholarship, Yao Ts'ung-wu and Sechin Jagchid (Cha-ch'i-ssu-ch'in) each have written one article on the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* in Yuan China.[88] Yao Ts'ung-wu, who concentrates on the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* before Qubilai's reign, attempts to equate various Chinese designations for "commissioner" or "envoy" in the years 1206–1259 with the term *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*. For instance, he takes the Chinese term *hsuan-ch'ai* (commissioner) as it appears in the *Meng-ta pei-lu*, the *Hei-ta shih-lueh*, and the *Hsi yu chi* as a synonym of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*, and he reads all references to *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* in the *Secret History of the Mongols* as probable synonyms of *hsuan-ch'ai*. This equation of terms by context is tempting, yet only one text, the *Chih-yuan i-yü*, directly matches the term *hsuan-ch'ai* with *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*.[89] Yao Ts'ung-wu uses this evidence in the *Chih-yuan i-yü* as the basis of his argument that, every time *hsuan-ch'ai* appears in early Yuan texts, we have the equivalent of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*. Yet, the texts themselves do not "prove" this formula. Undoubtedly, the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* of pre-Qubilai times often functioned as commissioners, but, as mentioned earlier, other Yuan-period definitions of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* existed. Thus, both Yao Ts'ung-wu and Igor de Rachewiltz, who, in his article, "Personnel and Personalities in North China in the Early Mongol Period," writes that *hsing-sheng, liu-shou, chang-kuan*, and *hsuan-ch'ai* in the years 1216–1229, all rendered *daruγači*, are at risk when they intimate that a system of definite equations was at work.[90]



Sechin Jagchid's study of the *Ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* institution in China is based on the *Yuan shih* and the *Secret History of the Mongols*, and covers the period from the reign of the Emperor T'ai-tsu (Činggis Qan) through the reign of the Emperor Shih-tsu (Qubilai). Because he believes that Qubilai's reign represented the golden age of the Yuan, and that later Yuan emperors could do no better than simply maintain Qubilai's system of administration, Jagchid does not comment on the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* system after 1294.[91] Of great use to the researcher is his listing by nationality of the individual *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* in the *Yuan shih*, although, if one admits to any degree of interchangeability of Chinese and Mongolian official terms before Qubilai's reign, then, as de Rachewiltz points out, the list cannot be used for statistical purposes.[92] More general works on Yuan history by Chinese historians devote only a few pages to the formal structure of Yuan local government, and mention the office of *daruγači only in passing*.[93]

In contemporary Japanese, Soviet, Mongolian, and Western scholarship no monographs have been devoted to the history of the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* system per se. Japanese historians interested in the "feudal" aspects of Yuan society have commented in an ancillary fashion upon the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*, mainly in the context of their appointment in territories allotted to imperial relatives.[94] The Soviet scholar N. Ts. Munkuev similarly has addressed the question of the degree to which the Mongolian "aristocracy" controlled the financial, governmental, and judicial administration of its allotted territories through self-appointed *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*.[95] Contemporary Mongolian scholarship has concentrated on the social, economic, and cultural history of the Mongolian people in Yuan times rather than on the nature of Yuan government.[96] In two recent monographs on the Yuan legal order and the Yuan military published in the United States, the role of the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* in civilian administration has been underestimated. Paul Ch'en, in his *Chinese Legal Tradition*

*under the Mongols*, has dismissed the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* as "merely a nominal head of the administration" at the level of the route (*lu*), while portraying the Chinese general administrator (*tsung-kuan*) as the sole responsible official.[97] Ch'i-ch'ing Hsiao similarly has relegated the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* to "supervisory" status, overlooking the executive functions of the office.[98] The following chapters will demonstrate that the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* was *not* an office in name only but the very core of the Yuan regional-local government.

## *Primary Sources*

The primary sources that contain the most information on the office of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* and the workings of local government in general are the *Ta Yuan sheng-cheng kuo-ch'ao tien-chang* (compiled 1320–1322) and the *T'ung-chih t'iao-ko* (compiled in 1321).[99] These two collections of administrative regulations are a gold mine of detailed information on various aspects of Yuan society and government, but, owing to the language of the documents therein, they have not been thoroughly mined by researchers. Those Yuan imperial decrees known as *sheng-chih* are direct translations from Mongolian into Chinese and incorporate elements of Mongolian syntax. Herbert Franke has dubbed the highly colloquial language of these documents "a sort of translationese Chinese in Mongolian word-order";[100] Igor de Rachewiltz has attributed the difficulty of the language to poor work by Yuan government translators:

> The *pai-hua* of most of these documents is simply atrocious; clearly they are the slipshod work of poor and hasty translators. Often the Chinese text is so literal a translation from the Mongolian that even the Mongolian word order is retained. This fact shows that the translation was almost certainly dictated. However, by the end of the thirteenth century this language had to some extent crystallized into stereotyped formulas.[101]

Indeed, from the modern historian's point of view, it is fortunate that some crystallization into a formulaic terminology occurred in the course of the thirteenth century, thus enabling scholars to crack the code, in a manner of speaking. A clear understanding of the complex terminology of Yuan colloquial documents is absolutely vital to an understanding of Yuan regional-local government. Japanese scholars, in particular Tanaka Kenji, have contributed greatly to this field by deciphering terms that recur in the *Yuan tien-chang* and the *T'ung-chih t'iao-ko*.[102]



Because of the integral value of the documents themselves, many of those relevant to the office of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* have been translated in Chapters 2, 3, and 4. Nevertheless, as Weng Tu-chien has noted, the term *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* appears well over 200 times in documents in the *Yuan tien-chang* alone.[103] This study does not attempt an exhaustive tabulation of individual *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*, but rather offers a descriptive account of the office and a number of its occupants. It must be emphasized that not *all* passages on *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* in Yuan historical sources are cited, much less translated or discussed, in this book. The most representative and illuminating passages from the *Yuan tien-chang*, the *T'ung-chih t'iao-ko*, and other sources have been selected for translation in the belief that the documents themselves best convey the texture of Yuan administration.

It is important to keep in mind that the *Yuan tien-chang* and the *T'ung-chih t'iao-ko* do not represent legal codes in the strictest sense of the word, but rather are collections of administrative regulations and notes, which at times incorporate fragments of codes.[104] Generally speaking, executive and judicial process were one and the same in imperial China: The issuing of an imperial command was essentially the making of a law.[105] In a typical entry in the *Yuan tien-chang*, one might find that the Central Secretariat (Chung-shu-sheng) has received a report of bureaucratic malfeasance from below—perhaps from a regional secretariat (*hsing-sheng*), which in turn had received a report from a prefecture (*fu*). The Central Secretariat then proceeds to memorialize the Throne on the matter, incorporating in the memorial excerpts of reports from the regional secretariat and prefecture, and perhaps including a proposal on how to remedy the problem. The imperial decree itself may be as brief as "Let it be that way" (*na-pan-che* / Mongolian *teyin boltuγai*; that is, an endorsement of the proposal), or it may consist of several new regulations or an invocation of an earlier imperial decree.

The way in which such administrative regulations were put down on paper necessarily leads one to ponder the rationale behind the inclusion of inter-agency communications side by side with an imperial decree

George L. Yaney, in his study of the history of Russian administration, has written that Russian law did not carry with it the expectation of being enforced; rather, it was a hopeful statement of how people should behave.[106] As evidence for this, Yaney cites Peter I's practice of including explanations of his statutes and discussions of their purposes in the statutes themselves. This practice continued in Russia until 1885 when Alexander III ordered that such explanations be removed. Although the pre-modern Russian and Chinese legal orders were quite different, the notion of the myth of a legal-administrative system—that is, the hope that people's actions would conform to the letter of the regulations despite the obvious inability of the state to impose those regulations on society at large (owing to understaffing, budgetary limiations, and so forth)—helps explain the format of Chinese bureaucratic communications.

Finally, in addition to the documents in the *Yuan tien-chang* and the *T'ung-chih t'iao-ko*, biographies of individual *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* from the *Yuan shih* and biographical information from literary collections (*wen-chi*) will round out the picture of local government in Yuan China.

TWO

# *The* Ta-lu-hua-ch'ih— *Early History and Official Duties*

In a description of Yuan regional-local government, the closely linked questions of appointment and allegiance naturally arise. Specifically, the questions of who appointed *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* in Yuan times, to whom they felt loyal, and in whose interests they acted, are central to an understanding of how Yuan administration functioned below the level of Ta-tu, the imperial capital city.

The majority of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*, and other local officials were appointed by the metropolitan government in Ta-tu (present-day Peking), and thus belonged to the regular local government bureaucracy in China. This category of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* is the subject of Chapters 2 and 3. A sizeable minority of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*, however, were appointed by imperial relatives to serve in their personal, hereditary appanages. This second category of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*, whose loyalties were tied to imperial princes, empresses, imperial sons-in-law, imperial daughters, and meritorious officials—all of whom were recipients of imperially bestowed territories—is the subject of Chapter 4.[1]

Before examining the authority and duties of the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* within the context of the regular bureaucracy, it is necessary to trace the evolution of the office itself in early Yuan times, before the reign of Qubilai (1260–1294). In the decades before Qubilai's ascension to the throne of China, the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*, like all other officials, were unsalaried. In keeping with the customary Mongolian emphasis on hereditary

transfer of office, the office of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* often was transmitted from father to son or from elder to younger brother. The extra-bureaucratic character of the office, as exemplified by the hereditary factor in appointment, existed to a certain degree even after the office had become a part of Qubilai's standardized, salaried bureaucracy.

The first appearance of the office of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* in Chinese sources has been dated by scholars variously as 1214, 1223, and 1236.[2] The date 1214, as Sechin Jagchid has pointed out, constitutes the earliest mention of the appointment of a *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* in the *Yuan shih.* The *Yuan shih* account, in turn, represents the earliest record of the existence of the office of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* in China. Between June 1214 and May 1215, Činggis Qan appointed a certain Cha-pa-erh Huo-che (Lord Jabar) as *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* in North China. Cha-pa-erh, identified in his *Yuan shih* biography as a Central Asian Muslim,[3] was rewarded for his services during the siege of the Chin dynasty capital, Chung-tu, in the days after the Chin Court had abandoned the city for Pien (K'ai-feng), between June 1214 and May 1215.[4] His biography states: "He was appointed 'Head *Ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* of the Empire from North of the Yellow River to South of T'ieh-men' (Huang Ho *i-pei* T'ieh-men *i-nan t'ien-hsia Tu-Ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*)."[5] Whether this long title was merely honorary or carried actual duties and perquisites is unknown; the brief biography ends without mentioning it further.

The year 1223 represents the earliest mention of a *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* in the Basic Annals (*pen-chi*) of the Emperor T'ai-tsu (Činggis Qan) in the *Yuan shih.*[6] In that year, according to the *Yuan shih, ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* were established to oversee the various cities of the Western Regions (Hsi-yü), that is, Western and Central Asia. We know from other sources, however, that *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* were appointed as early as 1221 by Činggis Qan during his western campaigns.[7] During Činggis Qan's reign (1206–1227), the office of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* in China often was given as a special reward in return for the services of a loyal subject. Not only Činggis Qan but also the Prince of the Realm (Kuo-wang) Muqali (Mu-hua-li) could award the office. The duties of the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* under Činggis at times fell into the sphere of civilian activity, and at times into the military sphere.

The biography of An-mu-hai (*Ammuγai ∿ Ambaγai)[8] in the *Yuan shih* illustrates the military and hereditary aspects of the office of Činggis's reign:[9]



> An-mu-hai, of the Mongolian Pa-la-hu-tai (Baryudai) clan,[10] together with his father, Po-ho-ch'u (*Bo[l]γaču),[11] served T'ai-tsu (Činggis), and gained merit in military campaigns. The Emperor once asked him what weapons should be foremost in laying siege to cities and capturing territory. He answered, saying: "In laying siege to cities, catapult bombs (*p'ao-shih*) should be foremost, the reason being that their force is great and they can reach far." The Emperor was pleased by this, and immediately named him as a catapult operator (*p'ao-shou*). In the *Chia-hsu* year [1214], when the Grand Preceptor and Prince of the Realm (T'ai-shih Kuo-wang) [Muqali] mounted a southern invasion, the Emperor commanded him, saying: "According to the words of An-mu-hai, in laying siege to cities, the strategy of using catapults (*p'ao*) is extremely good. If you employ his strategy, what city will not be breached?" Immediately, [Muqali] conferred upon him a golden tablet (*chin-fu*),[12] and appointed him "*Ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* of the Catapult Operators of All Routes" (*Sui-lu P'ao-shou Ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*).

When An-mu-hai died sometime after 1252, his son, T'e-mu-t'ai-erh (Temütā ∿ Temüter), inherited his father's office, although the title of the office the son held was changed to "General Administrator of the Catapult Operators" (*P'ao-shou Tsung-kuan*). When T'e-mu-t'ai-erh was later appointed *tuan-shih-kuan* (Mongolian: *jaryuči,* or "judge"), *his* son, Hu-tu-ta-erh (Qududar), inherited the office of General Administrator of the Catapult Operators. In 1278, T'e-mu-t'ai-erh concurrently held the office of *Ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* of P'ing-chiang Route; he died the same year. Hu-tu-ta-erh later was promoted to the office of Myriarch of the Catapult Operators (*P'ao-shou Wan-hu*), and then to *Ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* (presumably *Ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* of the Catapult Operators).

The office of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* thus was transmitted in a hereditary manner through three generations. Initially, the office of "*Ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* of the Catapult Operators of All Routes" (chief officer of all artillery units in North China) was a reward for An-mu-hai's good advice to Činggis Qan. An-mu-hai's son, T'e-mu-t'ai-erh, held various military and civilian offices—indeed, the office of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* was from the beginning prominent in both the military and civilian incipient bureaucracies.

Another early example of the granting of the office of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* as a reward occurred in 1215, again in the context of the Mongols' war against the Chin dynasty in North China. Shih-mo Yeh-hsien came from a family loyal to the Khitan Liao dynasty.[13] After the fall of the Liao, the family had changed its surname from Shu-lü to Shih-mo.[14] Neither Shih-mo

Yeh-hsien's grandfather nor his father would serve the Chin dynasty. When Shih-mo Yeh-hsien himself was summoned to serve the Chin, he went into hiding. Hearing of Činggis Qan, he offered his services to the Mongolian Qan, and advised him to mount an attack on the Chin city of Tung-ching (the eastern capital of the Chin, present-day Liao-yang, Liao-ning province).[15] Impersonating the newly appointed Defense Commandant (*Liu-shou*) of Tung-ching, Shih-mo Yeh-hsien gained entry to the city, where he reported that he had just come from the Chin Court, that all was peaceful in the Chin realm, and that there was no reason to call up soldiers. He succeeded in dispersing the city's defense forces so that, when Muqali arrived three days later, his troops "did not waste one arrow" in capturing several thousand *li* of territory, 108,000 households, 100,000 troops, military materiel, and 32 cities and towns. After the Chin city of Pei-ching fell to Muqali's troops in 1215, Muqali planned to slaughter the city's inhabitants.[16] Shih-mo Yeh-hsien talked Muqali out of the slaughter and was appointed by Muqali to be the *Ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* of the city. It was quite common for defectors such as Shih-mo Yeh-hsien to be appointed to top regional and local posts in areas they had caused to surrender or helped capture.

Similarly, Shih-mo Yeh-hsien's son, Ch'a-la, talked Muqali out of slaughtering the inhabitants of the city of I-tu.[17] Later, in 1241, as a reward for his many achievements, Ch'a-la was appointed by the Yuan Emperor T'ai-tsung (Ögödei, ruled 1229–1241) to be *Ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* of the Two Routes of Chen-ting and Pei-ching (Chen-ting Pei-ching *liang Lu Ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*).[18] After Ch'a-la's death in 1243, *his* son, K'u-lu-man, "inherited [his father's] official duties."

Appended to the biography of Shih-mo Yeh-hsien in the *Yuan shih* are a few short lines on his elder brother, Shih-mo Shan-te-na, who also refused to serve the Chin, instead offering his services to the Mongols. He became *Ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* of Bešbaliq (Pieh-shih-pa-li).

It is important to emphasize that the office of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* in Činggis Qan's time included decidedly military responsibilities. In his military campaign in Ho-nan, for instance, Činggis appointed a Uiγur, Yueh-lin T'ieh-mu-erh (Yueh-lin Temür), to the office of "Military-Civil Head *Ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* of Ho-nan and other areas" (Ho-nan *teng-ch'u chün-min Tu-Ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*).[19] The mixture of civil and military functions in one office in a period of invasions and warfare should not be surprising. After a city had been captured by, or had surrendered to, the Mongols, order had to be restored to the daily lives of the inhabitants. Although we lack detailed accounts of the duties of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* in Činggis Qan's reign, we may surmise that, in addition to helping a city return to its normal pace of life (insofar as that was possible), a *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* must have been expected to prevent rebellion from breaking out against the Mongols. He was expected to keep his city or territory safely within the folds of the Mongols' new conquests.



The duties of the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* in regard to newly conquered cities and districts in North China are better documented during the thirty-year period beginning with Ögödei Qaγan's reign (1229–1241) through Möngke Qaγan's reign as the Yuan Emperor Hsien-tsung (1251–1259). In this period between the reigns of Činggis Qan and Qubilai, the role of the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* was gradually developing into that of the chief civil official stationed in a locality. Although emergency military tasks remained within the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*'s sphere, his day-to-day attention was focused on civilian affairs.

The evolution of the office from its position in the military conquest elite into the top-ranking position in the newly emerging civilian bureaucracy is reflected in unusual detail in the epitaph of a Mongolian *Ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*, known to us only by his nickname (*hsiao-tzu*), Meng-ku Pa-erh.[20] The life story of Meng-ku Pa-erh (1204–1274) not only reveals the evolution of the office of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* from the military to the civilian sphere; it also shows us that the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* was not simply a tool of exploitation in the hands of the Mongolian emperors but that he could also be a representative of his locale's interests, an important function in times of adversity. While it is not possible to say whether Meng-ku Pa-erh was representative of all *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* in this period, it is clear that he was a positive example in the eyes of his epitaph's compiler, Hu Chih-yü (1227–1295), himself a noted critic of the way in which government worked in Yuan times.[21] Because of the rarity of such an in-depth portrait in the primary sources, large portions of this epitaph are here translated:

> The Epitaph (*shen-tao-pei*)[22] of his eminence Meng-ku (Meng-ku *kung*),[23] the Great Yuan deceased Huai-yuan General (*Ta-Yuan ku Huai-yuan ta-chiang-chün*), the *Ta-lu-ka-ch'i*[24] of Huai-meng route (*lu*)[25] who concurrently held the office of *chu-chün e-lo*.[26]
>
> When the Emperor T'ai-tsu (Činggis) received the heavenly mandate, he

subjugated [places in] all directions. When the Emperor T'ai-tsung (Ögödei) succeeded to the throne and guarded the laws, he renewed the official system, making it simple and not complex. Ruling it was the system of laws. Within [that is, at court], one minister (*hsiang*) took charge of the sundry officials and assisted in official matters. Without [that is, in the country at large], there were established prefectures and counties (*chün-hsien*) in order to receive [documents] from above and pass them on below. As for the heads of the prefectures and counties (*chün-hsien chih shou-ling*), as a rule, they were those who supported the dynasty (*kuei-i*) and those who had submitted (*hsiao-shun*). Further, they selected one Mongol. He exercised control (lit. he garrisoned and pressed [the seals of office]: *ch'ien-ya*) above them.[27] He was called the *ta-lu-ka-ch'i*. From the heads of the prefectures and counties on down, all obeyed commands from him. The people's prosperity or ill fortune and the good or evil of administration in truth depended upon the virtue or unworthiness of the *ta-lu-ka-ch'i*.

Chang-te was located as one of the ten routes (*lu*).[28] Moreover, it represented a strategic thoroughfare between north and south. The Court believed his eminence [that is, Meng-ku Pa-erh] to be competent. From his position as *Cha-sa-k'o-ch'i*[29] of the troops of Hu-t'u-k'o,[30] he was promoted to the office of Chang-te Route *Ta-lu-ka-ch'i*. This was in the 4th moon of the *ping-shen* year (7 May–4 June 1236). At that time, the fall of the Chin had occurred only three years earlier. The people had just begun to be free from [disorder caused by] the army. Those who were wounded had not yet recovered. Those who had fled had not yet returned. Those who had remained still were not living peacefully. The regulations (*chin-wang*) were loose. The soldiers, relying upon their achievements, could not but commit violent acts of appropriation and robbery. Even between the city walls and the market place, some of the outside doors were closed in the daytime and they did not dare open them [because the prowling soldiers made it unsafe]. As soon as his eminence arrived [lit. left his saddle: *chieh-an*] he attended to the administration. He knew that the people would think this to be a hardship. Immediately he sent down a directive (*ling*) saying:

> As for those who dare to oppress the people, they must by punished by the law. As for the craftsmen and merchants (*kung-ku*) who are in the shops, they should all attend to their businesses. The doors of the markets should be open. They should live peacefully, be content with their affairs, and be without alarm, suspicions, fears, or dread. As for those who are farmers, they should work in the fields and earnestly till the land in accordance with the season. Do not be careless and lazy. As for those who make you suffer, I can instruct and lead and punish them.

After the directive had been sent down, those who committed abuses yielded and none dared to break the law. The peasants in the fields and the travelers on the road were safe. For the first time [the people] enjoyed their lives.



In the 2nd moon in spring of the *wu-hsu* year [16 February–17 March 1238], the Huai-chou[31] Prefect Wang Jung revolted.[32] The Grand Preceptor and Prince of the Realm (T'ai-shih Kuo-wang) [Tas][33] commanded his eminence to punish and pacify them [the rebels]. Moreover, he gave instructions to exterminate [the entire prefecture]. His eminence replied, saying:

> When the imperial army (*wang-shih*) punishes the rebels, those who were coerced into following [the rebels] should be pardoned. So much the more so for the innocent.

The Prince of the Realm [Tas] considered his words commendable and followed them. Wang Jung was executed but the whole region was spared. Local people, carrying wine and incense and seeing him off, cried out and wept and could not endure his leaving. . . .

In the *chi-hai* year [1239], in Hsiang and Wei[34] there were locusts. The countryside was without green grass. The people lacked food. His eminence reported this to the great minister Hu-t'u-k'o ([Šigi] Quduqu) who was in charge. He distributed 5,000 *tan* of army rations of grain to help the starving. Because of that, the people were without vagrancy and starvation.

From the *keng-tzu* year to the *kuei-mao* year [1240–1243], for four years, there was a large-scale invasion southward. In the places through which troops passed, the local officials complained. His eminence, because he was loyal, diligently prepared and equipped [the troops] unstintingly, and the people's welfare was not disturbed.

In the *ting-wei* year [1247], in the Huai [River valley] and the Han [River valley], as soon as all the various cities were pacified, they then revolted. The people had nothing upon which to rely. They fled to the north and to the south. The border generals and local officials fought and plundered, and regarded that as an achievement. His eminence, by his kindness and trust, was able to assemble more than 10,000 households. He turned them all into common people [again]. Even young lads were not ignored.

In successive years there was no harvest. People were coerced into paying taxes. Three or four out of every ten houses were deserted. His eminence ordered officials to go out in all directions proclaiming (*kao-yü*) [saying]:

> Those who return to their livelihoods will be exempt from taxes for three years.

That year he assembled together 17,000 households.

In the 1st moon of spring of the *wu-shen* year [28 January–25 February 1248], the Hui-chou[35] bandit Chu Ko[36] organized a gang and rebelled. The military officials, taking advantage of this pretext, planned to commit their own abuses. His eminence said:

> The dynasty has honored me. It has enriched me. It has delegated the

handle of military power (*ping-ping*) to me. It has entrusted the well-being of the district to me. Has it asked me to pacify the bandits or to become a bandit myself? There is no need for you to exaggerate recklessly the danger. If the bandits are not caught and the disorder is not quelled, I will bear the responsibility for it.

Immediately, he led troops out, and they caught 38 bandits at Hei-lu-shan.[37] The local people lived peacefully as before, and they were not disturbed at all.

In the 3rd moon of spring of the *chi-yu* year [15 April–13 May 1249], the bandit Hsieh Chih-ch'üan[38] created disorder. He [Meng-ku Pa-erh] followed the earlier policy and pacified him [that is, he handled the pacification effort himself].

The General, Ch'a-han (Čaγan),[39] knew that his eminence was pure of heart and benevolent. Whenever it happened that the routes handed over criminals sentenced to death (*ssu-ch'iu*), then he assigned his eminence the task of making an official investigation. He conducted a thorough examination, and in accordance with the law grievances were redressed and punishments mitigated. The times that this occurred could not be counted [that is, so often did it happen]. . . .

In spring of the 3rd year of the Chung-t'ung reign period [1262], Li T'an revolted.[42] He sent his rebel gang out to impersonate mounted couriers. [They were sent to] faraway places to cause disturbances. From east to west they passed through many routes. None of the government officials could distinguish them [from the real couriers]. His eminence discovered them and investigated, and they admitted [the crime]. The traitorous conspiracy was thus exposed and quelled.

In the 4th year [of the Chung-t'ung reign period: 1263], there was a drought. He prayed for rain and it rained. In that year he was appointed Luminous and August General (*Ming-wei chiang-chün*) and *Ta-lu-ka-ch'i* of Chung-shan prefecture (*fu*).[41]

In the 7th year of the Chih-yuan reign period [1270], he was transferred to the office of *Ta-lu-ka-ch'i* of Ho-chung prefecture.[42]

In spring of the 11th year [of the Chih-yuan reign period: 1274] as an official with seniority and long service, for incorruptibility, and for the fact that he was respected in the places where he had served, he was allowed to wear the golden tiger tablet. Skipping over [the normal steps of appointment], he took office as Huai-yuan General, *Ta-lu-ka-ch'i* of Huai-meng route, and concurrently *chu-chün e-lo* . . .

Thus, when Meng-ku Pa-erh died at the age of 70, he had served as a *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* in four different localities. While in office, he had helped Tas deal with a rebelling prefect, he had quelled local disturbances, and



he had attempted to restore a measure of peace and prosperity to the lives of the inhabitants of North China after the final demise of the Chin dynasty. His authority extended to chastising local military officials for their involvement in the schemes of a local gang (1248), and to the judicial realm, as evidenced by the final investigations of criminals sentenced to death which he was assigned to undertake.

Meng-ku Pa-erh's epitaph also attests to the non-standardized character of office in the early Yuan: Meng-ku Pa-erh's tenure in office as *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* ranged from 27 years as *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* of Chang-te route to only 4 years as *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* of Ho-chung prefecture.

Of Meng-ku Pa-erh's seven sons, one was appointed to the office o Sung-chou *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*.[43] One of Meng-ku Pa-erh's six daughters married a son of the influential Shih T'ien-tse (1202–1275), a member of Chinese clan that was recruited by the Mongols very early in thei campaigns.[44] Shih T'ien-tse was active in suppressing rebellions and re capturing cities in Chen-ting route and other areas of North China i which Meng-ku Pa-erh served in office. It is thus not surprising to see ev idence of social bonds among the emerging Mongolian-Chinese cor quest elite.[45]

At the same time that Meng-ku Pa-erh was serving as *Ta-lu-hua-ch'i* of Chang-te route and was involved in the suppression of Wang Jung's re volt in Huai-chou (also called Huai-meng, and later Huai-ch'ing), a other *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*, Ch'un-chih-hai (*Čulǰiγai), was enjoying somewhat similar career pattern.[46] Ch'un-chih-hai, of the Salǰūtai clan, in 1233 was appointed Military-Civil *Ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* of I-tu Regional Se retariat (I-tu *Hsing-sheng chün-min Ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*). In 1237 he was tran ferred to the office of Head *Ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* of Ching-chao Region Secretariat (Ching-chao *Hsing-sheng Tu-Ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*).[48] On his w from I-tu to Ching-chao, he came to Huai-meng, about halfway to h destination. Because there was a great epidemic affecting the loc troops, Ch'un-chih-hai remained to help garrison Huai-meng. Althou he left for a time to substitute for Ch'a-han (Čaγan) in Ho-nan, when returned to Huai-meng, he was appointed *Ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* of Huai-me route.

At this point, the careers of Ch'un-chih-hai and Meng-ku Pa-e must certainly have become entwined, for the *Yuan shih* biography

Ch'un-chih-hai reports that the revolt of Wang Jung (here dated 1239) began with the ambush, wounding, and taking captive of Ch'un-chih-hai. Ch'un-chih-hai was rescued by his wife, Hsi-li-po-lun (Sirbeilün),[49] who led her husband's troops in an attack on Wang Jung's house. Later, after the capture of Wang Jung, the Yuan Court sent an envoy to Huai-meng, and presented Wang Jung's wife, children, and property to Ch'un-chih-hai's family. The envoy also expelled more than 10,000 people from the city of Huai, intending to massacre them. In the same way that Meng-ku Pa-erh is said to have talked Tas out of slaughtering the inhabitants of this region, Ch'un-chih-hai is credited with persuading the Court not to massacre the people in the city; he said, "The perpetrator of evil was only a single individual, [Wang] Jung. What crime have these people committed? If you exterminate them all, what purpose will there be in defending an empty city? If the Court blames the envoy for not killing them, I request that I myself take his place."[50] The Court agreed, and the people were spared. Moreover, Ch'un-chih-hai gave Wang Jung's wife and children a "certificate" (*ch'üan*) which freed them as slaves and made them commoners.

One of Ch'un-chih-hai's six sons, Ang-a-la (Ang'ara), inherited the office of *Ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* of Huai-meng route after his father's death.[51] While the issue of transmission of the office of *daruγači* will be examined more thoroughly in Chapter 3, there is no question that sons of *daruγači* tended to achieve local government positions, including the office of *daruγači* itself. As we have noted, one of Meng-ku Pa-erh's seven sons became a *daruγači*. This was true not only in early Yuan times, but also in mid- and later Yuan times. For instance, the epitaph of an early-fourteenth-century Tangut *daruγači*, one Huang-t'ou, records that, of his nine sons, two held the office of *daruγači;* one held the office of route general administrator (*tsung-kuan*); and one held the office of associate administrator (*t'ung-chih*).[52] The 1333 list of successful *chin-shih* degree candidates (the *Yuan-t'ung yuan-nien chin-shih lu*) lists another Tangut, Mai-chu, who went on to hold the office of Sung-chiang *daruγači* and whose great-grandfather and father had also served as *daruγači* (in unspecified locations).[53]

From a brief summation of Ch'un-chih-hai's biography, a benevolent, and perhaps stereotypic, image of the early Yuan *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* emerges.



Retaining their prerogatives to act militarily, the early Yuan *daruγači* were nevertheless intent on restoring and maintaining order among the civilian population. Putting local society back into order involved more than simply military pacification; *daruγači* were compelled to assume the job of civilian administrators, and some *daruγači* worked conscientiously in the interests of the civilian population under their jurisdiction, as the biographies of both Meng-ku Pa-erh and Ch'un-chih-hai indicate.

Other aspects of the early Yuan office of *daruγači* are reflected in the biography of a Western Liao (1124–1211) official by the name of I-ssu-mai-li (Isma'il).[54] His biography is important for two reasons: it suggests circumstantially that Central Asian notions of administration may have influenced the developing Yuan bureaucracy: I-ssu-mai-li served as a *basqaq* in Central Asia before serving as a *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* in China; and the biography demonstrates the fact that inheritance of the office of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* in the decades before Qubilai's reign had become a well-entrenched practice. The fact that I-ssu-mai-li served first as a *basqaq* in the Western Liao and later as a *daruγači* in China does not, however, prove the hypothesis of a few scholars that the office of *daruγači* originated in Turkestan.[55]

The *Yuan shih* account describes I-ssu-mai-li's background before he surrendered to the Mongols in 1217:[56]

> I-ssu-mai-li was from Ku-tse Wo-erh-to (Hu-ssu Ordo [the Qarā-Khitāy capital]),[57] in the Western Regions (Hsi-yü). In the beginning, he was the personal retainer of the Western Liao *Gurkhan* (*K'uo-erh-han*, [that is, the Qarā-Khitāy Emperor, Chih-lu-ku, ruled 1178–1211].)[58] Later he was the senior official (*chang-kuan*), the *basqaq* (*Pa-ssu-ha*,[59] of K'o-san (Kāsān),[60] which was under the jurisdiction of Ku-tse Wo-erh-to (Hu-ssu Ordo). When Ta'i-tsu (Činggis) was on his western campaign, I-ssu-mai-li led the heads of K'o-san and other cities to surrender, and this was reported to the Throne by the general Jebe (Che-po).[61] The Emperor commanded I-ssu-mai-li to serve Jebe as his vanguard leader. He (Jebe) attacked the Naiman (Nai-man), subdued them, and beheaded their leader Ch'ü-ch'u-lü (Küčülüg).[62] Jebe ordered I-ssu-mai-li to take Ch'ü-ch'uplü's head and display it in his (Ch'ü-ch'u-lü's) lands. As for the cities of Kāshgar (K'o-shih-ha-erh), Yarkand (Ya-erh-ch'ien), and Khotan (Wo-tuan), following the trend, all surrendered.

After subduing other Central Asian peoples such as the Qangli and Qipčaγ, I-ssu-mai-li took part in the Emperor T'ai-tsung's campaign against the city of Pien (K'ai-feng); he was ordered to take charge of *a'uruγ* (*ao-lu*) or military-household affairs in Huai-meng. In 1232, this former *basqaq* was appointed *Ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* of Huai-meng. In 1239, when the Emperor T'ai-tsung (Ögödei) ordered I-ssu-mai-li to go on campaign in the Western Regions, he commanded I-ssu-mai-li's elder son, Nieh-chih-pi, to inherit (*hsi*) the office of Huai-meng *Ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*. I-ssu-mai-li's second son, Mi-li-chi, inherited the office of *pi-she-ch'ih* (*bičečči*), that is, clerk or secretary,[63] to which I-ssu-mai-li had been appointed prior to his appointment as *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*. Although the Emperor already had appointed I-ssu-mai-li to be a *Cha-lu-huo-ch'ih* (*Jarγoči*, or judge) in the Western Regions, the General Ch'a-han[64] and the *Hsing-sheng* T'ieh-mu-tieh-erh (Temüder)[65] jointly memorialized, requesting that he remain in office as *Ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* of Huai-meng. The Emperor acquiesced. In 1240, while *Ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* of Huai-meng, I-ssu-mai-li was promoted to serve as the Head *Ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* (*Tu-Ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*) of 28 localities within Huai-meng and Ho-nan, and an imperial decree ordered him to confiscate the family property of any officials in the localities under his jurisdiction who did not obey commands. After I-ssu-mai-li died in 1255, his second son, Mi-li-chi, became Huai-meng *Ta-luhua-ch'ih*.[66]

During Qubilai's reign, it was not uncommon for the office of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* to be transmitted from father to son or to grandson. In 1280, for instance, the Qipčaγ official, Chan-ch'e Pa-tu-erh (*Jemče[g] Bādur), during an imperial audience, asked to be excused from his duties as Ch'ui-chou route *Ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* because of age. Qubilai ordered Chan-ch'e Pa-tu-erh's grandson, Ma-wu (Ma'u), to take over the office.[67] This precedent had been established as early as Ögödei's reign, as the biography of I-ssu-mai-li demonstrates.

The evolution of the office of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* from its position in the military conquest elite into the top-ranking position in the newly emerging civilian bureaucracy is further documented by the life of a Chinese *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*, Chang Chao (1225–1288).[68] His career demonstrates the fact that, by the early years of Qubilai's reign, it was possible to attain the office of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* mainly through advancement up the ranks of the civilian bureaucracy, instead of through military channels.



Chang Chao was from Chi-nan in North China.[69] For two generations, his family had grown wealthy in commerce. In 1232, when Mongolian troops in the region disrupted people's livelihoods, Chang Chao's family opened up their own granary to help the starving. Chang Chao himself entered government service as a clerk in Chi-nan: "When he was young, he studied Confucian learning, but, because the route to becoming a *chin-shih* through examinations and selection had been abolished, he switched to studying clerks' affairs (*li-shih*)."[70] After serving as a clerk for over ten years in Chi-nan and Shou-yang,[71] in 1260 he was appointed as a clerk in the Central Secretariat (Chung-shu-sheng). He was then promoted to the position of document supervisor (*t'i-k'ung-an-tu*).[72] Chang Chao was slowly and laboriously working his way up through the emerging Yuan bureaucracy.

In 1263, he held the office of Vice-Director of the Grand Military Commission of the Eastern Routes of Shan-tung (Shan-tung *tung-Lu Ta-tu-tu-fu Yuan-wai-lang*), and was transferred in the same year to the Surveillance Bureau of the Eastern routes of Shan-tung (Shan-tung *tung-Lu Lien-fang-fu*)[73] and concurrently held the office of Consultant to the Bureaus of Salt Distribution (Chuan-yun-shih-ssu *ts'an-i*). In 1265, he was appointed General Administrator of the Sundry Military *A'uruγ* of Chi-nan route (Chi-nan *Lu Chu-chün ao-lu Tsung-kuan*). In 1267, he was promoted to Vice-Director of the Bureaus of the Left and Right of the Regional Secretariats of the five routes of Shan-hsi, Hsi-Shu, and Ssu-ch'uan (Shan-hsi *wu-Lu* Hsi-Shu Ssu-ch'uan *Hsing-chung-shu-sheng Tso-yu-ssu Yuan-wai-lang*). Four years later, he was appointed administrative assistant (*chih-shih*) in Yen-chou.[74]

In 1274–1275, it appears that Chang Chao for the first time became directly involved in Mongolian military manoeuvres. While serving as Director of the Bureaus of the Left and Right of the Regional Secretariats of Huai-hsi and other routes (Huai-hsi *teng-Lu Hsing-chung-shu-sheng Tso-yu-ssu lang-chung*), he assisted A-t'a-hai (Ataqai, 1234–1289),[75] in his attack on Kua-chou and Chen-chiang by handling supplies of grain and weapons for the troops.[76] In 1276, when the Sung-dynasty General Li T'ing-chih (1217?–1276) abandoned the city of Yang-chou, fleeing to T'ai-chou, Chang Chao led troops and helped bring about the surrender of Yang-chou.[77] It was after this episode that Chang Chao

was appointed Yang-chou route *Tsung-kuan-fu Ta-lu-hua-ch'ih.*

Thus, in addition to Chang Chao's steady advancement in the civilian bureaucracy, his participation in the capture of Yang-chou certainly led to his appointment as *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* of that route. From 24 November 1278 to 13 June 1279, he held the office of Chen-chiang route *tsung-kuan-fu Ta-lu-hua-ch'ih,* but resigned from office because of illness. During the five years when he was out of office, Chang Chao bought 80,000 *chüan* of books, and presented 10,000 to the Chi-nan Prefectural School (Chi-nan Fu-hsueh) to assist education. He returned to office either in 1284 or 1285 as the General Administrator (*Tsung-kuan*) of Tung-ch'ang route,[78] and in 1288 died at age 63.

Chang Chao's life is illuminating because it demonstrates the career mobility which was possible in times of conquest and consolidation in Chinese history. From a merchant background and self-educated, Chang Chao was frustrated by the absence of a functioning system of formal examinations leading to appointment to office. He thus studied to become a clerk, worked for many years as a clerk, and was appointed to several different offices before finally attaining the office of *Ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* of Yang-chou route. It is obvious, however, that his appointment as *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* represented a reward for his help in causing the city to surrender to the Mongols.

Qubilai's reign is often portrayed by historians as the apogee in the development and functioning of Yuan administration, and Qubilai himself is credited by historians with centralizing and integrating the growing and complex Yuan bureaucracy.[79] In local civilian administration, however, Qubilai's far-reaching goals were not always attained. The degree to which Qubilai was unsuccessful is reflected in his efforts at disentangling the post-conquest military and civilian bureaucracies and also in the evolution of the office of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* in the local civilian administration.

One aspect of Qubilai's ambitious attempt to systematize and rationalize Yuan government was his policy of keeping the civilian and military bureaucracies separate. He was not the first Mongolian ruler to attempt to define the territorial and administrative jurisdictions of civilian and military officials in China. Ögödei (the Emperor T'ai-tsung) had earlier followed Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's proposals aimed at separating



military and civilian spheres of authority.[80] Yet, jurisdictional disputes between civilian and military officials continued on into Qubilai's reign. As an example, the following memorial, jointly submitted by Mi-li-chi, the *Ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* of Huai-meng route, and T'an Ch'eng, the General Administrator of the same route, lodges a complaint against military officials' refusal to recognize the authority of civilian officials:[81]

> On the 28th day, *ting-ch'ou* [of the 6th moon of the 2nd year of the Chung-t'ung reign period: 26 July 1261], the Central Secretariat (Tu-t'ang)[82] memorialized and respectfully received an imperial decree (*sheng-chih*) [which said]:
>
> To the Pacification Bureau (*Hsuan-fu-ssu*) of Chen-ting route: According to the memorial of Mi-li-chi, the *Ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* of Huai-meng, and T'an Ch'eng, the General Administrator, they reported [saying that]:
>
> As for the territory under our jurisdiction, much of it has Mongolian military officials (*t'ou-mu*) who have been stationed on it. If it happens that there is official business concerning a legal case, they are unwilling to come forward to give testimony. Often they do not submit to being summoned and questioned (*kou-chui*),[83] and this results in the delay and obstruction of official business.
>
> Approved the memorial (*chun-tsou*).
>
> Let the pacification bureaus in all the sundry routes in all places be instructed:[84] from this time onward, the civilian population overseers (*kuan-min-kuan*)[85] of the various subprefectures (*chou*) and cities, whenever there is official business concerning Mongolian military personnel (*chün-jen*), when they conduct an investigation, should together with one military overseer (*kuan-chün-kuan*) conduct a hearing and decide the case (*t'ing-tuan*). Let this be put into effect (*shih-hsing*). Let there be no partiality.
>
> Approve this.[86]

This particular problem was solved by the creation of a joint civil-military court, although the one military official at such a court was undoubtedly outnumbered by civilian officials such as the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih, tsung-kuan, t'ung-chih, chih-chung,* and *t'ui-kuan.*

The 1262 rebellion of Li T'an in I-tu in Shantung was the main catalyst behind Qubilai's announcement of a policy of separating the military from the civilian administration.[87] As the *Yuan shih* biography of Shih T'ien-tse, the powerful regional "warlord," states: "There were some who said that the rebellion of Li T'an originated from [the fact that] the power of the feudatory vassals (*chu-hou*) was too great."[88] Shih T'ien-tse decided to use his own family as a starting point, and memor-

ialized, saying: "Military and civilian power should not be joined in one family. If [the Emperor] is going to carry this out, I request that your subject's own family begin." On that same day, seventeen members of the Shih family gave up their military *p'ai-tzu* and ranks, retaining only their civilian ranks.

Despite this grand gesture on the part of the Shih family, the old problem of the military sphere's encroaching upon the civilian sphere persisted well into Qubilai's reign. For instance, in response to a Central Secretariat memorial of 12 April 1287, there was an undated imperial decree which stated:[89]

> Those who serve as military officials are prohibited from overseeing the people (*kuan-min*); those who serve as civil officials (*min-kuan*) are prohibited from overseeing the military (*kuan-chūn*).

Despite persistent pressure on Qubilai by the Privy Council (the Shu-mi-yuan) in the late 1280s to be allowed to appoint its own military officials to vacant civilian offices, Qubilai prohibited such an arrangement. The existence of numerous documents pertaining to the appointment of military men to civilian offices and vice versa, dating from the last years of Qubilai's reign, provides evidence that no truly effective means was ever found to enforce a military-civilian separation. The following set of documents found in the *Yuan tien-chang* shows that Qubilai himself felt somewhat ambivalent about whether or not military officials should be allowed to fill vacant offices in the civilian bureaucracy:[90]

> In the 25th year of the Chih-yuan reign period [3 February 1288–22 January 1289], the Regional Secretariat of Hu-kuang and other places sent a communication (*cha-fu*)[91] and received a communiqué (*tzu*) from the Shang-shu-sheng:[92]
>
> On the 21st day of the 1st moon of the 25th year of the Chih-yuan reign period [23 February 1288], one article of the text which Huo-erh-ch'ih (Qorči)[93] and others memorialized [is as follows]:
>
> Officials of the Privy Council (Shu-mi-yuan) presented a document (*wen-shu*) in which Ha-la-tai (Qaradai, ?–1307)[94] memorialized [saying]:
>
> Military officials have achieved merit and fought bravely, and those who have received imperial directives (*hsuan-ch'ih*), [that is, giving them official assignments] are numerous. If those who are in charge of military affairs are prohibited from being appointed as civilian population overseers (*kuan-min-kuan*), how would it be (*tsen-sheng;* Mongolian: *yambar*)?
>
> There was an imperial decree (*sheng-chih*) saying:
>
> If there are vacancies [in civilian offices] let them [military officials] be appointed.
>
> We [the Shang-shu-sheng] have deliberated and come to a conclusion. There was an imperial decree saying:[95]
>
> Let those officials who oversee the military be prohibited from overseeing the people. Let civilian population overseers (*kuan-min-kuan*) be prohibited from overseeing the military.
>
> At present there are many vacancies among the civilian population overseers. There is no one [to fill them].
>
> Having memorialized, there was an imperial decree saying:
>
> If there are no regulations (*t'i-li*) to the contrary, let them [military officials] be prohibited from being appointed [as civilian officials].
>
> "Respect this."



Another problem in the realm of civil-military control, one which involved the office of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*, was administrative jurisdiction over the *a'urug* or military households. The following set of documents from the *Yuan tien-chang* illustrates the overlapping jurisdictions of civil and military officials.[96] Especially interesting is the suggestion by the Privy Council that local civilian officials who have participated in the administration of the *a'urug* should have their certificates of discharge (*chieh-yu*) sent to the Privy Council for consideration for promotion or demotion. Normally, civilian officials' certificates of discharge were sent to the Board of Personnel (Li-pu) or the Central Secretariat, that is, to civilian organs of the metropolitan government.[97] One cannot help but interpret the Privy Council's proposal as a power play, as an attempt by the military to gain control over one of the most important handles of power—the power of appointment.

> On the [ ] day of the 12th moon of the 9th year of the Chih-yuan reign period [22 December 1272–21 January 1273], there was respectfully received an imperial decree (*sheng-chih*) [which said]:
>
> According to the memorial of the Privy Council (Shu-mi-yuan), [it was stated]:
>
> When the offices of the civilian population overseers (*kuan-min-*

*kuan-ssu*) have exacted taxes and corvée labor (*k'o-ch'ü ch'ai-i*) from military households (*chün-hu*) the same way as civil households (*min-hu*), they have disturbed the peace. Now, at the time when we are mobilizing troops, we urgently fear that over a period of time this will reduce the strength of the military households. At present, we [the Privy Council] propose (*i*) that the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* and the senior civil officials (*kuan-min chang-kuan*) of the various routes, prefectures, subprefectures, and *ssu-hsien* [that is, counties and *lu-shih-ssu*],[98] while not hindering their original duties, should concurrently [take charge of] (*chien*) the *ao-lu* (a'uruγ) of the sundry troops. Besides this, the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* and general administrators (*tsung-kuan*) of the various routes [should be granted] an additional imperial appointment (*hsuan-ming*) and seal (*yin-hsin*). As for the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* and senior officials (*chang-kuan*) of the prefectures, subprefectures, and *ssu-hsien*, they should also be given seals [to administer the *a'uruγ*]. They should all use only document-routers (*shou-ling-kuan*) and petty clerks (*jen-li*) who have already been appointed to administer in addition [to their original duties] the *ao-lu* bureaus (*ao-lu ya-men*), [but] it is not necessary to increase their salaries. However, as for all affairs, great or small, that pertain to the military, respectfully in accordance with the imperial decree(s) [unspecified] also report them to the Privy Council ([Shu-mi-] yuan). If [a local official] does not receive from the Privy Council a document of instruction (*ming-wen*) which authorizes him, he should not on his own authority (*shan*) exact taxes and corvée labor (*k'o cha'ai-i*) from among the *ao-lu* [households]. When [local officials] have already completed their terms of office, [their superiors should] prepare a certificate of discharge (*chieh-yu*), [and then] send it to the Privy Council ([Shu-mi-] yuan). If while in office [a local official] has kept order and governed the military households (*chün-hu*) so as not to reduce their strength, if there is peace, examine the merits of the situation, and promote him. If [a local official] has on his own authority exacted taxes and corvée labor and [thereby] disturbed the military households, [causing them] to flee and become unsettled, also examine the gravity of the situation, and demote him.

Approved the memorial (*chun-tsou*).

That Qubilai's attempt to keep the civilian and military bureaucracies separate was never realized should not come as a surprise. The development of the Yuan civilian bureaucracy and the emerging role of the *daruγači* in that bureaucracy during Qubilai's reign reflect a general trend towards growing complexity unaccompanied by centralization in



administration. The old adage "too many cooks spoil the broth" is not out of place here.

If one were to examine briefly the characteristics of modern bureaucratic authority as outlined by Weber, one would list the principle of fixed jurisdictions, governed by regulations or laws; strictly defined official duties; precisely defined and distributed authority to issue commands; and prescribed qualifications for officeholding.[99] Weber stressed the modernity of such characteristics. Obviously it is unfair to fault the Yuan government for failing to measure up to a description of modern bureaucracies, but it is necessary to point out the Yuan administration's inefficiencies and lapses precisely because so much secondary literature has attributed a centralized, autocratic form of government to the Yuan and to the Mongolian "empire." Centralization and systematization can be shown to be somewhat irrelevant notions in a discussion of the workings of Yuan government. As Weber wrote: "Permanent and public office authority, with fixed jurisdiction, is not the historical rule but rather the exception. This is so even in large political structures such as those of the ancient Orient, the Germanic and Mongolian empires of conquest, or of many feudal structures of state. In all these cases, the ruler executes the most important measures through personal trustees, table-companions, or court-servants. Their commissions and authority are not precisely delimited and are temporarily called into being for each case."[100]

In reality, the Yuan dynasty's local administration of China fell somewhere between Weber's description of modern bureaucracies and his description of the Mongolian "empire." As of 1261,[101] members of the Yuan local administration, including the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* at each level, were salaried. Local officials' duties were defined and redefined by numerous imperial decrees from Qubilai's reign through the end of the Yuan. The fragmented and disorganized nature of the administration, as it evolved, however, may be ascribed to a variety of factors: failure to keep the civilian and military personnel from interfering in each other's realms (discussed above); the preference of the Yuan rulers for hereditary transfer of office instead of appointment based on examinations (discussed in Chapter 3); the existence of small administrations outside

the regular government, that is, the *t'ou-hsia* and other forms of semi-independent land and population control (discussed in Chapter 4); and, perhaps most important, the influence of the pre-conquest social structure of the Mongols on their post-conquest political structure, that is, the influence of tribal egalitarianism on modes of decision-making (discussed below).

The fragmented and disorganized nature of Yuan regional-local civilian administration will become readily apparent in the following description of the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih's* duties in that administration. Giving evidence of fragmentation and disorganization, however, is far easier than explaining why the civilian bureaucracy functioned in this mode. The *Yuan tien-chang* and *T'ung-chih t'iao-ko*, as usual, provide plentiful documentary evidence on the day-to-day running of the local administration; they do not, however, provide a ready-made theory to explain why the Mongols settled upon a type of administration that the modern historian finds woefully counterproductive to the goals of collecting revenue and keeping the peace, goals common to all dynasties that ruled China.

The non-centralized nature of Yuan regional-local government derived from two features of Mongolian socio-political practice. First, the thirteenth-century Mongols lacked a tradition of despotic control. Concentration of power in one person was not part of traditional Mongolian political culture. The pre-conquest institution of the Quriltai, an institution which I have described and analyzed elsewhere in considerable depth,[102] was an assembly of princes, nobles, and military leaders which met for two purposes: to acclaim a new ruler, or to discuss and decide upon military campaigns. Such a consultative institution grew quite naturally out of the pastoral nomadic economy and society of the pre-conquest Mongols. The wide dispersal of people and herds on the Inner Asian steppe made such a consultative institution imperative if cooperation between different tribes and clans was to be attempted. The Mongolian *qan* or *qaγan* was *primus inter pares*, and decisions were rendered in a conciliar, not an autocratic, fashion. This conciliar mode of decision-making is clearly reflected in the workings of local government in Yuan China.

The second feature of Mongolian socio-political practice that contributed to the disjointedness and malfunctioning of Yuan regional-local administration was the Mongols' willingness to delegate authority in a widely dispersed manner. Overlapping jurisdictions of authority and the assignment of the same duties to more than one office seem counterproductive: They can be explained in part by assuming that this duplication of duties was a safety device of sorts. In other words, rather than give one official or one office a great amount of discretion and scope in decision-making, the Mongols, as foreign rulers of China, felt that distributing authority along many different lines was a safer mode of operation. This delegation of authority no doubt reflected an occupation mentality; the Mongols were, after all, a foreign conquest dynasty on Chinese territory. But such a broad delegation of authority also reflected their realization that, as nomadic conquerers, they were not equipped to take on at once all problems of ruling a sedentary empire. Reliance on a great number of "experts" in civilian administration, as in finance and other fields, made sense as policy.



It is pertinent to note here that, according to Ch'i-ch'ing Hsiao's research on the Yuan military establishment, the Mongols also deliberately established a decentralized structure of *military* command and authority in Yuan China. Garrison troops in each region were under the jurisdiction of the regional secretariat, which held both the military and the civil power at the provincial level. This contrasts with the Sung dynasty's system in which the central government directly controlled military power at the provincial level and, moreover, kept military power separate from the provincial civil administration. Contemporary complaints about the Yuan garrison system echo the complaints about the Yuan civilian local administration: The multiplicity of offices with overlapping jurisdictions seemed excessively burdensome. Ch'i-ch'ing Hsiao suggests that the Mongols were attempting to ensure the reliability of their garrison commanders by creating such a system of multiple control, burdensome as it was in operation. Thus, the same principles of reduplication of duties and decentralized control were at work in the Yuan military *and* the Yuan civil bureaucracies. It is also pertinent to note that, according to Beatrice Manz's recent article, "The Office of *Darugha* under Tamerlane," "division and confusion of responsibilities" were common in the late fourteenth-century government of Tamerlane in

Central Asia, a government modeled on Turco-Mongolian traditions.[103]

Armed with this knowledge of pre-conquest Mongolian socio-political structure and post-conquest mentality, we may proceed to an examination of the duties of the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* in the local civilian administration that evolved under Qubilai. One of the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*'s main duties was managing the seals of office. The following documents from the *Yuan tien-chang* attest to the complexity of an administration in which no one individual was authorized to act without the approval or presence of others:[104]

> On the 4th day of the 8th moon of the 5th year of the Chung-t'ung reign period[105] [26 August 1264], the Central Secretariat (Chung-shu-sheng) respectfully received an excerpt of one item of an imperial decree (*sheng-chih*) [which is as follows]:
>
> > As for all officials of the capital, prefectures (*fu*), subprefectures (*chou*), and counties (*hsien*), whenever they send documents (*wen-tzu*), they should together with the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* of those same places affix their official signatures and seals (*shu-ya*).[106] As before, command the senior population overseers (*kuan-min chang-kuan*) to take full responsibility (*chang-p'an*). As for the seals of office (*yin-hsin*) which have been used, the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* seals up and marks (*feng-chi*)[107] [the container in which they are kept], while the senior officials (*chang-kuan*), [that is, the *chih-fu, chih-chou, hsien-yin*] keep them [in their offices] (*shou-chang*). If it happens that a senior official (*chang-kuan*) goes away on official business (*kung-ch'u*) or is on leave because of illness (*chi-ping tsai-chia*), on that same day [when he leaves office], notification (*tieh*) and the seal of office should be given to the next-ranking regular official (*cheng-kuan*) to take over the responsibility. They [the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* and the senior officials] should not entrust [the seal] to their intimate friends (*ssu-chi chih jen*).
>
> "Respect this."
>
> In the 12th moon of the 1st year of the Chih-yuan reign period [20 December 1264–18 January 1265], the three Boards of the Left (Tso-san-pu)[108] respectfully received the communication (*cha-fu*) of the Central Secretariat (Chung-shu-sheng) [in which the following was written]:
>
> > Whereas in an excerpt of an item within [an imperial decree] which was formerly sent down [it was written]:
> >
> > > As for the seals of office (*yin-hsin*) of the various routes, subprefectures, and prefectures, the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* seals up and marks (*feng-chi*) [the container in which are kept the seals of office], while the senior officials (*chang-kuan*) [that is, the *tsung-kuan, chih-chou*, and *chih-fu*] keep them [in their offices] (*shou-chang*).
> >
> > "Respect this."
> >
> > In addition, at present according to the report (*ch'eng*) of the General Administrator (Tsung-kuan) of I-tu route, Yu Hsien,[109] [it was written]:
> >
> > > All those *tsung-kuan-fu* who assess impositions on monopolized goods (*k'o-ch'eng*)[110] and household taxes (*ch'ai-fa*)[111] do not cause delay and errors. As for the seals of office, if the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* seals up and marks [the container in which are kept the seals of office], then, when that official (the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*) has a reason for not being at home (*yu-shih-ku pu-tsai pen-chia*)[112] and there is an urgent matter, no one can use the seals of office and no one can send out documents (*wen-tzu*). This causes delay and errors.[113] Afterwards as for the impositions on monopolized goods (*k'ao-ch'eng*), the household taxes (*ch'ai-fa*), legal cases (*tz'u-sung*), and other matters, the regional secretariat (*sheng*) [that is, *hsing-sheng*] and the [*tsung-kuan-*]*fu* should deliberate (*hsiang-tu*) and issue instructions to the *tsung-kuan-fu* of the various places regarding the sealing up and the managing of the seals of office (*feng chang yin-hsin*).
> >
> > Respectfully in accordance with the imperial decree (*sheng-chih*) which has already been sent down put this into effect.[114] If a *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* has a reason for not being [in his office], and if it happens that urgent official business arises, command the population overseer (*kuan-min-kuan*) [that is, the general administrator, prefect, and so forth] to use the next-ranking official (*tz'u-kuan*) to seal up and mark [the container in which the seals of office are kept.][115] It is proper for the clerical employees (*ling-shih*)[116] and document-routers (*shou-king-kuan*) publicly and together (*kung-t'ung*) to break open (*k'ai-ch'e*) [the sealed container in which the seals are kept] and to exercise temporarily the right of senior officials to seal up and use [the seals] (*feng-ya*). As for things which have already been done [in the absence of the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*], when the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* returns, let him be informed. Do not cause errors.
> >
> > We (the *Tso-san-pu*) have received this [the communication of the Central Secretariat]. Order the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* to give his consent to the senior officials (*chang-kuan*) to seal up and mark [the container in which the seals are kept].[117]
>
> In the first year of the Ta-te reign period [24 January 1297–11 February 1298], in the communication (*cha-fu*) of the regional censorates (*hsing-yü-shih-t'ai*) [it was reported]:
>
> > According to the report (*ch'eng*) of the investigating censors (*chien-ch'a yü-shih*), [the following was written]:

Let it be known that in one item of the imperial decree (*sheng-chih*) which was respectfully received [the following was written]:

> Whenever a *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* of any area sends documents, as well as [in regard to] household taxes (*ch'ai-fa*), civil lawsuits (*min-sung*)—every public matter, great or small—he must together with the population overseers (*kuan-min-kuan*) [that is, the general administrator, prefect, and so forth] affix his official signature and seal (*shu-ya*) and manage [affairs] (*kuan-ling*). As for the seals of office which they have used, the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* should keep and guard them (*shou-kuan*), while the senior official (*chang-kuan*) should manage judicial matters and seal up and mark (*feng-chi*) [the container in which the seals were kept].[118] If it happens that a *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* goes away on official business (*kung-ch'u*) or is on leave because of illness (*chi-ping chia-ku*), notification (*tieh*) and the seals should be given to the senior official (*chang-kuan*); however, he should command the next-ranking official (*tz'u-kuan*) to seal up and mark [the container in which the seals were kept].[119] They (the senior official and the next-ranking official) should publicly and together (*kung-t'ung*) use [the seals]. The *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* should not entrust [the seals] to his intimate friends (*ssu-chi chih jen*).
>
> In addition to respectfully obeying [the decree], we have understood that in the routes, prefectures, subprefectures, and *ssu-hsien*, the provisions (*li*) contain no quota for appointing seal-keepers (*chih-yin*). Those officials in charge of the seals (*chang-yin kuan*), [that is, the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* and senior officials] in many cases have had to bring along their slaves and household people to use [the seals].[120] If it happens that, in regard to the household taxes (*ch'ai-fa*), managing civil lawsuits (*kou-she min-sung*)—all official matters, great or small—the person who has used the seal wrongfully delays and hinders (*tiao-teng*),[121] extracts money and goods, or divulges secret affairs, it would be inappropriate to investigate (*ts'an-hsiang*);[122] we propose (*i*) to order that everywhere this be prohibited and punished (*chin-chih*). From this time onward, in all cases when documents are sent, order only the salaried clerks (*ch'ing-feng ssu-li*) who are on duty that day to take turns using [the seals of office].[123] As before, they should keep registers (*chi*) and bring them up to date for preparation of future review (*chieh-fu i pei chao-shua*). In such a way, you will see that public and private matters then will be benefited, and also you will remove one root that harms the people.

Besides the *hsien-t'ai*. . . .[124] Respectfully in accordance with [the imperial decree], put this into effect.



In addition to requiring at least two officials to be present when the seals of office were in use, the local-government system also demanded daily participation by local officials at each level of government in a conference. These daily conferences were not casual luncheon gatherings at which officials shared gossip and anecdotes. Punishments for unauthorized absences from the daily conference were severe. Failure to attend was punishable by a monetary fine, a beating, or dismissal from office.

Paul Ch'en has described the Yuan conference as an improvement over its Sung-dynasty predecessor:[125] "Although the Sung dynasty had earlier developed a summary system of conference, the structure of conference was further modified and refined in the Yuan period to facilitate various functions of government." In fact, there is no evidence of the existence of any sort of formal conference in T'ang or Sung times. Sung officials may have talked shop informally while eating together, but the terminology of the Yuan conference (*yuan-tso*) as well as the prescribed attendance and functions are all absent from Sung sources.

Similarly, Paul Ch'en has intimated that the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* was not involved in the daily conference:[126] "Since the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* (*daruγači*) was merely a nominal head of the administration, major administrative and judicial matters were jointly decided by the *tsung-kuan* and the principal official in a conference." Actually, the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* was a regular participant in the daily conferences. Also, in contrast to Paul Ch'en's optimistic appraisal of the Yuan conference system, there is much evidence that local officials as a whole often failed to attend the conferences, thereby short-circuiting the system of collective responsibility in administration, the corner stone of Yuan local government. The Yuan conference may indeed by viewed in a purely conceptual framework as a refined, formal institution that represented an improvement in local government over that of previous dynasties, but in reality it frequently served to delay and hinder the daily workings of government. The absence of an official from a conference would delay matters in much the same way that the absence of a *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* could prevent anyone from using the seals of office or sending out documents.

As stated earlier, the Yuan emphasis on collective responsibility and the Yuan conference itself undoubtedly were rooted in the Mongols' preconquest socio-political order. The participatory format of the Quriltai

helped shape the post-conquest Mongols' notions of administration in China. The following documents on the local government conference are from the *Yuan tien-chang*:[127]

In the 14th year of the Chih-yuan reign period [5 February 1277–24 January 1278], the regional secretariats (*hsing-chung-shu-sheng*) reviewed articles of the imperial decrees (*sheng-chih*) which had on numerous occasions been sent down. They compared the temporarily enacted provisions in the codes (*hsien-hsing ko-li*).[128] They have been examined and put into effect:

> The officials of the capital, prefectures, subprefectures, and counties gather together every morning. They sit in conference (lit. sit in the round: *yuan-tso*),[129] [where] they deliberate upon legal cases, and delve into official business. Except for those to whom it is appropriate to grant leave, [the others] must not be remiss in their duties [that is, in attending conference]. As before, every day they must sign in in the official conference register (*kung-tso wen-pu*). Those who are absent on official business will be marked down above.

In the 2nd moon of the 23rd year of the Chih-yuan reign period [25 February–25 March 1286], the Central Secretariat (Tu-sheng) deliberated and concluded (*i-te*) [the following]:

> As for all salaried officials in the Central Secretariat, from this time onward if without reason they manage official affairs without meeting together in assembly, the first time [that this offense is committed], fine them (*fa*). The second time, sentence them (*chueh*) to seven strokes. The third time, seventeen strokes. After that, if they do not change the way in which they conduct official affairs (*kou-tang*),[130] let them be dismissed from office.

In the 1st moon of the 28th year of the Chih-yuan reign period [1 February–1 March 1291], the regional secretariats (*hsing-shang-shu-sheng*)[131] sent a communiqué (*tzu*) to the Shang-shu-sheng[132] [which stated]:

> Let this be examined. Previously whenever the sundry inner [court] and outer [non-court] (*nei-wai*) bureaus (*ya-men*) sent documents, many [officials] did not jointly sign them in conference (*yuan-ch'ien*). If there was a discrepancy (*ch'a-ch'ih*) in an affair, because of this all were wrong [that is, because of the failure to sign]. Since the time when the Shang-shu-sheng was established [1287], no matter whether its affairs have been great or small, from the Minister of the Right (*Yu-ch'eng-hsiang*) on down, all have been required to sign [documents] jointly in conference (*yuan-ya*). All of the other bureaus have followed the previous irregular practice. If this is not investigated everywhere, it would be extremely inappropriate. With the exception of the Central Secretariat (Tu-sheng), from this time onward, as for all official affairs, great and small, officials, except for those who have an excuse for their absence, from the top to the bottom must jointly write and sign [documents] in conference.



The daily conference is also mentioned in the *Yuan tien-chang* under the heading, "Excuses for Leaves of Absence" (*chia-ku*), and the subheading, "Regulations Concerning the Granting of Leaves of Absence for Days" (*fang-chia jih-t'ou t'i-li*).[133]

In the 8th moon of the 5th year of the Chung-t'ung reign period [23 August–21 September 1264], the Central Secretariat (Chung-shu-sheng) respectfully received an excerpt of one item within the rules (*t'iao-hua*) of an imperial decree (*sheng-chih*) [which stated]:

> The officials of the capital, prefectures, subprefectures, and counties every day sit in conference (*yuan-tso*), [where] they deliberate upon legal cases, and examine into official affairs. If it happens that there is an imperial birthday (*t'ien-shou*) or a winter solstice, in each instance grant a leave of absence for one day. As for the first day of the new year and *Han-shih* [the day before the *Ch'ing-ming* holiday], in each instance [grant] three days. On the 15th day of the 7th moon, on the 1st day of the 10th moon, at the vernal equinox, on the 5th day of the 5th moon, at the autumnal equinox, and on the 9th day of the 9th moon, for each such period,[134] grant a leave of absence for one day. Official business of great urgency does not fall under this restriction.
>
> Respect this.

The daily conference also crops up in Wang Yun's suggestion that all Yuan officials should wear white on designated occasions. White, of course, was the color respected by the Mongols as symbolic of good fortune, while it was a color of mourning for the Chinese. It is not clear whether Wang Yun's suggestion was ever enacted:[135]

> A Discussion of the Circumstances of Esteeming White as the Color of Garments
>
> As for our dynasty's color of garments, white is esteemed. Henceforth it would be appropriate, no matter what the ranks of the sundry offices, if there should happen to be an imperial birthday (*t'ien-shou-chieh*) as well as when in the office where they sit in conference (*yuan-tso t'ing-shih*) they officially assemble to receive respectfully imperial decrees (*hsuan-chao*), for the furs and garments that are worn to be of one color. Pure white should be the standard [color] for garments. This should be proclaimed among metropolitan and provincial officials as a permanent institution.

As for the question of precisely which officials took part in the conference at the local level of government, the *Chih-shun Chen-chiang chih* (the local gazetteer of Chen-chiang compiled in the Chih-shun period, 1330–1332) notes that at the lower-route (*hsia-lu*) level, four officials met in conference: the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*, the general administrator (*tsung-kuan*), the associate administrator (*t'ung-chih*), and the commissioner of records (*p'an-kuan*). At the upper-route level (*shang-lu*), there would also be an assistant administrator (*chih-chung*) at conference:[136]

> Although they were called "subordinate officials" (*ts'an-tso*), yet all [officials, including the subordinate ones] sat together in conference (*yuan-tso*). No matter whether an affair was great or small in the *fu* [that is, the *tsung-kuan-fu*], it had to go up from the commissioner of records (*p'an-kuan*) for each, one by one, to affix his official signature and seal (*shu-ya*) [that is, the *t'ung-chih, tsung-kuan,* and *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* each had to sign documents]. Only then could it be put into effect (*shih-hsing*). This [practice] was not like [that of] the prefects (*tz'u-shou*) of earlier times who held sole responsibility in office.

A local gazetteer of Ming times notes that government business during the Yuan in Hui-chou prefecture (in modern Anhwei province) was carried on through the conference:[139]

> From the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* on down [that is, including the *tsung-kuan, t'ung-chih, chih-chung,* and *p'an-kuan*], those who sat in the hall [of the *Tsung-kuan-fu*], whenever the locality had government business, were required to confer together as to whether or not [such business] could be expedited. In all cases, the senior officeholders were not to discharge their duties with undue haste or act on their own opinion. They had to gather together and reach a unanimous opinion (*chung-ssu*).

In fact, there is evidence that, during the Yuan, the authority of the prefect (*hsien-yin*) was so circumscribed that even the task of interrogating thieves had to be carried out through the convening of a conference, not by the prefect alone. A 1268 imperial decree (*sheng-chih*) preserved in both the *Yuan tien-chang* and in Wang Yun's *Ch'iu-chien hsien-sheng ta-ch'üan chi* suggests that all officials whose presence was mandated at conference partook in the interrogation:[138]

> When the patrol chief (*hsun*[*-chien*]), the police commissioner ([*hsien-*]*wei*), and [other] officials in charge of catching thieves apprehend thieves, they forthwith should hand them over to their own county, where [county officials] should hold a conference (*yuan-tso*) and conduct an inquiry into the facts, and [then] forward [the thieves] to their own subprefecture, where [subprefectural officials] should again carry out a judicial investigation. Let this be put into effect. Do not put clerks as well as archers (*kung-shou-jen*) [that is, police][139] and others in charge of interrogation.



The Wang Yun text goes on to include an impeachment report with examples of flagrant violations of this 1268 decree: an archer (policeman) who, without informing his superiors, interrogated and tortured a suspected thief, and a police commissioner whose torture of a suspected thief led to the latter's death. In a handbook for local officials entitled *Frank Advice for the Magistrate* (*Mu-min chung-kao*), the author, Chang Yang-hao (1270–1329), notes the benefits derived from settling legal cases in conference in terms of restraining an individual official's emotions:[140]

> When there are legal cases, [officials] should convene together at a set time and hold an inquiry. One should not take advantage of a time when one is angry to act without proper authorization in administering a beating while interrogating.

Section 10 of Paul Ch'en's reconstruction of the *Chih-yuan hsin-ko* also contains a passage suggesting the collegial nature of the judicial process:[141] "With regard to a serious offense in any locality, the governing authorities shall hold at the public office a joint conference to decide the case." Thus, the authority of both the *hsien-yin* and the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* was fragmented and weakened by the conference format. Neither one official nor the other was given uppermost authority; and, both had to consult with a group of lower-ranking officials before making legal and administrative decisions.

In spite of the mandated restrictions on the *daruγači*'s authority, a few Yuan literati commented on what they perceived as the primacy of the *daruγači*'s position. Undoubtedly in some locales the *daruγači* did indeed succeed in dominating their colleagues in local government. Thus, the Yuan philosopher Cheng Yü (1298–1358), a native of Hui-chou route in modern Anhwei, wrote in an epitaph of a Mongol who had served as *daruγači* in Hui-chou:[142]

> Each route established one *ta-lu-ka-ch'i* (*daruγači*)[143] whose position was above that of the prefect and his subordinates. He was the one to manage governmental affairs, to display leadership to his colleagues, and to oversee his jurisdiction. . . .

Similarly, the Yuan poet Yang Wei-chen (1296–1370) referred to the *daruγači* as "the most senior among officials and their subordinates."[144] In a late Yuan (1353) discussion of the *daruγači*'s relationship to other local officials, Yang provides insight into how government business was conducted:[145]

> As for the arrival [at the local government office] of all business, the clerks together with subordinate officials had to discuss among themselves whether or not [such business should be acted upon.] Only then did they inform the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* about it. Their signing of documents was also like this.

According to this very brief account, the initial review of incoming documents did not involve the *daruγači*. Subordinate officials and clerks informed and passed on their recommendations concerning those documents to the *daruγači*. Then, according to the previously cited regulations contained in the *Yuan tien-chang* and other sources, the *daruγači* acted in concert with other local officials in the daily conference. Yang Wei-chen's description does not contradict what we know of the important position that so-called "document-routers" (*shou-ling-kuan*) occupied in Yuan local government. The unprecedented involvement of clerks and other low-level functionaries such as document-routers in local government will be explored in greater depth in Chapter 5.

To recapitulate, the Yuan system of local government conferences attests to the continuation of an important characteristic of the Mongols' pre-conquest social order—the consultative tradition. The overall system of dual staffing of top local offices whereby the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* was paired with another official of equal rank may also be seen as a natural product of the consultative tradition. The *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* had to meet with his counterpart (as well as other lower officials) every day to discuss government business.

The presence of the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* at the daily conference also underscores another important point—that he was not merely a nominal head of the local administration. During Qubilai's reign, the office of



*ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* evolved away from its initial function as the *qan* or *qaγan*'s "personal trustee" (Weber) into a full-fledged member of the regular bureaucracy. It is true that many of the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*'s duties pertained to regulating the activities of the bureaucracy itself; by Qubilai's reign, the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* was not in regular direct contact with the people in his jurisdiction. Indeed, the office is referred to in passing in the *Nan-t'ai pei-yao* as "the route (*lu*), prefecture (*fu*), and subprefecture (*chou*) *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* who do not directly govern people (*pu-ch'in-min lu fu chou ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*).[146] While the office of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* was not directly concerned with the people, the office was certainly not superfluous. By becoming fully integrated into the regular bureaucracy, however, the office lost its original *raison d'etre* of acting as the ruler's direct representative in a locality. The Yuan *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* had no special lines of communication to the Throne (such as secret memorials) and no special privileges that were not enjoyed by his counterpart (that is, prefect, magistrate) at each respective level of local government.

Besides using and guarding the seals of office and participating in official conferences, the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*, along with the other top officials in local government, were as of 1286 required to supervise and encourage agricultural pursuits within their jurisdiction. An imperial decree of the 28th day of the 8th moon of the 23rd year of the Chih-yuan reign period (17 September 1286) states:[147] "The *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* and the general administrators (*tsung-kuan*) of the various routes should supervise (*t'i-tiao*) agricultural affairs (*nung-shih*)." In an imperial decree of the 2nd moon of the 24th year of the Chih-yuan reign period (26 February 1287), the following regulations are set down:[148] "The *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* and the general administrators (*tsung-kuan*) of the various routes should take on the additional charge of encouraging agricultural affairs (*t'ien-chien kuan-ch'üan nung-shih*)." Another imperial decree of the 6th intercalary moon of the 29th year of the Chih-yuan reign period (16 July–13 August 1292) is addressed to "the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* and the population overseers (*kuan-min-kuan*) of the sundry routes, prefectures, subprefectures, and *ssu-hsien*, the officials who inspect agriculture, sericulture, and irrigation" (*t'i-tien nung sang shui-li kuan-yuan jen-teng*).[149] The *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* and the general administrators *were* the officials who inspected agricultural matters. Indeed, the local gazetteer of Chen-chiang route re-

cords that in 1289 the formal title of the office of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* was changed from "Chen-chiang *Lu Tsung-kuan-fu Ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*" to "Chen-chiang *Lu Tsung-kuan-fu Ta-lu-hua-ch'ih chien-kuan-nei ch'üan-nung-shih*," that is, the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* of the *Tsung-kuan-fu* of Chen-chiang route with concurrent jurisdiction over the encouragement of agricultural affairs.[150] A mid-fourteenth-century epitaph of a Tangut *daruγači* records the same longer version of the office title, incorporating the agricultural duties.[151]

As the period of military conquest came to a close in the 1270s, the Yuan leadership turned its attention towards internal, economic problems. Promotion of agriculture was undoubtedly viewed as a stabilizing policy; thus, the *daruγači* in the civilian bureaucracy shed their military duties and took on new civilian tasks.

Although there is not much information on the exact nature of the agricultural duties the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* performed, there is incidental evidence that they were involved in bookkeeping, as the following documents illustrate:[152]

> In the 8th moon of the 29th year of the Chih-yuan reign period [12 September–11 October 1292], the Central Secretariat (Chung-shu-sheng) [received] a report (*ch'eng*) [from] the Grand Bureau of Agriculture (Ta-ssu-nung-ssu)[153] [which stated]:
>
> > In the certificate of discharge (*chieh-yu*)[154] of the Lin-chang county (*hsien*)[155] *Ta-lu-hua-ch'ih,* T'ai Pu-hua (Tai Buqa),[156] there is a discrepancy (*cheng-tz'u*) between his figures on agricultural affairs, schools, trees,[157] public grains (*i-liang*) and other matters and those of the account books (*chang-ts'e*) [of the county]. The Grand Bureau of Agriculture understands that [according to precedent], when the responsible officials (*p'an-shu kuan-li*)[158] make errors, they should undergo a review (*chao-lueh*), and if convicted (*chao-fu*), the said officials accordingly should be sentenced. Hereafter, as for the subprefecture (*chou*) and county (*hsien*) officials who directly govern the people (*ch'in-min*) [that is, the *chih-chou* and *hsien-yin*] and also the inspection officials (*t'i-tiao kuan*)[159] [that is, the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*], in accordance with the number of their discrepancies we have deliberated and decided that [the appropriate number of] months or days should be deducted from their salaries.
> >
> > The Board of Punishments (Hsing-pu) has deliberated and concluded that it is appropriate to act in accordance with that which the Grand Bureau of Agriculture has proposed.
> >
> > The Central Secretariat (Tu-sheng) approved [the report].



The Central Secretariat then proceeds to propose a schedule of salar fines based on an official's errors in reporting numbers of trees plante by households, amount of public grain, and number of schools. For e ample, 10 days' salary would be deducted from the salary of an offici responsible for a discrepancy of 1,000 to 10,000 trees; and a whol month's salary would be deducted for a discrepancy of over 10,000 tree

The *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* also were held culpable by the Court for causin or failing to prevent damage to crops and cattle and for disturbing pec ple. An imperial decree of 1264 and a memorial of the Grand Bureau o Agriculture in 1298 as well as a decree of the same year describe th problem:[160]

> In the 8th moon of the 5th year of the Chung-t'ung reign period [23 August–21 September 1264] in one item of the rules (*t'iao-hua*) of the respectfully received imperial decree (*sheng-chih*) [it is stated]:
>
> > Powerful, influential people and others from among the sundry troops (*chün-ma*) and military barracks (*ying-chai*) as well as from [the office of] *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* and [the offices of] population overseers (*kuan-min-kuan*) must not recklessly misuse cattle (*t'ou-pi*), damage mulberry and fruit trees, trample crops in the field, or disturb the people. If there are people who break the law, with the exception of troops and military barracks [personnel] whose superiors (*t'ou-mu*) should be summoned to a hearing (*yueh-hui*) and pass sentence, as for the others, the authorities (*kuan-ssu*) of their respective areas should then decide the sentence for their crimes. Also, they [the local authorities] should examine the damaged crops in the field and the mulberry and fruit trees, and have [the offenders] pay a percentage [of the damage]. In addition, troops should not station themselves in village houses, and take the food and drink they want [without paying].

> In the 3rd moon of the 2nd year of the Ta-te reign period [12 April–11 May 1298], in an excerpt of an imperial decree (*sheng-chih*) which was respectfully received [it was stated]:
>
> > Officials of the Grand Bureau of Agriculture (Ta-ssu-nung-ssu) have memorialized, saying,
> >
> > > Troops, the wealthy and powerful, people in trade, and others passing through have not prevented their cattle from eating crops in the field; they [the cattle and the people passing through] have trampled on [crops], and eaten from, snapped, and broken mulberry trees and fruit trees. The *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* and the officials in the cities in that way have not been concerned with prohibiting this.
> >
> > Henceforth, whenever it happens that cattle go into and eat crops in the

> field, and people fell mulberry trees and fruit trees, and snap and break them, let the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* and the general administrators (*tsung-kuan*) of the cities then make an inspection (*t'i-tiao*). In accordance with the regulations (*t'i-li*) in the previous imperial decree [of the 8th moon of the 5th year of the Chung-t'ung reign period], they [the offenders] should be made to pay [the damages done to crops and trees]. As for the offenders, let it be the same as in this imperial decree. The *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* and general administrators of the cities should apply themselves energetically to the task of prohibiting this; if they do [the offenders] a favor (*ch'ü mien-p'i*, lit. "examine their faces")[162] by not making them pay, let that be memorialized to us. Although we have stated this, they have damaged crops in the field. Do not act contrary to the regulations (*t'i-li*) in the performance of these tasks (*kou-tang*). Do not cause the people to suffer (*sheng-shou*).

In another decree of Qubilai, the language of which is highly colloquial and filled with sarcasm, the role of the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* in maintaining order is emphasized:[163]

> In all areas among the common people there are the surveillance bureaus (*an-ch'a-ssu*),[164] the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*, the population overseers (*kuan-min-kuan*), and the community leaders (*she-chang*).[165] [Yet] if rebellions occur in places such as Chang-te and I-tu, [then] what are those offices doing? Hereafter, if that kind [of rebellion] occurs, let the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*, the population overseers, and the community leaders of their respective areas be punished.

The office of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* was at times assigned the task of rectifying troublesome situations which arose in the countryside. One such difficult situation was created by the mismanagement of *pu-lan-hsi* (**bu-ralki*) or *po-lan-hsi* (**boralki*), a Mongolian word encompassing slaves, animals, and material goods which had become separated from their original owners.[166] *Pu-lan-hsi* was such a distinctly Mongolian institution without Chinese analogues that it in itself deserves emphasis as an example of the continuation of purely Mongolian social practices in Yuan times. Presumably, a system of returning stray animals to their owners developed among Mongolian nomads of earlier times, and the system, when introduced into China, was simply extended to other types of properties. As early as 1243 and 1245, the interregnum period between Ögödei's and Güyüg's reigns, we may find references to large numbers of *pu-lan-hsi* slaves—unclaimed by their owners—being requisitioned to repair a monastery in Hu county in Shan-hsi.[167] Such slaves were to be fed from government granaries while on the job. Some *pu-lan-hsi* cattle were also requisitioned for the monastery repair work.



Jurisdiction over the *pu-lan-hsi* became a problem and remained so throughout the Yuan period. As the following documents illustrate, the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* were called in as troubleshooters to correct the mismanagement of *pu-lan-hsi* by other officials, but in the end seem to have perpetrated the very abuses they themselves were assigned to erase:[168]

> In the 11th moon of the 16th year of the Chih-yuan reign period [6 December 1279–3 January 1280], [the Board of Punishments] respectfully received an excerpt of an imperial decree (*sheng-chih*) [which stated]:
>
> According to the memorial of the Central Secretariat (Chung-shu-sheng):
>
> Formerly officials who oversaw the *pu-lan-hsi* (*kuan pu-lan-hsi kuan*)—such as Pei Wen-hsiu, A-san (Asan), Tou *Hsien-sheng*, Hsiao Hsueh (Se'üse), K'uo-k'uo-tai (Köködei)[169] and others—because in the various routes many of the chiefs (*t'ou-mu*) of all categories of people (*chu-se*) and others who collected the *pu-lan-hsi* hid them—[the officials who oversaw the *pu-lan-hsi*] could not thoroughly verify [the number of *pu-lan-hsi*] and take them to the authorities. The previous officials who oversaw the *pu-lan-hsi* should be dismissed from their duties. Up until the present time, we have entrusted Hu-tu-ta-erh (Qududar),[170] the President of the Board of Personnel (Li-pu Shang-shu)[171] and the Visitors Bureau Commissioner (K'o-sheng-shih)[172] with taking command of the affairs of the *tsung-kuan-fu* concerning the *pu-lan-hsi* in all routes. Investigate and take care of this. Establish regulations and put [them] into practice.
>
> The *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* and the *tsung-kuan-fu* of the various routes as well as the subprefectural and county *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* and the regular officials who oversee the population (*kuan-min cheng-kuan*) should collect (*shou-shih*) the *pu-lan-hsi* people, cattle, and various things, while not interfering with their original duties (*pu-fang pen-chih*).[173] The various subprefectures and counties should report every month. The *tsung-kuan-fu* should report every quarter. The President of the Board of Personnel should take on the additional charge of controlling the *pu-lan-hsi* of the sundry routes. The *Tsung-kuan-fu* as before should periodically send out envoys to expedite and oversee (*ts'ui-tu*) and to audit (*tien-k'an*) [those who collect the *pu-lan-hsi*]. The various routes should entrust their regular officials (*cheng-kuan*) with taking the *pu-lan-hsi* which have been collected to the authorities. Every moon, on the 25th day of that moon, the routes should designate a place in which to assemble the *pu-lan-hsi*. Tell people to [come forward and]

identify [their *pu-lan-hsi* property] within three days. If there are people who can identify them truly without falsification, summon [the *pu-lan-hsi*] and give them to their owners. In addition, as for those [*pu-lan-hsi*] whom no one identifies, according to the above,[174] every quarter, envoys should take them in custody to Ta-tu and hand them over to the President of the Board of Personnel who has taken on the additional charge of controlling the *pu-lan-hsi* of the sundry routes. The *tsung-kuan-fu* should collect and manage them. In addition, as for the *pu-lan-hsi* people, cattle, and things which had earlier been collected by the [*tsung-kuan-*]*fu*, subprefectures, and counties, they also should be thoroughly counted.[175] Envoys should go to the same [*tsung-kuan-*]*fu* to hand them over. There should be no concealment [of *pu-lan-hsi*].

On the 26th day of the 12th moon of the 7th year of the Ta-te reign period [8 January–5 February 1304], the Chiang-hsi Regional Secretariat (*Hsing-sheng*) respectfully received the communiqué (*tzu*) of the Central Secretariat (Chung-shu-sheng) [which said]:

Mang-ku-tai (Mangγudai)[176] of the Liao-tung Pacification Office (*hsuan-wei-ssu*) said (*yen*):

Official emissaries (*ch'u-shih jen-yuan*) respectfully carrying an imperial decree (*sheng-chih*) to register (*shua-hui*) the *pu-lan-hsi* population have not directly gone through the authorities (*yu-ssu*). [Unauthorized people] on their own authority (*i-mien*) in an unrestrained way (*tzu-i*) go down to the villages (*hsia-ts'un*), and do not inquire whether [the *pu-lan-hsi* people] were originally slaves (*ch'ü-k'ou*)[177] of military, civilian, or *t'ou-hsia* households. They stir up agitation (*shan-huo*) by making a collection (*chü-shou*) of *po-lan-hsi*. In such a manner, they cause a disturbance (*sao-jao*) and the people become unsettled. These cases were presented to the Board of Punishments.

[The Board of Punishments states:]

Whereas earlier we respectfully received the communication (*kuan*) of the Court of Imperial Etiquette (Hsuan-hui-yuan)[178] [which said]:

In the first year of the Yuan-chen reign period [1295], this Court [the Court of Imperial Etiquette] memorialized and respectfully received an imperial decree (*sheng-chih*), and excerpt (*chieh-kai*) [of which stated]:[179]

From this time onward, select one person from among each of the various routes *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* and the *tsung-kuan-fu* as well as from the subprefectural and county *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* and senior officials who oversee the population (*kaun-min chang-kuan*) and entrust them with collecting the *po-lan-hsi*, while not interfering with their original duties (*pu-fang pen-chih*). The population and cattle (*t'ou-p'i*) that have been collected in the subprefectures and counties, according to the regulations (*t'i-li*), should be handed over to their owners (*chu-jen*) for them to identify. They [the selected *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* and others] should list the number of those who are not identified, go to the Central Secretariat and the Board [of Punishments] (Sheng-pu), and present them. If some people conceal [the *po-lan-hsi*] and do not go to the authorities to report them, and if neighbors report this, and it is true, prosecute and punish the transgressor (*fan-jen*), and reward the informant (*kao-jen*).

Respect this.

Now, having received the afore-mentioned item, the Board has deliberated and reached a conclusion, and proposes that this should be in accordance with the intent (*shih-i*) of the original, respectfully received imperial decree (*sheng-chih*) to send the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*, the senior officials (*chang-kuan*), of the various areas to collect [the *po-lan-hsi*].

This is in accordance with the request of the Central Secretariat (Tu-sheng). Put this into effect (*shih-hsing*) respectfully in accordance with [that request].[180]



The procedure for registering and handing over the *pu-lan-hsi* to the authorities was altered in 1312 because of the failure of the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* and other local officials to act according to the regulations. Interestingly, some authority over the *pu-lan-hsi* was given to a lower echelon of non-salaried village personnel, the village heads (*li-cheng*) and the control chiefs (*chu-shou*), and some authority was given to the surveillance bureaus under the Censorate:[181]

On the [ ] day of the 8th moon of the 1st year of the Huang-ch'ing reign period [2–30 September 1312], the Fu-chien Pacification Office (*hsuan-wei-ssu*) respectfully received the communication (*cha-fu*) of the Chiang-che Regional Secretariat and respectfully received the communiqué (*tzu*) of the Central Secretariat [which stated]:[182]

The Court of Imperial Etiquette (Hsuan-hui-yuan) has prepared a report (*ch'eng*) by the Minister of the Agency of Men and Things Gone Astray (Lan-i-chien-ch'eng),[183] T'ang Shu,[184] [which states]:

Concerning the matter of the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* of the routes, prefectures, subprefectures, and counties of all areas accounting for (*t'i-tiao*) the *po-lan-hsi* people and cattle (*t'ou-p'i*) and other matters: these various officials [the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*] are dragging their feet without doing anything and are unwilling to devote their attention to accounting for [the *po-lan-*

> *hsi*]. This has resulted in the [*po-lan-hsi*] people and cattle fleeing and starving to death. They have manipulated the figures and do not thoroughly report them to the authorities. Even more [important], the various officials [the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*] often keep for themselves the falcons (*ying*) and sparrow-hawks (*yao*), and frequently fly them. They unreasonably gallop *po-lan-hsi* horses until they fall to the ground. They hide them without reporting them. Even if some are turned in, they are emaciated and worthless and are not fit to be ridden. From this time onward, it would be better to entrust the senior civil officials (*wen-tzu chang-kuan*) with [the task of] accounting for [the *po-lan-hsi*]. In all cases, the responsibility for *po-lan-hsi* people and cattle should be handed over to the village heads (*li-cheng*) and the control chiefs (*chu-shou*).[185] [The village heads and control chiefs] should collect and care for [the *po-lan-hsi*], establish a means to protect them, and attentively keep track of them, so that they do not flee, are not hidden, and do not starve to death. They should report on a monthly basis. Twice every year, in the 2nd and 9th moons, they should hand over [the *po-lan-hsi* to the appropriate officials]. This is truly beneficial.
>
> It [T'ang Shu's report] was sent to the Board of Punishments. [The following] has been deliberated and concluded: The procedure (*li*) has already been established concerning the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* of the routes, prefectures, subprefectures, and counties in their accounting for *po-lan-hsi* people and cattle. In accordance with that which the Court of Imperial Etiquette (Hsuan-hui-yuan) has proposed concerning the riding [of *po-lan-hsi* horses], the flying [of *po-lan-hsi* falcons and sparrow hawks], and the manipulation of figures and hiding [of *po-lan-hsi*] people and cattle, we have sent the Censorate (Yü-shih-t'ai) a communication (*cha-fu*) [which stated]:
>
> > The surveillance bureaus (*lien-fang-ssu*)[186] of the various circuits (*tao*) should strictly (*yen-chia*) investigate (*t'i-ch'a*) and regulate (*chin-yueh*). As for the number [of *po-lan-hsi*] which is reported to the government offices, it is appropriate to order the Court of Imperial Etiquette to devise a way to guard over it, so as not to cause the hiding [of *po-lan-hsi*], their becoming emaciated, or starving to death.
>
> Acting accordingly, the Central Secretariat (Tu-sheng) has approved the proposal [of the Court of Imperial Etiquette]. In addition, we request that, in accordance with the above [proposal], this be put into effect (*shih-hsing*).

Control over various aspects of the *pu-lan-hsi* seems to have shifted back and forth among local officials (including the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*), unsalaried village personnel, the Court of Imperial Etiquette in the capital, and the surveillance bureaus of the Censorate. Although only a sampling of documents from the *Yuan tien-chang* has been translated here, the complexity and changeability of jurisdictions should be evident. In addition to handling *pu-lan-hsi* business, *daruγači* were also involved in the compulsory purchase, registration, branding, and forwarding of horses throughout China for military purposes.[187] While the official regulations do not specify that the *daruγači* were obligated to fulfill educational duties, one late Yuan *daruγači* was praised for paying personal attention to schools and the recruitment of teachers and pupils in his jurisdiction (Ching-te county in present-day Anhwei).[188]

The early history of the office of *daruγači* shows the *daruγači* with one foot on the military side and the other foot on the civilian side of administration. While the Yuan military establishment did employ its own *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* at two of the three levels of its decimal-based system (that is, the *wan-hu-fu* and the *ch'ien-hu-so* had *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*), the office of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* also became firmly entrenched in civilian local administration. The duties of the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* within the context of the civilian local administration have been described in this chapter. Biographies of *daruγači* in the military bureaucracy, while often interesting and informative, have not been incorporated into the present discussion of the *daruγači*'s duties and activities. This is because *daruγači* appointed in the separate military bureaucracy technically were outside the sphere of civilian government. As the laudatory epitaph of one such myriarchy (*wan-hu-fu*) *daruγači* states:[189] "Each route (*lu*) established a general administration (*tsung-kuan-fu*) in order to govern the people and a myriarchy (*wan-hu-fu*) to govern the military." This dichotomy between *daruγači* of the civil administration (that is, the *tsung-kuan-fu* and lesser local units) and *daruγači* of the military establishment (that is, of the myriarchies and chiliarchies) has been observed throughout the present work.

THREE

# *The* Ta-lu-hua-ch'ih—*Appointment to Office and the Nationality Question*

Chapter 2 covered the early history and development of the office of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*. This chapter will detail the methods of appointment of Yuan local officials (including the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*) as well as the question of which nationalities held which local offices in the civilian bureaucracy. Furthermore, the average term in office of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* and other local officials will be estimated.

The way local officials were appointed to office in the Yuan period is indicative of the Mongols' political and social priorities. In the absence of an examination system during the greater part of the dynasty, access to official posts in the civilian government bureaucracy depended upon factors other than literary merit.[1] The Mongols' preference for hereditary transfer of office, as described in Chapter 2 in the early history of the office of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*, was responsible throughout the Yuan period for their attraction to, and emphasis upon, the Chinese institution of the *yin* privilege.

The *yin* privilege was the privilege extended to high-ranking officials whereby they could nominate family members (sons, grandsons) for civilian office. The *yin* institution, however, functioned quite differently under native dynasties from the way it functioned under the Liao, Chin, and Yuan, foreign dynasties of conquest. Under native Chinese dynasties, especially in the later imperial period, the *yin* privilege was atypical, contrary to the normal workings of society, and a numerically

insignificant means of upward mobility. Despite its origins as a purely Chinese institution, the *yin* privilege was atypical in the sense of being the least used and least respected route to office in native Chinese dynasties. Under the conquest dynasties, however, the *yin* privilege became the norm, it accorded with the normal workings of Mongolian sociopolitical practice, and it was numerically very significant.

Use of the *yin* privilege became the primary means of staffing the offices of local government in Yuan times.[2] Wittfogel and Feng have observed that both the Khitan people and the Mongols favored the use of the *yin* privilege "because it resembled in intent, if not in detail, the tribal tradition of a hereditary officialdom."[3] The *yin* privilege in the hands of the Mongolian rulers became an instrument for attempting to maintain the sharply defined social, political, and ethnic differences that existed to varying degrees in thirteenth- and fourteenth-century China.

Regulations on hereditary transfer of office favored Mongols first, then Se-mu-jen, while limiting the numbers of Han-jen and Nan-jen entering and advancing in the civilian government. There were separate *yin* regulations for officials in North China (Fu-li) and South-Central China (Chiang-huai), and special *yin* regulations for different offices, such as the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih,* and for different social groups, such as overseers of the artisan population (*kuan-chiang-kuan*). The Yuan political system, like its social system, was largely founded on hereditary categories, and thus the Chinese institution of the *yin* privilege was readily adopted and adapted by the Mongols. The *yin* privilege in the Yuan sought to guarantee Mongolian and Central Asian predominance in government, just as it had ensured Khitan predominance in the Liao and Jurchen predominance in the Chin.[4]

The basic qualifications for a person claiming the *yin* privilege are described in an imperial decree (*chao*) of 1267: only one person in a family could claim the *yin* privilege, and that person had to be 24 years of age (25 *sui*) or older and had to have primacy in inheritance, that is, had to be the eldest son by the principal wife, or that son's lineal descendant, whenever such existed.[5] The regulations concerning the *yin* privilege of the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* in the local government demonstrate the hierarchical and categorical nature of the *yin* privilege. The sons and brothers of Mongolian, Muslim, Uiyur, Naiman, and Tangut *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* were



governed by separate and more favorable *yin* regulations than the relatives of Khitan, Jurchen, and Northern Chinese *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih.* Also, the regulations inadvertently confirm the government-recognized existence and legitimacy of Chinese *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih.* The documents below date from the early part of Qubilai's reign:[6]

> In the 6th moon of the 7th year of the Chih-yuan reign period [20 June–19 July 1270], the Shang-shu-sheng respectfully received an excerpt of a communiqué (*tzu-kai*) from the Central Secretariat (Chung-shu-sheng) [which stated]:
>
> Previously, as for government *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* (*hsi-kuan ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*)[7] Hsueh-ch'ih,[8] the son of the deceased Po-erh (Bōl),[9] [*Ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*] of Chung-shan prefecture,[10] and others have requested hereditary transmission of office (*ch'eng-hsi*).[11] They have sent [their request] to the [joint] Board of Personnel-Rites (Li-li-pu)[12] for discussion (*chiang-chiu*). Later, there was sent in return an excerpt of a report (*ch'eng-kai*) [from the Board of Personnel-Rites which said]:
>
> It is difficult for the younger brothers and sons of the deceased *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* of that place to find an appropriate rank and title (*p'in-chi*) among the [lesser] population overseers (*kuan-min-kuan*) in obtaining office through the *yin* privilege (*ch'ü-yin*). We propose tentatively (*ch'üan-i*) that, as for [the younger brothers and sons of] those *tsung-kuan-fu ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* for whom hereditary transmission of office is appropriate, they should be appointed to office as lower subprefecture (*hsia-chou*) *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih.* As for [the younger brothers and sons of] the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* of the prefectures (*san-fu*) and of the sundry subprefectures for whom it is appropriate to succeed to office (*chi*), they should be appointed *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* of the counties. In addition, as for [the younger brothers and sons of] *ssu-hsien ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* for whom it is appropriate to succeed to office, [their procedure] is difficult to deliberate and decide. If [any individuals] should respectfully receive a special imperial decree (*t'e-chih*), allow those who have attained office through hereditary privilege (*ch'eng-hsi-che*) not to be bound by this procedure (*li*).[13]
>
> The Central Secretariat (Tu-sheng) has proposed [the following]: as for the [younger brothers and sons of] county *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* for whom it is appropriate to succeed to office, also examine the importance of their origins (*ken-chiao*),[14] and appoint them to the offices of police commissioner (*hsien-wei*) and patrol chief (*hsun-chien*). If they have assumed office (*kou-tang*) [already], promote them according to the order of their advancement hitherto. [The Central Secretariat] has memorialized and respectfully received an imperial decree (*sheng-chih*) [which stated]:

Let it be that way (*na-pan hsing-che*). Let the words which have been spoken be accepted. If they have already assumed office, let them be promoted.

Respect this.

Besides,[15] as for [the younger brothers and sons of] Mongolian, Muslim (Hui-hui),[16] Uiyur (Wei-wu-erh), Naiman (Nai-man), Tangut (T'ang-wu) and other *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* for whom it is appropriate to succeed to office, they should follow in accordance with that which was proposed and memorialized (*wen-tsou*) in the above item. In addition, we propose that [the younger brothers and sons of] Khitan, Jurchen, and Han-erh [that is, Northern Chinese and other subjects of the former Jurchen Chin dynasty] *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* for whom it is appropriate to succeed to office, should receive office through the *yin* privilege (*ch'eng-yin*) and be appointed (*hsu-yung*) according to the same regulations (*t'i-li*) as the population overseers (*kuan-min-kuan*). We request that this be examined and put into effect everywhere among the subordinate officials. From this time onward, when it transpires that [the younger brothers and sons of] deceased Mongolian, Muslim, Uiyur, Naiman, Tangut, and other *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* of the prefectures, subprefectures, counties, and *ssu-hsien* (*hsien-ssu*)[17] for whom it is appropriate to succeed to office request appointment (*kao hsu-yung*), record the imperial patent of appointment (*hsuan-ch'ih*) which their fathers originally received, and, if the regulations concerning transmission of office through the *yin* privilege (*ch'eng-yin t'i-li*) have already been applied, grant them [those seeking hereditary office] certification for office (*wen-p'ing*),[18] and tell them to go to the Board of Personnel (Li-pu) to request an official appointment (*ch'iu-shih*). We propose that the report (*ch'eng*) [of the Board of Personnel-Rites] to the Central Secretariat (Sheng) be adopted. In addition, those people who at present claim the *yin* privilege (*kao-yin-jen*), except for people whose rank (*p'in*) is higher than the 7th rank [that is, only those of the 8th and 9th ranks] should undergo an evaluation for office (*ch'üan*). We have memorialized (*wen-tsou*). In addition, as for those for whom it is appropriate to fill the position of lower county *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*, [if] in this interval there is no vacancy (*k'o-ch'ueh*), send them to the Board of Personnel to be examined and registered for office (*ch'üan-chu*).[19] Put this into effect (*shih-hsing*) in [the lower counties of] the regional secretariats (*sheng*) and the prefectures. Carry this out for [all] except those people whose rank is higher than 7A. In addition, respectfully review and put this into effect.



The regulations concerning the *yin* privilege of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* and population overseers (*kuan-min-kuan*) differed on the basis of geographical location. A January 1283 communication of the Central Secretariat briefly summarizes proposals made by the Board of Personnel; the full text of those proposals follows:[20]

Whereas, in the 12th moon of the 19th year of the Chih-yuan reign period [1–29 January 1283], there was respectfully received a communication (*p'an-sung*) from the Central Secretariat [which stated]:

The Board [of Personnel] has deliberated and proposed that the sons and grandsons of Chiang-huai officials who have reached retirement age and/or have died (*chih-shih shen-ku*) gain access to office through the *yin* privilege (*yin-hsu*). Sons and grandsons of [deceased officials of] the 6th and 7th ranks should be sent to the regional secretariats (*hsing-sheng*) and employed as officials. Moreover, they are exempted from the required service as apprentice (*pao-shih*).[21]

In the 12th moon of the 19th year of the Chih-yuan reign period [1–29 January 1283], the Central Secretariat [received] a report (*ch'eng*) from the Board of Personnel [which said]:

The sons and grandsons of Chiang-huai officials who have reached retirement age and/or have died frequently go to the Board [of Personnel] and claim the *yin* privilege (*kao-yin*). Now, in accordance with both the succession to office (*ch'eng-chi*)[22] of the Fu-li[23] *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* and the *yin* privilege (*ch'eng-yin*) of the [Fu-li] population overseers (*kuan-min-kuan*), we have deliberated and propose the following *yin* procedure (*yin-li*).

The Central Secretariat (Tu-sheng) has received the proposals. . . .

The Board of Personnel has deliberated and proposed the regulations (*t'i-li*) concerning access to office through the *yin* privilege (*yin-hsu*) of Chiang-huai officials who have reached retirement age and/or have died. The procedure concerning the succession to office of the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*:

[The following] has been discussed and concluded. It is difficult to establish and propose [the procedure for] the Chiang-huai *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*, many of whom [already] have seniority (*yu ch'ien-tzu*) and whose ranks should not be promoted quickly, uniformly with the [procedure for] the Fu-li [*ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*]. With the exception of the *t'ou-hsia ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* who should be appointed (*ch'ai-she*) in their own *t'ou-hsia*, the sons and grandsons of government (*hsi-kuan*) *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* who have reached retirement age and/or have died should be [appointed to office] in accordance with the procedure for the Fu-li population overseers (*kuan-min-kuan*). We propose that their [Chiang-huai *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*] sons and grandsons all inherit the *yin* privilege (*ch'eng-yin*). They must fulfill probationary terms as appren-

tices (*pao-shih*) for a full year. [Then] examine and make appropriate their *yin* qualifications and ranks (*tzu-p'in*). Appoint them [the sons and grandsons of Chiang-huai *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*] to office only in Chiang-huai. If [an individual] respectfully receives a special imperial decree (*t'e-chih*), he should not adhere to this procedure.

The procedure concerning the *yin* privilege (*ch'eng-yin*) of the population overseers (*kuan-min-kuan*): [The following] has been discussed and concluded. As for the Chiang-huai population overseers, except for those who have already received an imperial patent of appointment (*hsuan-ch'ih*) and who already have been appointed to office and assumed office (*li-jen kou-tang*), the sons and grandsons [of Chiang-huai population overseers] who have reached retirement age and/or have died should inherit the *yin* privilege (*yin-hsu*) uniformly in accordance with the earlier items of the respectfully received imperial decree (*sheng-chih*). Moreover, appoint them to office in Chiang-huai. As for those who have not yet assumed office, if their seniority has included that of a ranked official, let [their new rank in office] be decided solely in accordance with their previous seniority.

In addition, whereas on the 24th day of the 11th moon of the 9th year of the Chih-yuan reign period [15 December 1272], [the Board of Personnel] respectfully received a communication (*p'an-sung*) from the Central Secretariat [which stated]:

> Sons and grandsons [of population overseers] of the 6th rank and 7th rank have been examined to be evaluated as *chien-tang* [officials] and to be dispatched [as such].[24] Later, after each has been adjusted upward or downward, the matter [of their appointment] is to be decided.

At present we have put under consideration the people for whom the *yin* privilege (*ch'eng-yin*) is appropriate according to the established procedure (*ting-li*) of the communication of the Central Secretariat (Sheng-p'an). As for the regional secretariats in Chiang-huai, we are appointing them [those eligible for appointment through the *yin* privilege] to office there. Moreover, we exempt them from fulfilling probationary terms as apprentice (*pao-shih*). In addition, those who receive communications [of appointment] (*cha-fu*) from such bureau offices (*ya-men*) as the regional secretariats and the regional privy councils (*hsing-yuan* for *hsing-shu-mi-yuan*) should not abide by the limitations of appointment through the *yin* privilege (*yin-hsu*). If [any individual] should respectfully receive a special imperial decree (*t'e-chih*), he should not be bound by this procedure.

The procedure concerning the *yin* privilege of officials in charge of artisans (*chiang-kuan*): [The following] has been discussed and concluded. As for the Chiang-huai overseers of the artisan population (*kuan-chiang kuan-yuan*), except for those who have already received an imperial patent of appointment (*hsuan-ch'ih*) and who have received appointment to and have assumed an office, the sons and grandsons of those [overseers of the artisan population] who have reached retirement age and/or have died should be uniformly in accordance with the earlier procedure [that is, the procedure for the population overseers]. Let them be appointed through the *yin* privilege (*yin-hsu*) in Chiang-huai among the officials in charge of artisans. As for those who have not yet taken office, if their seniority has included that of a ranked official, let [their new rank in office] be decided solely in accordance with their previous seniority.[25] According to the procedure, they should fulfill a probationary term as apprentice for a full year. They should be appointed to office in Chiang-huai. In addition, as for the sons [of officials in charge of artisans] of the 6th and 7th ranks, it is appropriate to appoint them through the *yin* privilege (*yin-yung*) as heads of the various bureaus and departments (*ko chü-yuan chang nei*).[26] This is the same as the procedure for the *Yuan-wu*.[27] They [sons of officials in charge of artisans of the 6th and 7th ranks] should not enter the hierarchy of ranks (*liu-p'in*).[28] People for whom the *yin* privilege is appropriate (*ying-yin chih jen*) moreover may be exempted from service as apprentice. Send them to the regional secretariats and then appoint them. In addition, those who receive official notices [of appointment] (*cha-fu*) from such bureau offices as the regional secretariats and the pacification offices (*hsuan-wei-ssu*) should not abide by the limitations of appointment through the *yin* privilege. If [any individual] should respectfully receive a special imperial decree (*t'e-chih*), he should not be bound by this procedure.

Surrendered officials (*kuei-fu kuan-yuan*): They should be in accordance with the above-mentioned [procedure] of appointment to office through the *yin* privilege (*yin-hsu*). If [any individual] should respectfully receive a special imperial decree (*t'e-chih*), he should not be bound by this procedure.

On the 18th day of the 8th moon of the 4th year of the Ta-te reign period [1 September 1300], the Central Secretariat memorialized and respectfully received an excerpt from an imperial decree (*sheng-chih chieh-kai* [which said]:[29]

> Let the Emperor (Shang-wei)[30] decide (*chih-shih*).[31] When the sons and grandsons of Mongols possessing [aristocratic] origins (*yu ken-chiao ti*) inherit through the *yin* privilege (*ch'eng-yin*) their fathers' posts and their elder brothers' posts, let the Emperor decide (*huang-ti shih-yeh-che*). Besides that, sons of [deceased officials of] the 1st rank inherit the upper degree of the 5th rank. Sons of [deceased officials of] the lower degree of the 1st rank inherit the lower degree of the 5th rank. Sons of [deceased officials of] the upper degree of the 2nd rank inherit the upper degree of the 6th rank.

Maintain this sequence of appointment up to the 7th rank. It has been decided that Western and Central Asians (Se-mu) [advance] one degree (*teng*) higher than Han-erh people.

Respect this.

Appointment through the *yin* privilege (*yin-hsu*) of the sons and grandsons of the sundry appointed officials (*chu chih-kuan*):[32] Sons of [deceased officials of] the rank of 1a should be nominated to (*hsu*) the rank of 5a. Sons of [deceased officials of] the rank of 1b should be nominated to the rank of 5b. Sons of [deceased officials of] the rank of 2a should be nominated to the rank of 6a. Sons of [deceased officials of] the rank of 2b should be nominated to the rank of 6b. Sons of [deceased officials of] the rank of 3a should be nominated to the rank of 7a. Sons of [deceased officials of] the rank of 3b should be nominated to the rank of 7b. Sons of [deceased officials of] the rank of 4a should be nominated to the rank of 8a. Sons of [deceased officials of] the rank of 4b should be nominated to the rank of 8b. Sons of [deceased officials of] the rank of 5a should be nominated to the rank of 9a.[33] Sons of [deceased officials of] the rank of 6a: appoint them within the current (*liu-kuan*) to the office of patrol chief (*hsun-chien*). Appoint them as subalterns (*tsa-chih*) to the office of collector of trade and agrarian taxes (*ch'ien-ku-kuan*)[34] under the jurisdiction of the regional secretariats. Sons of [deceased officials of] the rank of 6b [should be appointed to] the upper level of the office of collector of trade and agrarian taxes (*chin-shang ch'ien-ku-kuan*). Sons of [deceased officials of] the rank of 7a [should be appointed to] the middle level of the office of collector of trade and agrarian taxes (*cho-chung ch'ien-ku-kuan*). Sons of [deceased officials of] the rank of 7b [should be appointed to] the lower level of the office of collector of trade and agrarian taxes (*chin-hsia ch'ien-ku-kuan*). All Western and Central Asians (Sè-mu-jen) should receive office through the *yin* privilege (*shou-yin*)[35] one degree higher (*yu i-teng*) than Han-jen. The sons and grandsons of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* should receive office through the *yin* privilege (*yin-hsu*) uniformly with the sons and grandsons of the population overseers ([*kuan-*]*min-kuan*).[36] Collateral transmission of the *yin* privilege (*p'ang-yin*),[37] in accordance with the old procedure,[38] should reduce the *yin* [ranks] (*chiang-hsu*). Pure Mongols (*cheng* Meng-ku-jen):[39] Let the Emperor (Shang-wei) decide (*chih-shih*). Those important (*shen-chung*) people [that is, pure Mongols] with [aristocratic] origins (*ken-chiao*) should receive (*ch'ü*)[40] [the right to transmit their ranks] by imperial decision (*sheng-ts'ai*).[41]



Claimants of the *yin* privilege often had to serve as apprentices before qualifying for a government office. A 1268 imperial decree (*chao*) exempted Mongols from serving as apprentices:[42]

> Among all people seeking access to office through the *yin* privilege (*chu yin-hsu jen-yuan*), with the exception of Mongols as well as the population which has already become hostages [*t'u-lu-hua* (*turγa*[γ])][43] to whom this decision should not be applied, those *yin* claimants 3rd rank and below and 7th rank and above, and whose age is 25 and above, should fulfill probationary terms as apprentices (*pao-shih*) for one year, and moreover should not be paid salaries. When they have completed their terms of service [as apprentices], as for the sons and grandsons 3rd rank to 5th rank, assess their talents and appoint them to offices; as for the sons of [fathers of] the 6th and 7th ranks it is permitted for them to be examined to be evaluated as *chien-tang* [officials] to be dispatched [as such]. Later, after each has been adjusted upward or downward, decide the matter.

An imperial decree of 1311 coupled the successful completion of an examination with exemption from a year's duty as apprentice. Once again, Mongols and Western and Central Asians were not required to take the examinations:[44]

> On the 18th day of the 3rd moon of the 4th year of the Chih-ta reign period [7 April 1311], there was respectfully received an imperial decree (*chao-shu*), within which one item [is as follows]:[45]
>
> > The sons and grandsons of the sundry appointed officials (*chih-kuan*) who seek access to office through the *yin* privilege (*ch'eng-yin*) must be examined on one Classic and one History (*i Ching i Shih*). Those among them who are able to understand the general meaning (*ta-i*) are exempted from fulfilling probationary terms as apprentices (*pao-shih*). Those who do not understand [that is, fail the examination] should be sent back to study. Those Mongols and Western and Central Asians (Se-mu) who are willing to be examined should be permitted, and as usual, are to be advanced one degree (*chieh*) higher [than the rank to which they otherwise would be entitled].

Interestingly, T'ang and Sung regulations governing the use of the *yin* privilege seem to have been *less* restrictive than the Yuan *yin* regulations. As Patricia Ebrey's work on T'ang aristocratic families has shown, the protection privilege was not strictly limited to the sons and grandsons of men of high posts. The descendants of even the lowest regular

officials, those with ranks 6 through 9, could qualify by serving in irregular posts (*liu-wai*), before entering the regular bureaucracy.[46] In the early Sung, one or more sons or other family members, even including dependents with no blood tie, could qualify for office through the *yin* privilege.[47] As described above, the Yuan *yin* regulations were closely bound up with ethnic, occupational, and geographic categories, and were, on the whole, more complex and limiting than the T'ang and Sung regulations.

Thus, one might be tempted to conclude that the *yin* privilege was far more heavily used in T'ang and Sung times than in Yuan times. In fact, the opposite is more likely: Native Chinese dynasties like the T'ang and Sung could afford to have liberal *yin* regulations precisely because the *yin* route to office was so underused. There was no need to tighten the *yin* regulations in T'ang and Sung times because there was not a flood of petitioners. In T'ang times, there was an awareness among aspirants to office that taking examinations was a more reliable path to very high ministerial-level office than claiming hereditary privilege.[48] In early Sung times, the lack of prestige associated with entering office through the *yin* privilege motivated some who were eligible to use the *yin* privilege to choose the more demanding route—examinations—instead.[49] Even if the T'ang examination system produced only about 6 percent of all officeholders, nonetheless, examinations existed as a prestigious alternative, along with a few less prestigious irregular routes such as service in the Imperial Guard.[50]

The Yuan regulations on hereditary access to office were more restrictive in part because, in the absence of an examination system, gaining access through the *yin* privilege was one of the few legitimate, authorized routes to office. The *yin* regulations in Yuan times were devised to facilitate the entry of Mongols and Western and Central Asians into the civilian bureaucracy, while allowing smaller numbers of Chinese to enter at lower ranks. The Chinese institution of the *yin* privilege, adapted to fit the Mongols' ethnic and social priorities, thus served the particular purposes of the Mongolian emperors.

In addition to advancement through the *yin* privilege, there were other routes of entry into the civil service, though the preeminence of the *yin* procedure should be kept in mind. As outlined in Chapter 2,



many *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* in the mid- and late thirteenth century first gained appointment owing to their participation in the Mongolian military campaigns in China. Apparently, service in the Imperial Guard (Su-wei) also could lead to rapid advancement in either the civilian or military bureaucracies. Makino Shūji on the basis of a comment by Yao Sui (1239–1314) has estimated that 10 percent of all civil service officials first entered public life through service in the Imperial Guard.[51] As one example, I-hei-mi-shih (Yīγmīš), a Uiγur who was the first *Ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* to be appointed in Chin-t'an county in Chen-chiang route in 1276, started his career in 1265 by entering the Imperial Guard. He later went on to hold many high offices in both the civilian and military bureaucracies.[52] A Mongol by the name of Tao Chia-nu began a long career in local government by first serving in the Imperial Guard.[53] He was later appointed *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* in Shuo-chou in Ta-t'ung route in 1312, then appointed Associate Administrator (*T'ung-chih*) of Chin-ning route in 1327, Associate Administrator (*T'ung-chih*) of Tao-chou route in the Hu-Kuang Regional Secretariat in 1333, and finally *Ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* of Chen-ting route.

Some Western and Central Asians and Mongols entered the Yuan bureaucracy through exhibiting a special expertise in military technology. The biography of the Mongolian catapult expert, An-mu-hai, as summarized in the previous chapter, shows how one man's military know-how was responsible for launching his own career as well as the careers of his son and grandson. Another such example is the Muslim A-lao-wa-ting ('Alā-al-Dīn), who was drafted by Qubilai in 1271 as an artillery artisan in charge of making catapults. In addition to serving in several military offices, A-lao-wa-ting (apparently the same person) is listed as the *Ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* of Tan-t'u county in Chen-chiang route from 1277 to 1284, as the Record Keeper (*Chu-pu*) of Chin-t'an county in Chen-chiang route for an unspecified term before 1286, and as the *Ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* of Chin-t'an county from 1299 to 1302.[54]

Local officials in the Yuan dynasty before 1270 were expected to serve 30-month terms in office. In the 4th year of the Chih-yuan reign period (1267), a Central Secretariat communication (*cha-fu*) stated: "We propose that officials who are transferred in office to the various routes (*ko-lu ch'ien-chuan kuan-yuan*) respectfully in accordance with the [earlier] im-

perial decree (*sheng-chih*) after serving a term of 30 months should undergo an evaluation to determine their merits or faults in order to promote or demote them."[55] Yet, in 1270, a proposal for 60-month terms in office was apparently adopted as the norm.[56]

Whatever the desired norm for the Yuan may have been at different times, the local gazetteers compiled during the dynasty record tremendous variation in duration of actual terms in office.[57] The local gazetteer of Chen-chiang route offers especially detailed information on the dates of tenure in office of all local officials. For instance, from 1275 to the time when the gazetteer was compiled (1330–1333), there were 24 *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* administering Chen-chiang route.[58] The longest term in office of a *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* was 6 years, while the shortest term was one day (Hsi-la-han, a Mongol, served from 17 February to 18 February 1276; the gazetteer records only that "he left office and returned north"). The office of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* was left vacant for 15 months in 1276–1277, for 3 months in 1278, and for a year in 1307–1308. From April to June 1278, two *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* simultaneously held office, and again for a 4-year period (1279–1283), two *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* are listed as concurrently holding office. In the latter case, one of the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* was Chinese—Shih Huan of Chen-ting[59]—and the other was a Turkic Muslim (Hui-hui).

The average term in office of a *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* in Chen-chiang route was 28 months. Of course, some terms were cut short by mourning for parents, illness, or death. Generally, beginning in the late 1280s, tenure in office was regularized to about 3 years, with less overlap and fewer vacancies. For the sake of comparison, it should be noted that similar irregularities in tenure existed among the general administrators (*tsung-kuan*) of Chen-chiang route: The longest term in office of a general administrator of the route was 5 years, but the average term was exactly 30 months. The office of general administrator was left vacant on ten separate occasions, once for as long as 37 months (October 1310–November 1313), and there was a year-long overlap of two people in office.

In the three counties (*hsien*) and the *lu-shih-ssu* under the jurisdiction of Chen-chiang route, the terms in office of the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*, the county magistrate (*hsien-yin*), and the *lu-shih* were noticeably longer in duration than those of the route officials, with 5- or 6-year terms not uncommon. In Tan-yang county, one county magistrate held office for 12 years.



Similarly long spells in office are documented in counties under the jurisdiction of Ch'ing-yuan route in Chiang-che: One *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* in Ting-hai county is listed as serving a 13-year term, while two others served 7 years each. In Tz'u-chi county, one *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* is listed as having served from 1276 to 1293–17 years![60]

Such long spells in office did not escape the notice of Qubilai and the metropolitan government in Ta-tu. An imperial decree (*sheng-chih*) of the 16th day of the 5th moon of the 30th year of the Chih-yuan reign period (21 June 1293) states:[61]

> In the regional secretariats (*hsing-sheng*), in the pacification offices (*hsuan-wei-ssu*), and in the various outer [that is, non-metropolitan] bureaus (*ya-men*), there are officials who have not been transferred in office (*ch'ien-chuan*) for 5 or 10 years. When the terms in office (*yueh-jih*) of people who are officials are long, it is inappropriate for them, and it is inappropriate for the common people (*pai-hsing-mei*). . . .

Although the problem of local officials' becoming entrenched in their localities was widespread, and not confined to any one area or any one local office, particular complaints with respect to the office of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* did arise. In one excerpt of an imperial decree (*sheng-chih*) received by the Central Secretariat in the 2nd moon of the 6th year of the Chih-yuan reign period (5 March–2 April 1269), it is stated:[62]

> As for the government officials of all areas, frequently the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* have long terms in office and form connections in office with them. They [the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*] secretly spy on newly appointed officials. All affairs are damaged and cannot be expedited. These people must also be investigated and punished.

The fact that long tenure in office by *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* could lead to the formation of intra-bureaucratic factions and to the disruption of government business was also noticed by Wang Yun. Under the heading, "A discussion of the circumstances of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* under the jurisdiction of Chi-nan route for whom it is appropriate to be transferred in office" ("Lun Chi-nan Lu so-hsia ta-lu-hua-ch'ih ho ch'ien-chuan shih-chuang"), Wang Yun wrote the following:[63]

> I have humbly observed that, among the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* who are presently in office in the subprefectures (*chou*) and counties (*hsien*) under the jurisdiction of Chi-nan route, those who have attained office through hereditary transmission (*ch'eng-hsi kou-tang*) and whose terms of office have expired and who, after many years, have not yet been transferred to another office are 13 people. At present in the government (*ch'ao-sheng*) and the administration (*shu-cheng*) there are a few inappropriate matters. It is necessary to start anew. If the abovementioned *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* are transferred according to the regulations (*li*) to offices within the subprefectures and counties of that *t'ou-hsia* [that is, the *t'ou-hsia* within Chi-nan route], that would be appropriate, and it would not lead to their taking advantage of long terms of office to form factions and to pursue their private interests, thus causing officials [in the Chi-nan route government] to suffer. In addition, as for those *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* who have not yet been transferred in office in other routes, it would also be appropriate to settle their cases uniformly.

Wang Yun's proposed solution was to transfer *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* who had exceeded their terms in office from the Chi-nan route administration to the Chi-nan *t'ou-hsia* administration, presumably to the office of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* of the subprefectures and counties under the *t'ou-hsia*.

It has been the commonly held assumption among researchers of Yuan history that the office of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* was open only to Mongols and Western and Central Asians, and that the Chinese, Jurchens, and Khitans were barred from the office. Ch'i-ch'ing Hsiao, for instance, has written: "With few exceptions, only Mongols and the Se-mu were qualified to serve as *darugači*."[64] Sechin Jagchid has counted all the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* in the *Yuan shih* and arrived at the following enumeration: 103 Mongols, 47 Han·Chinese; 33 Uiyur; 16 Tangut; 17 Hui-hui and others from Western Asia including Western Liao subjects; 12 Khitans; 2 Jurchens; 8 Qangli; 7 Qipčaγ; 5 Tibetans; 5 Qarluγ; 2 Önggüd; 1 Korean, etc. . . .[65]

Jagchid's quantification of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* by nationality on the sole basis of the *Yuan shih,* however, is not totally representative of the general situation in Yuan times for two reasons. First, by using only the *Yuan shih,* he has limited his sample to higher-level *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*, since, for example, county-level *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* are not often mentioned. Second, Jagchid himself admits that, among the 103 Mongolian *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* he has identified in the *Yuan shih,* some may have been Mongolian in name only.[66] A number of Chinese in Yuan times assumed Mongolian names precisely in order to attain higher offices that might otherwise not have been open to them. This practice will be addressed in greater depth below. Thus, the impossibility of ascertaining beyond doubt the actual nationalities of those *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* with Mongolian names renders statistics on nationalities questionable, if not meaningless.



The approach to this important issue in the following pages will be descriptive, rather than statistical. The general impression that emerges after a wider reading of Yuan sources is that Western and Central Asians participated in great numbers at all levels of local government. If one were to combine Mongolian and Western and Central Asian *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* into one group, they would certainly outnumber Chinese *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*; but Mongolian *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* alone were very likely outnumbered by Chinese *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih.*

Qubilai as Emperor of China mandated a system whereby the office of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* should be occupied by Mongols and Western and Central Asians, while the other top local offices such as general administrator (*tsung-kuan*), prefect (*chih-fu*), subprefect (*chih-chou*), and county magistrate (*hsien-yin*), together with their staff positions, should be occupied only by Han-jen. The failure of such a system in practice may be inferred from various imperial decrees and government statements issued during the course of Qubilai's reign:[67]

> On the *chia-tzu* day [of the 2nd moon of the 2nd year of the Chih-yuan reign period: 13 March 1265] it was ordered that Mongols were to fill the office of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* of the various routes, Han-jen were to fill the office of general administrator, and Muslims (Hui-hui-jen) were to fill the office of associate administrator (*t'ung-chih*). This was permanently to be the established system.

> [On the *ting-ch'ou* day of the 3rd moon of the 5th year of the Chih-yuan reign period: 9 May 1268], [it was ordered that] the Jurchens, Khitans, and Han-jen of the sundry routes who were serving as *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* be dismissed, [but that] Muslims (Hui-hui), Uiyur (Wei-wu), Naiman, and Tanguts as before [remain in office].

> [On the *wu-wu* day of the 9th moon of the 16th year of the Chih-yuan reign period: 20 October 1279] it was proposed that the Han-jen who were acting as *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* be dismissed.

Again, in 1291 there was an imperial decree (*chao*) which stated that, with the exception of the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*, senior officials (*chang-kuan*) in the routes, prefectures, subprefectures, and counties should be Han-jen.[68] The only exception to this rule in the *Yuan shih* was the appointment of the indigenous non-Chinese peoples of South China to head the local offices:[69]

> The offices of senior officials of the sundry *Man-i* (*Chu Man-i chang-kuan-ssu*). As for the sundry *ch'i-tung*[70] of the Southwestern Tribes (Hsi-nan i), each should establish an office of senior officials (*chang-kuan-ssu*), with the same rank as that of the lower subprefectures. As for the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*, the senior official (*chang-kuan*), and the vice-senior official (*fu-chang-kuan*), select indigenous people (*t'u-jen*) for office.

However, in 1288 the Hu-kuang Regional Secretariat reported that many local officials in the *ch'i-tung* of the Man and Liao peoples would not take up their posts because of fear of contracting malaria, and it requested, apparently as a temporary measure, that Han-jen be appointed as *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* and that military officials should take on civilian duties.[71]

Two local gazetteers compiled in the Ming dynasty seem to reflect Qubilai's ideal of reserving the office of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* only for Mongols and Western and Central Asians. The 1502 gazetteer of Hui-chou prefecture (in present-day Anhwei) states that, in the Yuan in the office of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*, "they uniformly used Mongols," whereas, in the office of general administrator, (*tsung-kuan*), "they used Han-jen and Nan-jen to take charge of and to manage affairs."[72] The 1579 gazetteer of Hang-chou prefecture includes the following brief description of the Yuan office of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*: "Mongols and Se-mu-jen held this [office]. Han-jen and Nan-jen were not allowed."[73]

Yet, a gap between Qubilai's ideal and the reality of Yuan times existed. Not only do the repeated decrees in the *Yuan shih* imply difficulties in limiting offices to specific nationalities, but one Yuan gazetteer in particular shows the discrepancy between the imperial mandate and actual conditions. The local gazetteer of Chen-chiang route is especially valuable and in fact is unique among Yuan gazetteers, precisely because it lists the nationalities of almost all local officials who served in the route from 1276 to the time when the gazetteer was compiled (1330–1333). Although this gazetteer admittedly represents only one geographically narrow sample, it may reflect reality more closely than the imperial decrees issued from the distant capital city.



This gazetteer records that the office of route *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* was held by 2 Mongols, 3 Chinese, 1 Jurchen, and 18 Western and Central Asians.[74] The office of route general administrator (*tsung-kuan*) was held by 2 Mongols, 5 Western and Central Asians, 11 Chinese, 1 Jurchen, and 1 unspecified. The laxity in adherence to the nationality policy is reflected to a lesser degree in the *lu-shih-ssu* and in Tan-yang and Chin-t'an counties under Chen-chiang route, each of which had only 1 Chinese *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*. In the *lu-shih-ssu* and the three counties, Western and Central Asians easily outnumber Mongols in the office of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*, 48 to 14. A certain flexibility in appointment is demonstrated by the appointment of Chang Chen,[75] Chinese, to the offices of *Ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* of Chin-t'an county, *Ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* of Tan-yang county, and County Magistrate (*Hsien-yin*) of Tan-t'u county between 1275 and 1282.

While other Yuan local gazetteers do not specify the nationality of officeholders, the names listed by those gazetteers do reflect a somewhat stronger adherence to Qubilai's principles of ethnic segregation in office. Nonetheless, the *Chih-cheng Chin-ling hsin-chih* (1344) lists 8 probable non-Han names out of a total of 21 general administrators (*tsung-kuan*) in Chien-k'ang route, in contravention of Qubilai's 1265 decree, which limited the office of general administrator to Han-jen.[76] Similarly, 4 out of the 8 subprefects in Feng-hua subprefecture (*chou*) in Ch'ing-yuan route were Mongols and/or Western and Central Asians.[77] Thus, in practice, strict adherence to the imperial decrees limiting specific offices to specific nationalities was never achieved. Perhaps the imperial decrees were viewed more as guidelines than as the "law."

It is also possible that at least a few of the officials listed in the Chen-chiang gazetteer as Mongols were in fact Chinese. In the other Yuan gazetteers, none of which record nationality, some of the seemingly Mongolian names may have belonged to Han-jen. The adoption by Chinese of Mongolian names in Yuan times has been noted by other writers. Chao I, for instance, wrote that in the early Yuan period, the emperors established the precedent of bestowing Mongolian names upon meritorious Chinese subjects, and that, later in the dynasty, Chinese themselves adopted Mongolian names because they considered it

an honor to have them.[78] Chao I also believed that the practice of assuming Mongolian names grew from the widespread study of the Mongolian language by Chinese officials. This Yuan practice reversed the practice of the Jurchen people in Chin times who emphasized study of Chinese language and the adoption of Chinese names. Yet, Chao I did not mention what was probably the primary motivation behind the adoption of Mongolian names and the study of Mongolian language—the desire for rapid advancement in the civil service.

Assuming Mongolian names for the sake of quick advancement was not uncommon. Although Ch'en Yuan has disagreed with Chao I on the prevalence of adoption of Mongolian names, and has brought forth several examples from Yuan literary collections (*wen-chi*) of the opposite practice—non-Chinese people adopting Chinese courtesy names (*tzu*) and given names (*ming*)[79]—a number of documents in the *Yuan tien-chang* mention Chinese *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* with Mongolian names.[80] One such document concerns a Southern Chinese (Nan-jen) *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* who had adopted a Mongolian name:[81]

> On the 12th day of the 3rd moon of the 11th year of the Ta-te reign period [14 April 1307], the Fu-chien Surveillance Branch Bureau (Lien-fang-fen-ssu)[82] made a report (*tieh*) [saying]:
>
> We have respectfully received the communication (*cha-fu*) of the Chiang-nan Regional Censorate (*hsing-t'ai*) [which stated]:
>
> According to the report (*shen*) of Chiang-hsi circuit (*tao*), [it was stated]:
>
> We have investigated and found that Pai-yen (Bayan) the *Ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* of Nan-ch'eng county[83] in Chien-ch'ang route is actually a Southerner (Nan-jen). After a legal hearing [it was ascertained that] the family name (*hsing*) of this person is Huang and [his given name (*ming*) is] Tsu-t'ai. According to his confession, [these are] the circumstances. This is indeed a violation of the laws. We propose that it would be appropriate to dismiss him.

As it turned out, the patent of office of this Nan-jen masquerading as a Mongol was confiscated (*chui-shou ch'ih-tieh*), and he was dismissed from office.

The problem of non-Mongolian *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* with Mongolian names seems to have been particularly acute in the appanages or *t'ou-hsia*. An imperial decree (*sheng-chih*) of the 4th moon of the 2nd year of the Chih-ta reign period (10 May–8 June 1309) states:[84]



> In the various *t'ou-hsia*, there are many people who are Northern Chinese (Han-erh) [which classification also included] Khitans, and Jurchens, who have assumed the names of Mongolian people to fill the office of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*. From this time onward, appoint Mongols. If there are none, select for appointment Western and Central Asians who have [aristocratic] origins (*yu ken-chia* Se-mu-jen).
>
> Respect this.

Chao I saw a connection between the issues of adoption of Mongolian names and study of Mongolian language by Chinese, but he did not note the motivation behind these developments. How did Han-jen and Nan-jen manage to be appointed as *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*? Is it possible that those Chinese *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* with Mongolian names were also literate in Mongolian?

Mongolian, not Chinese, was the official language in Yuan times, and most documents of importance were written in Mongolian. All metropolitan and provincial offices of the 5th rank and above were required when sending documents to the Throne to use Mongolian writing, although a copy of each document was to be written in Chinese.[85] On 17 March 1269, the 'Phags-pa script was first established as the script to be used in all documents.[86] There are numerous references to the drafting of memorials in Mongolian. In a set of rules (*t'iao-hua*) within an imperial decree (*sheng-chih*) of the 1st moon of the 8th year of the Chih-yuan reign period (11 February–12 March 1271), the following item appears:[87]

> The Central Secretariat, the Boards, the Censorate, and the Privy Council (Sheng, Pu, T'ai, Yuan) should in all cases use Mongolian script to write the titles of memorials (*tsou-mu*).

Again, in the 5th moon of the 21st year of the Chih-yuan reign period (17 May–14 June 1284), the Central Secretariat and the Han-lin-yuan included among their proposals the following:[88]

> We propose that, from this time onward, the large and small bureaus (*ta hsiao ya-men*) of the various areas for which it is appropriate to present memorials should uniformly use Mongolian script to write them.

The Central Secretariat on the *wu-wu* day of the 5th moon of the same year (26 May 1284) was issued a decree (*ch'ih*) which stated in more explicit terms that Mongolian, not Uiγur, script should be used in government paper work:[89]

> As for all titles of memorials (*tsou-mu*) as well as documents (*wen-ts'e*), it is not permitted to use Uiγur (Wei-wu) script. Imperial directives (*hsuan-ming*) and communications (*cha-fu*) must uniformaly use the Mongolian script.

If the use of Mongolian script in the drafting of documents was so widespread, knowledge of Mongolian must certainly have been an asset in promoting one's career in thirteenth- and fourteenth-century China. A parallel development occurred in Persia where, according to Juvaini, knowledge of Uiγur led to rapid (and in his eyes undeserved) advancement:[90] "They consider the Uighur language and script to be the height of knowledge and learning. Every market lounger in the garb of iniquity has become an emir; every hireling has become a minister, every knave a vizier and every unfortunate a secretary. . . ."

While translators (*i-shih*) and interpreters (*t'ung-shih*) played important roles at the higher levels of the multi-lingual Yuan government, knowledge of Mongolian was not restricted to them.[91] Many Chinese studied Mongolian language at the Mongolian National University (Meng-ku kuo-tzu-hsueh), established in Ta-tu in 1271, and at the Mongolian Language Schools (Meng-ku tzu-hsueh), established in 1269 in the routes (*lu*). Throughout the dynasty, the qualified sons and younger brothers of Mongolian and Chinese officials and members of the Kesig (the Imperial Guard) could be selected to enter the Mongolian National University.[92] Instruction was accomplished by translating a Sung dynasty condensation of the *Tzu-chih t'ung-chien* called the *T'ung-chien chieh-yao*[93] from Chinese into Mongolian. As for the ethnic composition of classes at the Mongolian National University, among the 100 licentiates (*sheng-yuan*) of the University in 1315, there were 50 Mongols, 20 Se-mu, and 30 Han-jen.[94] Acceptance into the route-level Mongolian schools, according to an imperial decree of 1271, was open to the literate sons, grandsons, younger brothers, and nephews (*tzu sun ti chih*) of all officials from the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* and general administrator on down, although a quota of *sheng-yuan* (30 for upper routes, 25 for lower routes)



was established.[95] The route schools also admitted Muslims, Uiγur, and Tanguts who resided in the routes. In 1301, the quota was broadened to include 20 *sheng-yuan* from the prefectures (*gu*), 15 from the upper and middle subprefectures, and 10 from the lower subprefectures.[96]

In many cases, the graduates of both the capital's Mongolian National University and the routes' Mongolian Language Schools were appointed as translators at different levels of the government, an office which could serve as a stepping-stone to higher offices. A document in the *Yuan tien-chang* mentions in passing that Han-jen did serve as translators (*i-shih*).[97] One must also consider the question of how Mongolian documents were handled on the levels of the *lu-shih-ssu*, the prefectures, the subprefectures, and the counties, none of which had interpreters or translators appointed within them.[98] Unlike the regional secretariats, each of which had a post for an interpreter (*t'ung-shih*) and the routes, each of which had posts for one interpreter and one translator,[99] the other local offices must have depended upon their regular officials, the majority of whom were Chinese, to translate and compose Mongolian documents when necessary.

The prevalence in government of Chinese officials with some expertise in Mongolian language may be inferred from an imperial decree (*chao*) of May 1337 which attempted to reverse this development:[100]

> The chief officials of the Central Secretariat, Privy Council, Censorate, and Boards (*Sheng, Yuan, T'ai, Pu*), of the pacification offices (*hsuan-wei-ssu*), the surveillance bureaus (*lien-fang-ssu*), as well as of the localities must uniformly employ Mongols and Se-mu-jen. Prohibit Han-jen and Nan-jen from studying the Mongolian and Se-mu scripts.

Despite the 1337 decree, it seems that access to office through proficiency in the Mongolian language was an established career path. An analogous situation existed in the elite Kesig, which, by the fourteenth century, was admitting Chinese from all social strata, instead of restricting admission to Mongols and Western and Central Asians.[101] Because service in the Kesig led to high posts in the bureaucracy, the Kesig naturally attracted Chinese aspirants. The penetration of such purely "Mongolian institutions" as the Kesig and the office of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* by Northern and Southern Chinese is linked to the problem of numbers.

Mongols, after all, constituted a very small segment of the population of Yuan China. Although an actual shortage of Mongols qualified for government service cannot be proven, it is generally recognized that, by the late thirteenth century, Mongolian military families as well as the families of Mongolian commoners had become impoverished even to the point of selling wives and children into slavery.[102] According to Ch'i-ch'ing Hsiao's estimate of the total Yuan population after the conquest of the Southern Sung, Mongolian and Se-mu households together numbered only 400,000, constituting 3 percent of the whole population; Han-jen households (the inhabitants of the territory of the former Chin dynasty—Northern Chinese, Jurchens, Khitans, and so on) numbered 2 million, 15 percent; the Southern Chinese (Nan-jen) households numbered 11 million, 82 percent.[103]

The Soviet scholar N. Ts. Munkuev has estimated, and undoubtedly overestimated, the Mongolian population in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries as no less than a million and a half people.[104] The figure of a million and a half refers to all Mongols throughout the Eurasian continent, and not just to those in China, but, nevertheless, the figure appears overinflated when one realizes that the total population of the Mongolian People's Republic in 1985 stood at under 2 million.[105]

The seventeenth-century Mongolian chronicle, the *Erdeni-yin tobči,* by Saγang Sečen, a descendant of Činggis Qan in the 22nd generation, mentions that in 1368 there were 400,000 Mongols in China proper:[106]

> Then having left,-one after another (*ubun čubun*)[107] prodding each other on (*qadquldun*)[108] and fleeing, out of 400,000 Mongols 60,000 left, and 340,000 were prevented from leaving and stayed behind.

Munkuev acknowledges that the figure of 400,000 Mongols in China appears not only in the text of the *Erdeni-yin tobči,* but also in the *Altan tobči* (1604), and the *Šara tūǰi* (mid-seventeenth century). Yet, he interprets the figure of 400,000 as "a reflection of that catastrophic reduction in the number of Mongols as a result of military defeats in China and their final expulsion from this country."[109]

Even acknowledging the figure of 400,000 Mongols in China as a rough approximation, it is obvious that the Mongols in Yuan China represented a tiny minority. Moreover, the increasing impoverishment of Mongolian military and commoner families in the fourteenth century meant that the likelihood of filling all offices of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* with Mongols was diminished. It is also not at all surprising to find few Mongols in the lower offices of local government. Below the offices of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*, general administrator, and county magistrate (*hsien-yin*) in Chen-chiang route and its three counties, there were in all only 3 Mongols who served as route associate administrator (*t'ung-chih*), and only 1 Mongol as police commissioner (*hsien-wei*) of Tan-yang county.[110] It should also be noted that in all such lower offices as *chih-shih*, registrar (*ching-li*), commissioner of records (*p'an-kuan*), judicial officer (*t'ui-kuan*), assistant administrator (*chih-chung*), document supervisor (*t'i-k'ung-an-tu*), record keeper (*chu-pu*), and police commissioner (*hsien-wei*), Chinese easily outnumbered Western and Central Asians.[111] Thus, it would appear that the ethnic categories devised by Qubilai were often ignored in the Yuan as necessity dictated that offices be filled with people who could demonstrate bureaucratic and linguistic expertise, whatever their national origins.

Finally, it should be noted that salaries in Yuan times were not tied to ethnic or national origins. The salaries of the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*, general administrators, and other local officials, regardless of whether they were Chinese, Mongolian, or Se-mu, did not vary according to ethnic background. While salaries were standardized throughout China, a North-South differential existed in the distribution of office lands (*chih-t'ien*) to local officials. In 1284, when office lands were established for Chiang-nan officials, they equaled only half the amount of the Fu-li office lands.[112] A route *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* in Chen-chiang, which was a lower route, for instance, would receive 7 *ch'ing* (approximately 112 acres) of office lands, while his counterpart in North China would receive 14 *ch'ing.*[113] It should be pointed out, however, that southern land had a much higher productivity than northern land; reducing allotments by half did not necessarily reduce income.

Despite the numerous restrictions placed on Northern and Southern Chinese by the Yuan rulers, the ambitious could reach positions of responsibility in local government through assuming Mongolian names, studying the Mongolian language, and working their way up from the

ranks of clerks, translators, and interpreters. Paradoxically, although the Yuan represents a period in Chinese history of rigid social and ethnic stratification (as exemplified by the emphasis upon the *yin* privilege, hereditary appointment, and national origins), yet, because of the absence of an examination system during most of the dynasty, access to office assumed various irregular forms, which to some extent often undermined imperial decrees and regulations.

FOUR

# *The* Ta-lu-hua-ch'ih *of the Appanages*

The preceding two chapters have discussed the office of the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* in relation to the regularly appointed local officialdom. Now we turn to *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* in the appanages of the imperial relatives and meritorious officials. There were several terms in use in Yuan times to mean "appanage" or "fief," among them *fen-ti* (allotted territories), *ai-ma* (Mongolian *ayimaγ*: sometimes translated as "tribes"), and *t'ou-hsia* (appanages).[1] The occasional interchangeability of these terms in Yuan sources has led later scholars to debate the exact meaning and significance of terms such as *t'ou-hsia* and *ai-ma*. Paul Ratchnevsky, for example, has written that the terms *ayimaγ* and *t'ou-hsia* were not in all circumstances used interchangeably, but that at times they overlapped in meaning.[2] There is, in fact, one passage in the *Yuan tien-chang* that does equate *t'ou-hsia* and *ai-ma* (*ayimaγ*).[3] Both Abe Takeo and Murakami Masatsugu have defined the *t'ou-hsia* of the Yuan period as "the fiefs (or enfeoffed people) of the imperial princes (*chu-wang*), empresses (*hou-fei*), the imperial sons-in-law (*fu-ma*), imperial daughters (*kung-chu*), meritorious officials (*kung-ch'en*), and others."[4]

Although the term *t'ou-hsia* originally referred to the recipient of a grant, it was also used to refer to the population or territories that were granted.[5] The term may be traced back to the Liao dynasty, when it often appeared in the combination *t'ou-hsia chün-chou* (entrusted commandery-prefectures). Wittfogel and Feng surmised that the term

*t'ou-hsia* 投下 (or 頭下) in the *Liao shih* was a transcription of a Khitan term related to the Monglian words *tūšiye* (support) and *tūši-* (to rely on); however, it is more likely that *t'ou-hsia* was of purely Chinese origins (to submit and come down).[6]

Although hereditary princely lands were not unknown in Chinese history before the Yuan period, they were not the norm in the developing institutions of mid- and later imperial times. The system as it evolved under the Mongolian rulers of China bore the mark of Mongolian and Inner Asian concepts of property division among family members, concepts difficult to accommodate to traditional Chinese imperial practice. In the early-thirteenth-century Mongolian world-view, the empire belonged to the ruling family, and imperial family members were entitled to shares (*qubi*) of it. During Činggis Qan's lifetime, such shares came in the form of peoples, not territories, a concept of exploitation natural to a nomadic culture.[7] After the destruction of the Chin dynasty in 1234, the Mongols' earlier concept of personal, movable property changed to territory, befitting a situation involving sedentary populations; territories, not peoples, were granted to imperial relatives and other worthies in North China.

After the conquest of the Chin dynasty, Ögödei Qayan (the Emperor T'ai-tsung) ordered a census in North China. The purpose in Ögödei's eyes was to grant shares of conquered population to imperial relatives—only now the shares were measured in territory rather than in persons.[8] In spite of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai's advice to concentrate fiscal and political power in the hands of the Emperor, Ögödei's distribution of appanages set the precedent for the rest of the dynasty. Even Qubilai, whose reign later historians have characterized as successfully centralizing authority, never abolished the appanages; Qubilai only imposed on them certain fiscal obligations to the imperial government in Ta-tu in the form of a tax on the "five-households silk households" (*wu-hu-ssu-hu*).[9]

The history of the appanage system as it functioned throughout the Yuan Dynasty remains complex and fragmentary, even in spite of the labors of Japanese scholars on this topic.[10] The topic of appanages is intrinsically related to the topic of local government in Yuan times, since the appanages were staffed by the same offices of local government (including the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*) as the regular civilian government hierarchy offices. The difference lay in who appointed the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*. As this chapter will show, the protracted argument between the Yuan emperors and the appanage-recipients over who had the authority to appoint the senior officials in the appanages reflected an uneasy, never-resolved aspect of the relationship in Yuan times between the institution of the emperor and the Sino-Mongolian institution of granting appanages.



The question of who appointed the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* in the *t'ou-hsia*—the Central Secretariat and the Board of Personnel in Ta-tu or the appanage-holders themselves—has correctly been identified by Iwamura Shinobu as one of the most important questions in Yuan history.[11] By examining that power of appointment, one can piece together a history of the changing relationship between the Yuan Imperial Court and the appanage princes, and the place of local government issues in that relationship.

In 1236, when Ögödei ordered the granting of appanages to imperial relatives in North China, the appanage-holders were permitted to appoint *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* as their chief officials, but the remaining officials in the appanage administrations, on the advice of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai, were to be appointed by the Imperial Court and were charged with collecting revenue for the Court.[12]

Under Qubilai, there were various attempts to rein in the discretionary powers of the holders of *t'ou-hsia*. As early as 1261, according to a brief entry in the *Yuan shih* dated 4 July of that year, the *t'ou-hsia* were blamed for causing disturbances among the people under their jurisdiction:[13] "The imperial princes (*chu-wang*) were prohibited from sending envoys on their own authority (*shan*) to impress the people [into service] (*chao-min*) as well as to levy private revenues (*cheng-ssu-ch'ien*)." A more detailed description of the improper activities of the appanage-holders appears in the text of the 1261 imperial decree as preserved in the *T'ung-chih t'iao-ko*:[14]

> In the 6th moon of the 2nd year of the Chung-t'ung reign period [29 June–28 July 1261], in a respectfully received imperial decree (*sheng-chih*) addressed to the pacification bureaus (*hsuan-fu-ssu*) of the ten routes (*lu*), it was stated:
>
> It has now come to our attention that as for the text (*wen-tzu*) of the re-

spectfully received imperial decrees (*sheng-chih*) as well as [the text] of the decrees of the imperial princes (*ling-chih*), the sundry *t'ou-hsia* have sent messengers (*shih-ch'en*) not to the route offices, but [instead] directly to the subprefectures (*chou*) and counties (*hsien*), where they have opened and read [the texts]. Registering (*chü-shua*) the civilian households (*min-hu*) and the artisans (*jen-chiang*), and then collecting (*chü-shou*) and moving (*ch'i-i*) them, as well as exacting payment of their debts (*ch'ien-chai*), has led to harassment [of the people]. On account of this there has been sent down specially an imperial decree (*sheng-chih*) [which stated]:

> From this time on, whenever the *t'ou-hsia* register and move artisans and civilian households and exact payment of their debts, first they must go through the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* and population overseers (*kuan-min-kuan*) of the pacification bureaus (*hsuan-fu-ssu*) of those same routes. If they are not [in the category of] great majority (*ta-shu*[*-mu*])[15] civilians and artisans (*min chiang*), it is appropriate to collect and move them. Register them as above. They [the *t'ou-hsia*] must certainly not as before cause a disturbance by going directly to the subprefectures and counties on their own authority (*i-mien*). If they are truly not great majority [households], the offices of the various routes (*lu*) certainly should not hinder [the *t'ou-hsia*] from appropriately registering and moving civilians and artisans. In addition, as for the public affair (*kung-shih*) of debts, [the *t'ou-hsia* authorities] should not on their own authority (*i-mien*) collect people to exact [payment of debts]. If they themselves [the civilian households and artisans] have borrowed money, [their cases are] to be determined in accordance with the imperial decrees (*sheng-chih*) originally sent down.[16] This must be determined at the pacification bureaus. Set a deadline [by which time the debtors] should return [to the pacification bureaus to repay debts]. The violators should be punished.
>
> Respect this.

Between 1252 and 1271, the imperial princes were engaged in bickering over their household registers. According to a Shang-shu-sheng memorial of 1271, the number of households to be given to imperial relatives had not been satisfactorily settled:[17]

> In the 3rd moon of the 8th year of the Chih-yuan reign period [11 April–10 May 1271], [the Board of Revenue?] respectfully received an imperial decree (*sheng-chih*) [which stated]:
>
> According to the memorial (*tsou*) of the Shang-shu-sheng [it was stated]:
>
> In the *i-wei* year [1235] in the imperial decree (*sheng-chih*) of the Qaγan and Emperor (*Ho-han Huang-ti*) [Ögödei] which was originally respectfully received [it was stated]:
>
> > The distribution to the imperial princes (*chu-wang*), to the imperial princesses (*kung-chu*), to the imperial sons-in-law (*fu-ma*), and to the officials of the various *t'ou-hsia* of the registered civilian households (*ch'ao-shu-tao min-hu*) has already been accomplished.
>
> In the imperial decree (*sheng-chih*) of the late Emperor [Möngke], respectfully received in the *jen-tzu* year [1252], [it was stated]:
>
> > A registration [of households] is once again to be carried out.
>
> At that time [that is, 1252], the former regional secretariats (*hsing-shang-shu-sheng*)[18] did not distribute carefully [the households to the imperial princes and others]. In the twenty years down to the present [that is, from 1252 to 1271], [the imperial princes and others] have quarreled about the household registers (*hu-chi*), and have repeatedly reexamined them. We [the Shang-shu-sheng] are seriously inconvenienced by the fact that we cannot settle such disputes. In the present instance, it has been decided that, upon careful investigation, the distribution of all categories of households should be respectfully determined in accordance with the successively promulgated (*lei-chiang*) imperial decrees (*sheng-chih*), by examining and comparing them. As for the various household registers, we propose [the following] item-by-item (*chu-k'uan*) regulations (*t'i-li*): the household registers[19] which have been investigated and for which it is appropriate to undertake the civilian household taxes (*tang ch'ai-fa*)[20] should be in accordance with the imperial decrees (*sheng-chih*) which have already been sent down. Do not increase again the quota [of households to be distributed to the imperial princes and others].[21]
>
> Moreover, we approve the memorial (*tsou*) concerning the matter of causing the auxiliary [households] (*hsieh-chi*)[22] [to be placed?] within the quota of those households that bear the civilian-household taxes.
>
> The *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*, the population overseers (*kuan-min-kuan-li*), and the officials who oversee the military (*kuan-chün-kuan*) of all the routes (*lu*), prefectures (*fu*), subprefectures (*chou*), and counties (*ssu-hsien*), as well as all categories of people (*chu-se jen-teng*) of all the *t'ou-hsia* should put into effect the items of the rules (*t'iao-hua shih-li*) of the memorial of the Shang-shu-sheng.



The chief official in the administration of a given *t'ou-hsia* was the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*. Although the office of *t'ou-hsia ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* was briefly abolished on 24 December 1264, it existed throughout the remainder of Qubilai's reign.[23] The regulations for governing the *t'ou-hsia* administra-

tions were set over the course of Qubilai's reign. In the 1260s, the imperial princes were permitted to recommend officials for office in the *lu, fu, chou,* and *hsien* under their appanage jurisdictions. The "senior officials" (meaning the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*) at each of the levels of the appanage administration were permitted to be transferred to other positions in the appanages, but were not allowed to serve in the regular local government bureaucracy outside the realm of the appanages. The *Yuan shih* states:[24]

> As for the allotted territories (*fen-ti*) of the imperial princes (*chu-wang*) and the livelihood lands (*t'ang-mu-i*)[25] which they receive, in all cases they themselves should recommend their persons [for office], and forward their names to the Court (Ch'ao-t'ing), after which they will be granted official posts. In the second year of the Chih-yuan reign period [1265], there was an imperial decree (*chao*) [commanding that] the senior officials (*chang-kuan*) of the various *t'ou-hsia* general administrations (*tsung-kuan-fu*) should not be transferred outside [that is, outside their appanages], and that the senior officials of the subprefectures (*chou*) and counties (*hsien*) under their [*t'ou-hsia*] jurisdiction should be transferred in office only within the towns subordinate to those *t'ou-hsia.*

Thus, while the authority to recommend officials (including the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*) for office lay in the hands of the appanage princes, a request by an enfeoffed grandson of Ögödei in 1280 to allow the princes to appoint all *t'ou-hsia* officials was rejected.[26] In 1281, the appanage princes enfeoffed in the newly-conquered south (Chiang-nan) were granted the right to appoint their own *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*[27] In 1282, it was ordered that the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* of the "allotted territories" (*fen-ti*) be transferred once every three years, since the absence of a policy of transferring them had caused the people in their jurisdictions to suffer.[28]

Qubilai mandated the appointment of Mongols, or at least Western and Central Asians, to the office of *t'ou-hsia ta-lu-hua-ch'ih.* The prohibition against the appointment of Chinese, Jurchen, and Khitan *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* in the appanages paralleled Qubilai's prohibition against non-Mongols serving as *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* in the regular local government bureaucracy. There is abundant evidence that Qubilai's attempt to keep Chinese, Jurchens, and Khitans out of the office of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* was ignored in both the regular bureaucracy and in the appanage administrations. In 1268, Qubilai issued an imperial decree (*chao*) limiting all offices in the *t'ou-hsia* to Mongols:[29] "As for all *t'ou-hsia* officials, Mongols must be appointed." A year later there was a proposal to dismiss all Chinese, Jurchens, and Khitans from the office of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* in the *t'ou-hsia*:[30]



> In the 6th year [of the Chih-yuan reign period: 1269], because among the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* who had been appointed to office in the routes (*lu*) and those who had been commissioned (*ch'uang-ch'ai*) in the various *t'ou-hsia* there were for the most part Jurchens, Khitans, and Northern Chinese (Han-jen), with the exception of Muslims (Hui-hui), Uiyur (Wei-wu-erh), Naiman (Nai-man), and Tanguts (T'ang-wu), for whom it was permissable to be appointed according to the same precedent (*li*) [as that which governed] Mongols, it was proposed that it would be appropriate to dismiss the others [that is, the Jurchens, Khitans, and Northern Chinese]; those who had already been appointed many times were to be appointed among the population overseers (*kuan-min-kuan*).

In 1283, the Censorate, quoting a report of the investigating censors (*chien-ch'a-yü-shih*), suggested appointing only Mongols to the office of *t'ou-hsia ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*:[31] "As for the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* of the routes (*lu*), prefectures (*fu*), subprefectures (*chou*), and counties (*hsien*) which have been distributed to the various *t'ou-hsia,* it is required to select and employ pure Mongols (*cheng Meng-ku jen-yuan*)."

The problem of non-Mongols serving as *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* in the appanages was not solved during Qubilai's reign. A number of later Qubilai and post-Qubilai imperial decrees attest to the continuing practice of appointing Chinese, Jurchens, and Khitans to this office. Some of these appointees adopted Mongolian names in order to attain the office of *t'ou-hsia ta-lu-hua-ch'ih.* An imperial decree (*chao*) of 21 April 1304, for instance, stated:[32]

> As for the prefectures and districts (*chün-i*) that have been distributed to the Imperial Princes (*chu-wang*) and the imperial sons-in-law (*fu-ma*), they should appoint only Mongols as *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih.* Once every three years, according to the regulations, they should be transferred. As for those Northern Chinese (Han-jen), Jurchens, and Khitans among them who have Mongolian names, they should all be dismissed.

In 1316, the Board of Punishments (Hsing-pu) suggested that *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* who had improperly assumed Mongolian names be brought in for legal hearings and have their patents of office removed.[33]

The appanage princes were permitted to appoint, subject to the approval of the Central Secretariat, not only the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* but also judges (*jarγuči* or *tuan-shih-kuan*).[34] Such judges came under the ultimate jurisdiction of the Imperial Clan Administration (Tsung-cheng-fu), were appointed by each of the appanage princes in his holding, and administered legal affairs mainly pertaining to Mongols.[35] That appanage *tuan-shih-kuan* and *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* could exceed their authority in the eyes of the central government in Ta-tu is made evident by a 1271 Shang-shu-sheng memorial which refers to the *tuan-shih-kuan* and *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* as having sentenced people without authorization.[36]

Under the Emperor Jen-tsung (Ayurbarwada, great-grandson of Qubilai, ruled 1311–1320), there was an attempt to consolidate the Imperial Government's power over the appanages by diminishing the enfeoffed princes' discretionary power in two areas. First, the Emperor attempted to abolish the office of judge (*tuan-shih-kuan*) in the *t'ou-hsia* in 1311, and second, in 1316–1317, he attempted to abrogate the right of the imperial princes to appoint their own *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*. Both attempts ultimately met with failure.

The abolition of the office of judge in the appanages is described as follows in the *Yuan shih*:[37]

> On the *hsin-mao* day [of the 10th moon of the 4th year of the Chih-ta reign period: 4 December 1311], the office of *tuan-shih-kuan* of the imperial princes (*chu-wang*) was abolished. As for those Mongols who committed illegal acts of robbery or fraud, the chiliarchs (*ch'ien-hu*) under whose jurisdiction they were were ordered to hold judicial hearings.

The plan to abolish the office of *tuan-shih-kuan* met with opposition, however, and was apparently not observed by all imperial princes. The Prince of Chin, Yeh-sun T'ieh-mu-erh (Yesün Temür), who later became the T'ai-ting Emperor, established four more judges (*tuan-shih-kuan*) in his appanage on 27 January 1316.[38] The Prince of Chou, Ho-shih-la (Qošila), who ruled as Emperor for a few months in 1329, appointed eight judges in his appanage on 4 April 1316.[39]



It is difficult to gauge whether the appointment of judges represented outright acts of defiance against the wishes of the Emperor Jen-tsung. The important observation to be made, however, is that this most Sinified of all Yuan Emperors attempted to weaken the appanages and centralize authority. The Emperor Jen-tsung whom John Dardess has characterized as having "Confucianizing tendencies"[40] was also the Emperor responsible for reinstating the examination system in 1315. By contrast, the Prince of Chin and the Prince of Chou, who opposed the Emperor Jen-tsung's policies, had political careers that kept them in Mongolia for long periods; they were quite possibly more in touch with traditional Mongolian socio-political notions of pluralistic rule–notions that would favor independent actions by enfeoffed princes. At the very least, their appanages served as power bases and rallying points for their supporters in their later attempts to gain the throne of China.

The Jen-tsung Emperor's attempt to take away the enfeoffed princes' discretionary authority to appoint their own *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* was short-lived in the face of the active opposition of the princes. The idea to have *t'ou-hsia ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* appointed only by the Central Secretariat in Ta-tu was espoused by T'ieh-mu-tieh-erh (Temüder), then Minister of the Right (*Yu-ch'eng-hsiang*).[41] Temüder, in the tradition of Aḥmad and Sangha, the notorious financial advisors who had served Qubilai, made policy with the goal of increasing tax revenues. He had little sympathy with the appanage princes who throughout Yuan times were accused of economic exploitation of their populations to the detriment of the treasury in Ta-tu. Moreover, it seems that Temüder was instrumental in reducing by the year 1319 the total number of "five-households silk households," most of which were in North China, to about one-fourth their 1236 original number.[42]

In a set of documents in the *Yuan tien-chang*, the Censorate in 1317 accused Temüder of defying Qubilai's established system of managing the *t'ou-hsia*. In the face of strong criticism by the Censorate and by certain of the imperial princes themselves, Temüder was forced to back down from his scheme to weaken the power of the princes:[43]

> In the 1st moon of the 5th year of the Yen-yu reign period [2 February–3 March 1318], the Chiang-nan Regional Censorate (*hsing-t'ai*) respectfully received the communiqué (*tzu*) of the Censorate (Yu-shih-t'ai). In one item of the

content of that which was memorialized by the Censorate officials on the 17th day of the 6th moon of the 4th year of the Yen-yu reign period [25 July 1317], [it was stated]:

Investigating censors (*chien-ch'a-mei*) said in a document (*wen-shu*):

As for the *daruγači* of the various *t'ou-hsia*, at the time when the Emperor T'ai-tsu (Činggis Qan) first arose in the northern regions, the older and younger brothers (*ko-ko ti-hsiung-mei*)[44] discussed and decided [the following], saying: "If we take the empire (*t'ien-hsia* [that is, the world?]), we shall all divide up the lands and enjoy the riches together."

Since the time when the Emperor Shih-tsu (Qubilai) ascended the throne, a system of laws (*fa-tu*) has been established. As for the cities which were distributed to the imperial princes (*chu-wang*), they [the imperial princes] were instructed to appoint their own *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*. This way of managing things has been in effect for many years. Recently, T'ieh-mu-tieh-erh (Temüder) departed from (*pieh-le*) the imperial decree (*sheng-chih*) of the Emperor Shih-tsu. He has without reason dismissed the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* whom the various *t'ou-hsia* have appointed. On account of (*ti-shang-t'ou*)[45] his instructing them to appoint only second-ranking officials (*tz'u-erh-kuan*),[46] [T'ieh-mu-tieh-erh] has lost the loyalty of the imperial princes. . . .

On the 22nd day of the 6th moon of the 4th year of the Yen-yu reign period [30 July 1317], in one item of the content of that which was memorialized [by the Censorate?] [it was stated]:

Previously, as for the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* whom the imperial princes (*chu-wang-mei*) appointed in the various routes (*lu*), prefectures (*fu*), subprefectures (*chou*), and counties (*hsien*), they were ordered to appoint the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*.[47] [Now] they are ordered to appoint head (*wei-t'ou*) *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* from within the great majority (*ta-shu-mu*).[48]

There was respectfully received an imperial decree (*sheng-chih*) which stated:

Recently, Censorate officials have memorialized [saying]:

In the cities of the various *t'ou-hsia* only in accordance with the regulations (*t'i-li*) which have already been put into effect, let them appoint head (*wei-t'ou*) *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*. Let them not be appointed from within the great majority (*ta-shu-mu*).

Recently, Yeh-sun T'ieh-mu-erh (Yesün Temür), the Prince of Chin (*Chin-wang*), To-liu-nieh (Dörēne)[49] and other princes (*ta-wang*) have said:

This is the affair of our *t'ou-hsia*. How would it be if we appointed *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* in accordance with the former procedure (*li*)?

They sent a letter (*wen-shu*) to us saying that:



When we memorialized, we respectfully received an imperial decree (*sheng-chih*) which stated:

We also have spoken thus. From the time of the Emperor Shih-tsu, the established regulations have been attended to. In accordance with the former procedure (*li*), have the various *t'ou-hsia* appoint only head (*wei-t'ou*) *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*.

So said the imperial decree.

Respect this.

Thus, while the appanages could appoint vice-*ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*, this new office was apparently only second in command. The Central Secretariat under Temüder authorized itself to appoint the head (*wei-t'ou*) *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* from outside the appanages themselves. It appears that the right of the princes to appoint their own *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* was abrogated for a little over a year (from June 1316 to July 1317) before pressure from the Censorate and the princes themselves reversed Temüder's policies. Temüder's short-lived reform did cause a certain amount of reshuffling as the new office of vice (*fu*)-*ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* was added to the *t'ou-hsia* bureaucracy, displacing other local offices in the appanages. The *Yuan shih* records under the date 24 June 1316 the following laconic entry:[50] "The offices of associate administrator (*t'ung-chih*) and county magistrate (*hsien-ch'eng*) of the prefecture and districts (*chün-i*) in the allotted territories (*fen-ti*) of the imperial princes (*chu-wang*) and meritorious officials (*kung-ch'en*) were changed into the office of vice-(*fu*)-*ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*; the middle and lower counties (*chung hsia hsien*) as well as the *lu-shih-ssu* [each] appointed in addition one vice-*ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*." The *Yuan tien-chang* provides more background on the installation of vice-*ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* in 1316:[51]

In the 7th moon of the 3rd year of the Yen-yu reign period [20 July–18 August 1316], the regional secretariats (*hsing-sheng*) respectfully received the communiqué (*tzu*) of the Central Secretariat [which stated]:

On the 11th day of the 5th moon of the 3rd year of the Yen-yu reign period [1 June 1316], in one item of the content of that which was memorialized [by the Central Secretariat] it was stated:

Last year in the various routes (*lu*), subprefectures (*chou*), and counties (*hsien*) which were distributed to the various *t'ou-hsia*, and in the various Kesig (Ch'ieh-hsieh) [units][52] *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* were appointed above

> the people who were appointed by the regular means of selection (*ch'ang-hsuan*).[53] In the various routes (*lu*), subprefectures (*chou*), and counties (*hsien*), each should eliminate one official. Have those who should be appointed by the *t'ou-hsia* serve as vice-*ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*.
>
> At present in accordance with the previous, in the various routes and subprefectures eliminate the office of associate administrator (*t'ung-chih*); in the upper counties (*shang-hsien*) eliminate the office of county magistrate (*hsien-ch'eng*); have the various *t'ou-hsia* appoint vice-*ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* [to replace the above-mentioned abolished offices]. If the middle and lower counties' offices of record-keeper (*chu-pu*) and the office of commissioner of records (*lu-p'an*) of the *lu-shih-ssu* which are in charge of taxation and apprehending robbers are abolished, that would not be appropriate. How would it be if we had the various *t'ou-hsia* appoint in addition one vice-*ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*?
>
> We have discussed this. As for the memorial, let it be that way (*na-pan-cbe*). So said the imperial decree.
>
> Respect this.
>
> The Central Secretariat (Tu-sheng) respectfully requested the regional secretariats to put this into effect accordingly.

In the spring of 1317, the Central Secretariat received a report saying that neither salaries nor public lands (*kung-t'ien*) had been established or distributed to the newly appointed vice-*ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*. The Central Secretariat proceeded to adopt a set of regulations proposed by the Board of Revenue which gave the new vice-*ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* the same salaries and lands that had been given to the offices they replaced (the associate administrator and county magistrate) or salaries and lands equivalent to those of the county record-keeper (*chu-pu*) and commissioner of records (*lu-p'an*) in the *lu-shih-ssu*.[54] Yet, only a few months later, the office of vice-*ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* was permanently abolished. On 30 July 1317, the *Yuan shih* records the decree (*ch'ih*):[55] "As for the allotted territories (*fen-ti*) of the imperial princes (*chu-wang*), the imperial sons-in-law (*fu-ma*), and the meritorious officials (*kung-ch'en*), as in the old system they themselves selected the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*." Further evidence of the reinstatement of the old system of appointments in the appanages appears in a document in the *Yuan tien-chang* dated 1318:[56]

> From this time onwards, when the various *t'ou-hsia* have vacancies for officials, have them select and appoint [officials] only from within the *ai-ma* (*ayima*[γ]). People from within the great majority (*ta-shu-mu-li-jen-mei*) should not deceptively advance into [such offices].



The administrations of the appanages were thus segregated from the regular local government administration, and the office of vice-*ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*, which existed only during the reign of the Emperor Jen-tsung, was abolished.

The friction between the imperial princes and the Throne did not, however, end with the death of Ayurbarwada, the Emperor Jen-tsung. In 1328, after the death of Yesün Temür, who had reigned as the Emperor T'ai-ting, a brief war over the succession to the throne ensued.[57] Although, as John Dardess has pointed out, the enfeoffed princes were not heavily involved in the succession struggle, it does appear that those princes who had cast their lot with the losing side (Aragibag, son of Yesün Temür) faced unpleasant consequences.[58] The new Emperor, Tuγ Temür, moved quickly in November 1328 to dismiss the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* of the *lu, fu, chou,* and *hsien* under the jurisdiction of the Prince of Chin, Pa-ti-ma I-erh-chien-pu (Badma Irgelbu),[59] and the Prince of Liao, T'o-t'o (To[γ]tō). The Prince of Liao had fought on Aragibag's side.[60] The *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* of these two appanages were to be replaced by officials appointed by the Central Secretariat and Board of Personnel in the capital.

A month later, Yen T'ieh-mu-erh (El Temür), Chancellor of the Right and *éminence grise* at the court of the Emperor Wen-tsung (Tuγ Temür) memorialized, saying:[61]

> The *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* of the prefectures (*fu*) and counties (*hsien*) under the jurisdiction of the Prince of Chin (Chin-wang) as well as the Prince of Liao (Liao-wang) and others have already been dismissed. As for the Imperial Clan Administration (Tsung-cheng-fu) *cha-lu-hu-ch'ih* (*jarγuči*) who have been recommended by them [the princes], and the *tuan-shih-kuan* [that is, *jarγuči*] of the Central Secretariat, all are their [the princes'] personal retainers (*ssu-jen*), and they too should be dismissed from office.

This memorial was approved.

The abrogation of the princes' authority to appoint *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* and judges (*jarγuči* or *tuan-shih-kuan*) grew out of the Imperial Court's fear that certain princes were inclined to rebel. The Prince of Liao's

loyalty was questioned in a report of a Chiang-nan Regional Censor on 13 January 1329:[62]

> As for the Prince of Liao (Liao-wang), T'o-t'o (To[γ]tō), since the time of his grandfather and father, several times [his family] has revolted, probably owing to the fact that the territory with which they have been entrusted is great and their properties are numerous. It would be appropriate to expunge his princely title (*wang-hao*), to banish his sons and grandsons to remote areas, and to divide up the territory originally entrusted to him.

In May 1329, the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* who served in the appanages of the imperial princes were instructed not to retain their official residences in places from which they had already been transferred. Also, the sons and younger brothers of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* were ordered not to succeed to the same offices that their fathers and elder brothers held.[63] This was not the first attempt to establish a type of anti-nepotism regulation with regard to appanage appoinments. In 1313, the Imperial Prince Pa-pu-sha (*Babuša) informed the Central Secretariat that he intended to appoint a certain Hsueh-erh-t'ieh-kai (Sertegei)[64] as a *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* in his *t'ou-hsia*.[65] Censors reported, however, that Hsueh-erh-t'ieh-kai's brothers were already serving as *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* in the subprefectures (*chou*) and counties (*hsien*) within Pa-pu-sha's appanage. The Central Secretariat expressed concern that government business would be obstructed and the people would be disturbed by such an arrangement. As a result, the Central Secretariat permitted the appointment of Hsueh-erh-t'ieh-kai but demanded the dismissal of his brothers who were already serving as *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*. An imperial decree (*sheng-chih*) approved the Central Secretariat's suggestion that a comprehensive precedent (*t'ung-li*) be created to stop such appointments in the future.

The history of the *t'ou-hsia ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* system after the reign of the Emperor Wen-tsung remains somewhat obscure. Iwamura Shinobu has suggested that the *t'ou-hsia* system as a whole declined during the course of the Yuan dynasty for three reasons: a reduction in the number of registered households owing to their actual flight from the *t'ou-hsia;* emigration on the tax rolls of the "five-households silk households" to the status of government households; and a decline in agriculture.[66] Because there are no documents in the *T'ung-chih t'iao-ko* and the *Yuan tien-chang* postdating the early 1320s, it is difficult to follow the further evolution and demise of the *t'ou-hsia ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* system.



Despite imperial attempts to weaken the authority of the appanage princes in their own domains, the existence of territories, populations and officials outside the direct control of the government in Ta-tu constituted a thorn in the side of imperial policy-makers. Modes of governing that can be traced back to the decentralized structure of the tribal society of the pre-conquest Mongols persisted throughout the Yuan dynasty. The duties of the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* in the regular government bureaucracy under the jurisdiction of Ta-tu and the duties of the appanage *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* were similar. Yet, the two types of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* answered to different authorities—one representing the myth of imperial unity and integration and one representing the enfeoffed princes' impulse towards decentralization. The Mongols' thwarting of imperial Chinese models of governing displays one of the anomalies of Mongolian rule in China.

The Ming dynasty rulers did not perpetuate the Yuan system of *t'ou-hsia*. Unlike many of their Yuan predecessors, Ming imperial princes lacked administrative, judicial, or territorial jurisdictions.[67] The appanage system that the Mongols devised with its full complement of local officials from the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* on down was unique to Yuan times.

As far as Mongolian history is concerned, a significant long-term effect of the Yuan appanage system was, as Chou Liang-hsiao has pointed out, to weaken imperial authority among the Mongols and to contribute thereby to the political fragmentation which accelerated after 1368 when the Mongols abandoned Ta-tu and returned to the steppe.[68] The internecine struggles among various Mongolian tribal and clan groups from the late fourteenth century until the imposition of Manchu administration in the seventeenth century had their roots in the Yuan political system itself.

FIVE

# *Yuan Local Government and Society*

Many questions pertaining to the character of Mongolian rule in thirteenth- and fourteenth-century China remain as yet unresolved. In particular, the degree to which Yuan government penetrated and affected Yuan local society is an enigmatic topic. One wonders whether Chinese social mores and customs changed at all during the century or so of Mongolian rule, and, if there were changes, whether those changes originated to some extent out of contact with Mongols and Western Central Asians on the local level. It is not the aim of this concluding chapter to reconstruct Yuan local society; such an ambitious task must await further research. Here, we shall merely scratch the surface of the rich and plentiful materials on Yuan social history to attempt a preliminary, tentative assessment of the relationship between government and society in thirteenth- and fourteenth century China.

As a means of treating this topic, we shall initially focus on the role of lower-level functionaries such as clerks and village officers. The clerks and village personnel represent two distinct groups which stood (sometimes as a bridge, sometimes as an obstacle) between local government and local society.[1] Through examining the functioning of these two groups as well as the reasons why the Mongols depended so heavily upon them and why they were resented by elite elements in Chinese society, it will be possible to formulate a notion of the way in which the interests of Mongolian rulers coincided or conflicted with society's needs.

Most researchers agree that the social status of clerks in Yuan times rose appreciably in comparison with their status in Sung and earlier times.[2] As noted in Chapter 3, many officials in the Yuan bureaucracy began their careers by serving as clerks. The new legal professionalism of this corps of clerks has been described by Paul Ch'en in his book on the legal code of 1291.[3] Yet, scholars do not agree on the effects of this professionalism on the quality of local government in the Yuan. Paul Ch'en concludes that the legal and administrative expertise displayed by the clerks bettered social conditions:[4]

> The infusion of legal experience and practical knowledge at the various levels—from the formal trial to the preparation of legal documents—contributed to the expansion of legal professionalism in the Yuan dynasty, thus promoting the effective administration of justice.

Yet, it seems more likely, as James T. C. Liu has remarked, that "an increasing reliance on the clerks because of their expertise led to more widespread corruption."[5] Legal professionalism made clerks appear even more indispensable, but did not necessarily curb their traditional penchant for bribery and corruption. What do contemporary observers say about the influence of clerks upon the quality of local government? Did legal professionalism in the Yuan help to counter the corruption that has been traditionally ascribed to clerks throughout Chinese history? While clerical corruption per se is impossible to measure in absolute terms, and while it is difficult to determine whether complaints about clerks were of a perennial nature or peculiar to the Yuan, the observations of Yuan and early Ming writers clearly reflect a negative evaluation of clerks. We shall discuss below whether to accept at face value these negative appraisals.

In his *Ts'ao-mu-tzu*, the late Yuan and early Ming writer Yeh Tzu-ch'i, who held a dim view of the Mongols and Mongolian culture, ascribed governmental corruption to a deficiency in morality among the Yuan rulers:[6]

> In the final years of the Yuan dynasty, officials were greedy and clerks were corrupt. Initially this was because the Mongols and Western and Central Asians (Se-mu-jen) ignorantly did not know what incorruptibility and a sense of shame were.



Yeh Tzu-ch'i did not single out clerks as the only ones responsible for the corruption and bribery he believed were interwoven into the fabric of Yuan administration; rather, he saw corruption emanating from the top, and bemoaned the lack of an examination system:[7]

> In the beginning of the Yuan, the system of laws (*fa-tu*) was clearly maintained. There were still things people feared to do; the situation had not yet degenerated to the extreme. From the time when Pai-yen (Bayan), the Prince of Ch'in (Ch'in-wang), dominated the government,[8] the chief offices of the Censorate were all gained by negotiating a price. Frequently those payments amounted to several thousand strings of cash. So, when they went out on their official tours, they competed in outdoing one another in illegal profits, and so repaid the costs [of obtaining office]. In this they were comparable to the "generals in debt" (*chai-shuai*) of the T'ang.[9] Thereupon the various offices of government all adopted this mode of behavior. At all levels [of government] there was bribery, practiced openly, as if in a market. The turmoil was such that the fundamental principles (*chi-kang*) could not be restored. In the subprefectures (*chou*) and counties (*hsien*) to which they traveled, the officials of the surveillance bureaus (*su-cheng lien-fang-ssu-kuan*) each brought along a treasurer (*k'u-tzu*) who examined the paper money and weighed the silver, virtually in the manner of the marketplace. The *Spring and Autumn Commentary* (*Ch'un-ch'iu* [*Tso-*] *chuan*) says:[10] "The ruin of dynasties occurs because of the immorality of officials. Favoritism and bribery are manifestations of the loss of virtue by officials." How can this not be believed?
>
> As for the official career path, except for the Prince (*Wang*) Mu-hua-li (Muqali) and the others of the four Kesig who through their great [aristocratic] origins and status (*ta-ken-chiao ch'u-shen*) were appointed to office in the Central Secretariat (Sheng) and the Censorate (T'ai),[11] most of the others were [appointed from the ranks of mere] clerks. As for those who were selected through the examination system, they amounted to only one out of 10,000. They amounted to nothing more than an instrument for giving the appearance of an Age of Great Peace. People say that [the examination system] has no benefit, and that it may as well be abolished. Can it be that the turns of historical fate have brought this about? Why was [such degeneration] never so serious under the T'ang or the Sung?

Another writer, K'ung Ch'i, blamed all the dynasty's problems upon the employment of petty clerks (*hsiao-li*) and the absence of scholars in the administration:[12]

> That [the Emperor] Shih-tsu (Qubilai) was able to achieve the great unification of the empire was because he used authentic scholars (*chen-ju*). He used

> authentic scholars to gain the empire, but he did not use authentic scholars to govern the empire. After [a period of] more than eighty years, suddenly disaster has broken out. This is entirely because petty clerks (*hsiao-li*) are responsible for affairs. From the capital to distant areas, in the highest offices such as the Central Secretariat (Sheng), the Privy Council (Yuan), the Censorate (T'ai), and the Boards (Pu), and in the lesser offices of the routes (*lu*), the prefectures (*fu*), the subprefectures (*chou*), and the counties (*hsien*), as well as in all the various minor offices, there are none that are not like this. Even if one scholar were to govern, how could he rectify these abuses? How much the more so when there are no authentic scholars to govern. Therefore, I say that that which has spoiled the empire and the dynasty consists of the crimes of the clerks.

A remarkable vehemence in denouncing clerks forms a common element in all these writings. To give yet another example or two of this pointed criticism, K'ung Ch'i, in a separate tirade against clerks, wrote:[13] "As for the crimes of local clerks (*t'u-li*), execution would be too light a sentence." Hu Chih-yü (1225–1293), while insisting that officials were as guilty as clerks in delaying legal hearings and bending the laws, wrote:[14]

> Even if one were to beat the clerks every day, they still would not [properly] perform the responsibilities of governing. Why is that? They feel no shame on being cursed at and they do not object to being flogged. As long as they obtain their bribes, they are satisfied. This is the common practice of the county (*hsien*) clerks.

Another perspective on clerks' abuses emerges from a handbook for local officials entitled *Frank Advice for the Magistrate* (*Mu-min chung-kao*), a 2-*chüan* work written by Chang Yang-hao (1270–1329) while he served as a magistrate (*hsien-yin*) of T'ang-i county in modern Shantung province.[15] Far from advocating the execution or beating of corrupt clerks, Chang Yang-hao tends to place the responsibility for clerical corruption squarely upon the shoulders of the magistrates themselves. In a rather moralistic tone of voice, Chang's handbook offers many interesting observations, criticisms, and suggestions originating from his personal on-the-job experience.

In one piece entitled "Controlling clerks," Chang Yang-hao advises magistrates that the very indispensability of clerks leads inevitably to their corruption, and that magistrates' only recourse is to keep careful track of clerks' records and to refuse to accept gifts from them.[16] Other advice on how to prevent clerks from turning corrupt appears in his essay entitled "Restraint":[17]



> As for the sundry clerks, do not allow them to go out fraternizing among the people or to make friendships with wealthy households, by means of which they will divulge official business, create pretexts for lawsuits, and (lit.) open lucky doors (*ch'i hsing-men*). In their free moments, you [that is, the magistrate] should gather them together, lecture to them on the classics, and read to them the statutes (*lü*).

Chang Yang-hao's advice on the one hand to make clerks keep their distance from local officials ("when clerks and officials associate with each other closely, cunning and deceit easily arise"),[18] and on the other hand to keep clerks from mixing among the population at large seems unrealistic; clerks could not be locked away in isolation. Nonetheless, the many pages in Chang's handbook devoted to the problem of controlling clerks indicates the top priority of this problem in the eyes of Chinese scholar-officials.

Certain questions inevitably arise about the Mongols' extensive use of clerks in local government. How did the use of sub-officials serve the governing needs of the Mongols? Why did the use of sub-officials so infuriate members of the Chinese elite? And were the Mongols deliberately by-passing the Chinese elite through employing only professionally trained legal experts?

As various modern scholars have noted, two of the most reliable routes to a government career in Yuan times were the military and the clerkly.[19] In the absence of an examination system before 1315, scholars who elected to pursue government careers had to come to terms with the limited appreciation the Mongolian rulers showed towards traditional Confucian learning. This does not mean, however, that the path to office was closed to scholars. Some scholars, especially those from Chin-hua prefecture, as John D. Langlois's research has shown, redefined the scholar's role in government and society so that clerical tasks fell within the scholar's purview.[20] Chin-hua scholars did serve in the government and they encouraged other literati to develop an expertise in legal and administrative affairs.

Why, then, were there so many complaints about clerical corruption and its supposedly catastrophic effects on the workings of local government? While not denying the very real problem of clerical abuses, one must point out that the complaints of the traditional elite regarding clerks should not always be taken at face value. Undoubtedly there was a "sour-grapes" syndrome at work. Because irregular routes to officialdom were either not palatable to certain scholars, or else not entirely open to them, we might expect those who were excluded (including the self-excluded) to cast aspersions upon the workings of a system in which, for one reason or another, they took no part. Such an attitude of "righteous indifference," as F. W. Mote has termed it, should be differentiated from a true commitment to withdrawal into the life of a Confucian eremite.[21] Thus, the complaints of the literati regarding clerks in the Yuan dynasty in part reflected the reality of a steady devolution of power downward into the hands of clerks and document-routers (*shou-ling-kuan*), and in part reflected the bitterness of men whose career expectations had been thwarted.

Modern scholars who have written on Yuan China have been quick to attribute clerkly corruption and other facets of Yuan maladministration both to a moral lapse on the part of the Mongolian rulers and to a type of exploitation supposedly peculiar to the Mongols. Thus, John D. Langlois's statement that the Mongolian emperors "did not always concern themselves with the moral quality of their agents, so long as the agents were able to deliver sufficient amounts of monies and goods" reflects much the same sentiment as the late Yuan–early Ming writer Yeh Tzu-ch'i's judgment that "the Mongols and Western and Central Asians (Se-mu-jen) ignorantly did not know what incorruptibility and a sense of shame were."[22] Similarly, David Farquhar has implied that the main *raison d'être* of the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* was the exploitation of local populations. He has referred to the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* as the "representatives of the Mongol imperial power, found not only at the circuit, but at all levels of government, wherever populations were directly administered and exploited."[23]

In terms of a framework of analysis, exploitation as a theoretical approach to the larger question of the Mongol's motives, interests, and policies in ruling China is somewhat limiting. Acceptance of exploitation as the only moving force behind the Mongols' decision-making processes may preclude a meaningful analysis of elements in Mongolian culture which helped to determine patterns of rule in China.



On the question of whether Mongolian exploitation was generically different from the exploitative practices of traditional Chinese governments, it should be stressed that there is no evidence that the Mongolian rulers from Qubilai's reign onward collected revenues from the Chinese population in order to send those revenues to other qayanates. Thomas Allsen has pointed out that Qubilai's authority outside China and Mongolia was "somewhat tenuous," and that, despite nominal recognition of Qubilai as the ruler of a so-called empire, the other qayanates did not act on Qubilai's orders.[24] In terms of the mutual cooperation and mutually beneficial financial and military arrangements that would normally characterize regions within a political unit functioning as an empire, one can with assurance dispense with the use of the word "empire" to describe the distinctly separate political states governed by the Mongols in Eurasia after 1260. Thus, without a centralized Eurasian revenue-collecting and distributing network after 1260, it is hard to see how the activities of the Yuan government administration differed greatly from the activities of other dynasties that ruled China.

The fundamental goal of all dynasties on Chinese territory—whether conquest dynasties or Chinese dynasties—was twofold: to exact wealth from the empire, and to maintain order within the empire. Achieving balance between these two aspirations was the key to success. If a government extracted too much in the way of taxes and corvée demands, the populace would revolt, and the dynasty's claim to the mandate to rule would be jeopardized. Any imperial government that ruled China was exploitative to the extent that such a government had to find a suitable means to extract wealth, resources, and manpower from the population. This observation applies not only to a foreign dynasty of conquest like the Yuan but to Chinese dynasties as well. The fact that the Yuan dynasty was plagued by revolts throughout its life suggests that the Mongolian emperors never did achieve the necessary balance between exploitation and policing.[25] This may help explain why the Yuan dynasty, which witnessed cultural and artistic florescence and economic growth, was so short-lived.

While monies and goods were not being exacted from the Chinese

population to support a larger Mongolian empire, yet, during and after Qubilai's reign, China did serve as a resource base to sustain warfare against other qayanates and against Japan, Burma, Indonesia, and Vietnam. China, in other words, was used by its Mongolian emperors as a resource base to support further, mostly unsuccessful, Mongolian conquest and expansion. This type of exploitation—for expansionist purposes—was, however, not qualitatively different from the vastly expensive expansionist policies pursued by the Sui dynasty against Koguryō in the early seventh century or by T'ang T'ai-tsung against the Central Asian oasis kingdoms and Koguryō. Thus, the motives behind Mongolian revenue collection in China were hardly unique; to suggest that there was a peculiarly Mongolian type of exploitation would be to ignore obvious precedents in Chinese history and to credit the Mongols with greater organizational successes than they in fact ever achieved.

Furthermore, exploitation is a rather unsatisfactory answer to the question of why the Mongols ruled China in the manner they did. We might ask why the Mongols did not rule China in the more efficiently exploitative manner that their cousins on the western fringe of the steppe ruled the Russian principalities, that is, as absentee tribute-collectors. The Mongols of the Golden Horde situated themselves in their capital city of Sarai (later New Sarai) on the lower Volga, never bothering to occupy the Russian cities or countryside. Remaining aloof from one's subjects while collecting revenues from them would seem to be an ideal strategy for exploitation of a conquered people.[26]

The Golden Horde method of exploitation sharply contrasts with the Mongols' direct involvement in court politics, policy-making, and local government in China. Through their representatives—the *basqaq* and the *daruγa*—the Golden Horde rulers effectively exacted taxes, tribute, and plunder. One must ask why, if nomadic exploitation was the central rationale for the Mongols' continuing presence in China, the Yuan rulers went as far as they did in adopting Chinese bureaucratic modes of governing. Why was the post of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* allowed to develop from that of personal envoy or plenipotentiary of the ruler into a fully operative member of a functioning bureaucracy? Although the Mongols staffed and ran local government along their own decentralized lines, often at variance with Chinese bureaucratic precedents,



that mode of governing was far removed from the archetypical nomadic raid.

There was an internal logic within Mongolian culture that helped determine the overall pattern of Mongolian governance in China. The Mongols did value technicians (clerkly and military) over learned scholars. Most Mongols were indeed unread in traditional Confucian writings. Yet, their refusal to use the services of Confucian-educated scholars derived not so much from any hostility to the Confucian tradition, but rather derived from the fact that the utility of such practical endeavours as record-keeping and the military arts was more easily recognizable to them.

The thirteenth-century Mongols had cultural values that they interjected into the process of selecting personnel to staff the offices of local government and the positions of the sub-bureaucracy. Loyalty and faithfulness to one's ruler are values that emerge prominently from a reading of the thirteenth-century *Secret History of the Mongols*.[27] Sechin Jagchid and Paul Hyer have pinpointed the place of loyalty among the Mongols:[28] "Loyalty became an iron rule in Mongolian society as Chinggis Khan set an important precedent of paternalistic concern for his subordinates and followers." In adapting their culture to the requirements of bureaucratic procedures in China, the Mongols gradually deemphasized the importance of interpersonal relationships based on loyalty and faithfulness to one's leader. The Mongols could not apply the same tests of loyalty that they might have on the steppe; but they could deliberately exclude members of the Chinese elite in favor of clerks who had not necessarily been imbued with Confucian learning. The loyalty of the clerks could not be guaranteed, but at least there was no competing ideology for the Mongols to contend with, inasmuch as a number of clerks had received a relatively narrow professional training.

Indeed, as John D. Langlois has pointed out, Yuan clerks were "technicians who espoused no ideology."[29] It was not that the Mongols were hostile to Chinese culture or learning— they simply were not very interested. Their notions of government service were derived ultimately from tribal and military values. Chin-hua scholars were able to bridge this cultural gap to a certain extend by assuming the extra task of developing expertise in clerkly learning. For those Chinese scholars who

could not compromise and who were either shut out of government service or relegated to unranked positions in the bureaucracy, condemnation of the clerks as a group perhaps provided an outlet for deeply felt frustrations.

This is not to say that corruption did not exist in the local government of the Yuan. The repetition of certain types of complaints lends credibility to their validity. Typical complaints about local administration included overstaffing, lack of continuity in administration, too rapid and frequent promotion of clerks, and slowness in the judicial decision-making process. Wang Chieh (1274–1336) called for the reduction of supernumerary officials in an 8-point proposal addressed to the Central Secretariat,[30] while Wang Yun (1227–1304) urged that subprefectures (*chou*) and counties (*hsien*) be merged and that the total number of officials be reduced.[31] Wang Yun wrote that one of the worst abuses in the government administration in the Yuan was that of "ten sheep and nine shepherds." In his handbook for local magistrates, Chang Yang-hao devotes pages to the problem of lack of continuity and cooperation in local administration. Prefects whose terms in office are about to expire neglect to inform their replacements about pending business and even treat their newly arrived replacements with unconcealed contempt.[32]

Hu Chih-yü described the promotion of clerks back and forth between local and metropolitan positions:[33]

> Clerks advance too quickly. Just after leaving the prefectures (*fu*), subprefectures (*chou*), and *ssu-hsien*, they immediately enter [offices in] the Central Secretariat (Sheng) and Boards (Pu). Just after entering [offices in] the Central Secretariat and Boards, [even though] they have not completed one term in office, they immediately are appointed in the prefectures, subprefectures, and *ssu-hsien*.

Hu Chih-yü ascribed delays in the resolution of legal suits to officials' and clerks' fear of being punished. Better no decision at all than an erroneous decision:[34]

> In recent years, villainous and greedy officials and clerks, fearing punishment for wrongdoing, [simply] do not conclude any business, to the point where, even when the truth and falsehood of two parties in a legal suit are clearly discernible, they procrastinate. A slight delay may last several months, and, when extreme, it may last one or two years, or even to the point where the incumbent official's term in office has come to an end and the incumbent clerks (*ssu-li*) have been replaced by several [new] people, but still no decision will have been made.



Such statements by people concerned with the government's impact upon society in one way or another point to a laxity of government control over its own officials and clerks. Obviously there was no dearth of officials, as reflected both in the *Yuan tien-chang's* documentation of the number of civil officials (26,698) and in contemporary proposals to reduce the number of local officials. Yet, in the end, neither a relatively well-staffed local administration nor a professionally trained corps of clerks could prevent mismanagement and abuses. As John D. Langlois has stated, "The bureaucracy in Yuan times, while theoretically governed by numerous codes of regulations, was largely ungovernable."[35]

Similarly, one must reconsider Paul Ch'en's premise that "the judicial system of the Yuan dynasty was well constructed and effectively prevented officials from abusing their power."[36]Although the Yuan judicial system was indeed well constructed on paper, the operational reality was quite different. Local administration, which included the dispensing of justice, was subject to an array of lax procedures and unlawful practices, such as the failure of local officials to attend the required daily conferences and overlapping jurisdictions of authority, as described in Chapters 2 and 3.

In terms of career mobility, clerks in Yuan times could hope to be promoted to serve as low-ranking officials in the bureaucracy in a collective category of officials known as *shou-ling-kuan* or "document routers." This category has been described in differing terms in the secondary literature. Paul Ch'en, for instance, has translated *shou-ling-kuan* as "chief officials," a somewhat misleading translation; while they may have been the chiefs of sections or bureaus, their actual ranks in the bureaucracy were never higher than the 6th rank.[37] Ratchnevsky defined the term as a general designation for officials who headed the employees in a given office, usually the registrar (*ching-li*) and the administrative assistant (*chih-shih*).[38] Ch'i-ch'ing Hsiao has translated *shou-ling-kuan* as "senior clerical officials," also a potentially misleading translation, since the term encompassed officials (*kuan*), albeit low-ranking ones, not clerks (*li*).[39]

The *Yuan shih* does not readily identify or discuss *shou-ling-kuan* per se, but, when the designation *shou-ling-kuan* appears with reference to specific offices and specific ranks, those offices generally range in rank from 7b to 9b[40] The local gazetteer of Chen-chiang route provides valuable insight into the particular duties of the *shou-ling-kuan*:[41]

> In all cases, the general administrations (*tsung-kuan-fu* ) [of the routes] appointed registrars (*ching-li*), *chih-shih*, and document supervisors concurrently serving as heads of document despatching and filing in the Records Office (*t'i-k'ung an-tu chien chao-mo ch'eng-fa chia-ko*). These three officials were called *shou-ling-kuan*. They were employed to manage the duties of the Six Bureaus (Liu-ts'ao) [that is, duties corresponding to the duties of the Six Boards in the capital]. No matter whether an affair was great or small, the clerk in charge would first of all always pick up the documents and go to inform the *shou-ling-kuan*. They [the *shou-ling-kuan*] would carefully examine it, and, if they approved, only then did they draft a proposal. The route officials (*lu-kuan*) [that is, the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih, tsung-kuan, t'ung-chih, p'an-kuan,* and *t'ui-kuan*] would then affix their official signatures and seals (*shu-ya*), and put it into effect. If the route officials held a different opinion, they would hear [the arguments of] the *shou-ling-kuan*, who would rehash the matter in open discussion. If they [still] did not agree, [the route officials] also permitted them to report the matter in writing to the staff (*mu*) of the [Central?] Secretariat and to the [appropriate] Board. As for any official business being delayed and obstructed, once every ten days [the *shou-ling-kuan*] would thoroughly investigate, and once a month they would hold an inquiry, make revisions and corrections, and put [official business] back onto course. These are the duties of the *shou-ling-kuan*. This is a general summary of them.

*Shou-ling-kuan* is thus best translated as "document-routing officials" or "document-routers," since they were the first to handle communications and documents as they came into the office, and they were authorized to note down their opinions and decisions concerning matters in those documents. This is an enormous amount of authority for such low-ranking officials, and this placement of authority at such a low level represents a phenomenon unwitnessed in earlier dynasties. The valuable services performed by the one *shou-ling-kuan* at the county (*hsien*) level of local government, that is, the *tien-shih* or "record-keeper," were duly noted by the Yuan philosopher Cheng Yü (1298–1358) in a laudatory preface.[42] Cheng Yü also noted the lack of official acknowledgment of the record-keeper's services:



> The record keeper (*tien-shih*) is a county secretarial official (*mu-kuan*). He receives despatches from the [regional] secretariat (*sheng*). His rank is 9B and below. Among his concerns are examining into, bringing to [his superiors'] attention, and removing [errors] from the record books, and making proposals concerning decisions. His salary is meager; his rank is low. His duties are numerous; his responsibilities are heavy. The prosperity of a county and the welfare of a large area frequently must depend on him. As for how officials govern their people and how people are governed by officials, the one who occupies the position between officials and people is the *tien-shih*.

The status of the *tien-shih* at the county level was only marginally higher than that of the clerks. The Chen-chiang gazetteer records slightly higher salaries for *tien-shih* than for the clerks, but *tien-shih*, like clerks, received no office lands (*chih-t'ien*) at the county level.[43] At the level of the general administration (*tsung-kuan-fu*), the Chen-chiang gazetteer categorizes the posts of interpreter (*t'ung-shih*) and translator (*i-shih*) under clerks (*li*), not under *shou-ling-kuan*.[44] The Chen-chiang gazetteer also records that in the general administration the *shou-ling-kuan* received less than half the salary the clerks received, but, unlike the clerks, they received office lands.[45]

While there is not much specific information in Yuan sources on the *shou-ling kuan*, the *Yuan tien-chang* records a report of the Board of Personnel dated 1300 which briefly mentions the duties of the *shou-ling-kuan* and refers to their participation in the daily conferences:[46]

> As for all matters assessing and allocating levies and taxes (*k'o-po ch'ai-shui*), lawsuits (*yü-sung*),[47] civilian marriages (*hu-hun*), matters which are appropriate to discuss, it is necessary for the *shou-ling-kuan* to discuss them in conference (*yuan-i*).

The Yuan scholar-official Wang Yun also provides some insight in his proposal entitled "Statement on the need for careful appointment to the posts of *shou-ling-kuan*," which mentions the origins of these low-ranking officials in the bureaucracy:[48]

> In recent years, most of the *shou-ling kuan* in the surveillance bureaus (*hsien-ssu*) have been selected from outside the current [that is, from outside the nine ranks]. Some of them are not at all well versed in legal cases and secretarial work. As for those among them who are weak, when they take their positions they are lazy and ineffective. The strong ones harbor selfish motives and

> ruin public affairs, thereby causing anarchy in the official administration. If from now on we select and appoint people only from among appointed officials (*chih-kuan*) of the 8th and 7th ranks who are serving as officials in the sub-prefectures (*chou*) and counties (*hsien*), and from among scholarly clerks (*ju-li*) who are well versed in worldly affairs, and whose good moral character and reputation are outstanding among the staff members, these people could indeed be appointed to fill offices [as *shou-ling-kuan*]. . . .

One group within the category of clerks in Yuan times deserves attention, if only because its members were in an excellent position to move up from clerkly to official status. This sub-group consisted of interpreters (*t'ung-shih*) and translators (*i-shih*). Without attempting as thorough an exposition of the history of these two terms as appears in an article by Yao Ts'ung-wu, a few words may be said about the position of interpreters and translators in the Yuan bureaucracy.[49]

As Yao Ts'ung-wu has pointed out, Sinicized Jurchens as well as Uiyur often served as interpreters at different levels of the Yuan government. An imperial decree (*sheng-chih*) dated 30 March 1297 stated:[50] "At present many of those who have studied the Mongolian language are Muslims (Hui-hui) and Uiyur (Wei-wu-erh-jen)." Yet, the regulations concerning promotion reveal that ethnic origins were not a criterion for serving as interpreters: Mongols were allowed to serve 120-month terms in office as interpreters, while Se-mu and Han-jen (Northern Chinese, Jurchens, Khitans, and so forth) were permitted 90-month terms.[51]

In the early Yuan period, there is evidence that the office of interpreter was hereditary. The *Yuan shih* biography of Hsing Chi, a Tangut, states that his great-grandfather, grandfather, and father had hereditarily served respectively the Emperors T'ai-tsu (Činggis), Hsien-tsung (Möngke), and Shih-tsu (Qubilai) as *ch'ieh-li-ma-ch'ih* (*kelimači*).[52] *Ch'ieh-li-ma-ch'ih* was the Mongolian term for interpreter or *t'ung-shih*, and not, as Yeh Tzu-ch'i believed, for translator (*i-shih*).[53]

Chapter 3 discussed the importance of developing proficiency in Mongolian language in the multi-lingual Yuan state. While it is difficult on the basis of available evidence to prove that the offices of translator and interpreter, as part of the established bureaucracy, were springboards to higher office, it seems quite likely that, given the value



the Mongols placed upon clerkly expertise and linguistic capability, translators and interpreters had certain advantages in career mobility.

Another group that occupied an intermediary position between local government and local society in Yuan times consisted of unsalaried village officers. This group is of interest because ideally it might yield a suggestion of how involved the government bureaucracy was in the lives of the people or to what extent people's contact with that bureaucracy was marginal.

Of the two officers whose presence was mandatory at the village level in thirteenth- and fourteenth-century China, one, the community leader (*she-chang*), was selected from among the villagers themselves, while the other, the village head (*li-cheng*), was selected by the local *ssu-hsien* authorities.[54] The community leader was responsible for encouraging and overseeing the villagers' agricultural pursuits and their general behavior, while the village head, at times assisted by an aide, the control chief (*chu-shou*), was charged with collecting taxes.[55]

Where the institution was implemented, a "community" (*she*) itself consisted of 50 households; if a village had as many as 100 households, two community leaders (*she-chang*) would be selected, and, if a village had fewer than 50 households, it could join with another nearby village to form one community.[56] H. F. Schurmann believes that the organization of households into communities may not have been intended to displace the existing village structure.[57] Rather, the government was attempting to superimpose a new structure on the already existing villages, presumably for the sake of tighter fiscal control over the population.

Shurmann, in his discussion of the community (*she*), points out that there is no evidence to indicate that all the villages in Yuan China established them;[58] it is possible that the imperial decrees of the 1270s and 1280s calling for the establishment of communities in both North and South China were ignored by some local officials. The local gazetteer of Chen-chiang route in South China, however, lists the numbers of community leaders (*she-chang*) per village in each of its three counties.[59] In computing the number of community leaders per number of civilian households in each county, one finds that Tan-t'u county averaged one community leaader per 90.98 civilian households, Tan-yang county

averaged one community leader per 90.55 civilian households, and Chin-t'an county averaged one community leader per 127.64 civilian households. Thus, while the ideal of one community leader for every 50 households was not achieved, the presence of these agricultural and village overseers can be documented in at least one route. The Chen-chiang gazetteer also lists the number of households that served as village heads (*li-cheng*) either on a constant or a rotating basis.

It is clear that the community leaders could play an active role in keeping local order, despite the fact that they were prohibited from intervening in legal cases. According to an undated placard (*pang-wen*) drafted by Hu Chih-yü, in order to halt the increase in counterfeiting land-mortgage documents (which stemmed from inflation in land prices), the prefectural authorities ordered the community leaders (*she-chang*) to gather all the people of each community at a public meeting.[60] The people themselves would select a broker (*kuan-ya-jen*) who was literate, well acquainted with the regulations, and honest. The people would also select a contract clerk (*hsieh-ch'i-jen*) who would write out a contract for every transaction involving the buying, selling, renting, or mortgaging of lands as well as transactions involving houses, people, and cattle. Any contract made without going through the broker and the contract clerk would be considered void, and the buyer and seller would be punished.

Chang Yang-hao, in his *Frank Advice for the Magistrate*, envisioned a more activist role for the village elders in setting the moral tone for their communities. Rather than waiting for families to come forward to report quarrels, Chang admonished village elders (*hsiang-chang*) to be on the lookout continually, to make public examples of the worst cases of family quarrels or inappropriate behavior, and to mete out severe punishments.[61] There are other references to the duties of the community leaders scattered throughout Yuan-period sources; such references, were they to be systematically analyzed, might suggest that the imperial decrees that ordered the formation of communities (*she*) were, in varying measure, implemented. In return for their services, the community leaders received in material reward only an exemption from corvée obligations.[62]

The relationship between the tasks to be performed by the village officers and those to be performed by local officials, including the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*, remains obscure. There are examples of local officials misusing the community leaders (*she-chang*); local officials were ordered on different occasions not to employ the community leaders to collect taxes (that was the duty of the *li-cheng*) and not to send community leaders off to oversee non-agricultural matters.[63] In an undated decree (translated in Chapter 2) issued during Qubilai's reign, the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* and other local officials, as well as the community leaders (*she-chang*), were threatened with punishment in the event of their failure to suppress local rebellions.[64] Yet, the Yuan government's involvement in the day-to-day workings of rural society remains an enigmatic topic, awaiting further research in the field of social history.



The role of the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* in the Yuan civilian administration is far easier to document than the role of the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* in rural society, as the preceding chapters have demonstrated. The nature of the Mongolian occupation of China was bound to change during the course of the Yuan dynasty, and it is in this light that the role of the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* in local administration may be viewed. Initially, the role of the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*, as both the *Secret History of the Mongols* and the *Yuan shih* make clear, was primarily that of military overlords despatched to maintain control over newly conquered cities and territories. As time progressed, however, the office of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* was subsumed in the regular bureaucracy of the Yuan government. The *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*, as it were, shed their initial function of acting as guardians of surrendered cities and became instead overseers of other bureaucrats. The *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* in the Yuan local government were charged with responsibility over the seals of office and other government business.

Certain mutual interests and relationships between the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* and the local populations under their jurisdictions could develop, and there are even examples of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* acting as benefactors and defenders of the interests of the people over whom they had managerial control. In Chapter 2, for instance, the translated portion of the epitaph of a Mongolian *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* named Meng-ku Pa-erh (Mongγo[l] Bar ∿ Bars) attests to his success in restoring peace and a degree of economic stability to the lives of those under his jurisdiction in North China.[65] Even in the late Yuan period, when the internal stability of the

dynasty had been badly shaken by rebellions, we find an example of a *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* in 1348 providing relief to the people under his jurisdiction, in this instance by sparing them the cost of the bunting for an imperial birthday by contributing his own salary and the salaries of his colleagues and subordinates to pay for it.[66]

Several Chinese literati wrote positively about the office of *daruγači* and praised the individuals who served in the office. For instance, the Yuan philosopher Wu Ch'eng (1249–1333) wrote a glowing eulogy of a certain Mu-sa-fei, *daruγači* of Ch'ung-jen *hsien* in modern southeastern Kiangsi.[67] Wu Ch'eng, himself a native of Ch'ung-jen county, states categorically that Mu-sa-fei was the best official his county had seen over the past twenty or thirty years. Allowing for the usual exaggerations in this genre of eulogistic literature, it is still noteworthy that the ethnic background of the officeholder—here, a Western-Central Asian—did not interfere with the literatus's appreciation of a good administrator. Another Yuan philosopher, Cheng Yü (1298–1358), wrote a highly complimentary epitaph of a Uighur *daruγači*, again showing no bias against the office or its occupant.[68]

Undoubtedly it was in the mutual interests of both local administrators and the local population not to make ethnicity an issue. The role of the *daruγači* in local society is, after all, part of the larger question of non-Chinese–Chinese relations in Yuan China. On the question of how Yuan local officials who were Mongols or Western and Central Asians interacted with the population of a given locale, the evidence for the most part indicates a social separation between Chinese on the one hand and Mongols and other non-Chinese on the other. The Mongols in particular remained by choice a self-contained nation within a nation. Outside of official government business, which obviously necessitated interaction between Mongolian officials and Chinese officials, Chinese clerks, and elements of the resident local population, the Mongols socially were fairly isolated.

One potential area for interaction between Mongols and Chinese was through cultural assimilation. We have already noted how important it was for Chinese officials to develop expertise in the written Mongolian language. This expertise was sought after not out of a genuine interest in Mongolian culture, but instead for the purpose of advancing one's career. Conversely, how many Mongols acquired more than just the rudiments of Chinese language and learning? Detailed research by Ch'i-ch'ing Hsiao has shown that a small number of non-imperial Mongols with elite background did indeed excel in Chinese scholarship.[69] According to Hsiao's combing from Yuan sources, there were at least 46 Mongols who excelled in Chinese scholarship, 26 Mongolian poets and playwrights who wrote in Chinese, and 24 Mongolian painters and calligraphers. While it would be unfair to dismiss the accomplishments of these Mongols, it is clear that in quantity and quality their accomplishments were inferior to those of the Western and Central Asians (particularly the Uighurs) who lived in Yuan China. The pursuit of Han learning by elite Mongols remained a minor trend until the end of the Yuan, and does seem to have contributed measurably to social interaction between the two ethnic groups at the local level.



Another potential area for interaction in local society between Mongolian and other non-Han officials on the one hand and Han Chinese on the other was through intermarriage. Most researchers agree that the Yuan government never issued any regulations banning intermarriage.[70] As Hung Chin-fu has pointed out, the Mongols really could not have banned intermarriage, since the Yuan emperors and imperial princes frequently took as their wives women of non-Mongolian ethnic background.[71] Whether or to what extent intermarriage among the different ethnic groups was common in local society is extremely difficult to gauge, however, given the fragmentary nature of the evidence. After closely surveying a variety of Yuan sources, Hung Chin-fu was able to document a total of 439 instances of Han Chinese marrying non-Han Chinese in Yuan times.[72] Even when one accepts Dr. Hung's conjecture that the unrecorded instances of intermarriage would greatly outnumber the recorded instances, the number 439 is relatively unimpressive, especially over a period of at least five generations.

With different cultures existing side by side, interacting but not mutually absorbing one another, it is hardly surprising to find evidence of friction. The *T'ung-chih t'iao-ko* provides such evidence concerning Mongolian-Chinese relations:[73]

> On the 19th day of the 5th moon of Chih-yuan 9 [16 June 1272], the Central Secretariat respectfully received an imperial decree (*sheng-chih*) [which stated]:
>
> We have ascertained that many Han-erh-jen gather together in groups and brawl with Mongols (Ta-ta-jen-mei). Where is there such a regulation? [That is, that Chinese have the right to beat up Mongols]. You must strictly prohibit this.
>
> Respect this.

A separate passage from the same source states:[74]

> On the 12th day of the 2nd moon of Chih-yuan 20 [12 March 1283], the Central Secretariat and the Board of War (Ping-pu) memorialized [saying that]:
>
> According to an excerpt of a communication of the Central Secretariat [it is stated]:
>
> Recently as for Mongols serving as members of the Imperial Guard (ch'ieh-hsieh-tai, Mongolian: Kesigdei) everywhere [they go] commoners have been unwilling to offer them anything to eat and have not given them shelter at which to stop and such things. We have repeatedly clearly instructed that people of the prefectures, subprefectures, counties, villages, metropolitan quarters (*fang*), and roadside inns henceforth, whenever Mongols serving as members of the Imperial Guard pass through their area, according to what is appropriate, must offer food and shelter in which to lodge without coming to blows.[75] If Mongols brawl with Han-erh-jen, they [the Han-erh-jen] must not reciprocate in kind, [but rather] indicate an eyewitness and report to the local officials. If there are people who break the law, severely punish them.

Qubilai obviously had little patience with Chinese who ganged up on Mongols, as his sarcastically phrased imperial decree of 1272 demonstrates. But, in the case of Mongols beating up Chinese, the victims were not supposed to strike back at their attackers, but rather had to turn to the local government bureaucracy for adjudication. Finding an eyewitness willing to testify against those Mongols who initiated the brawl might not have been an easy matter. The very idea of becoming ensnared in the local government bureaucracy would have discouraged most aggrieved parties from reporting. The significance of these two passages from the *T'ung-chih t'iao-ko*, when they are placed side-by-side, is, first, that Mongols could expect more lenient treatment than Chinese, and, second, that such brawls must have been frequent and troublesome enough to move Qubilai to issue regulations governing their resolution.



Unfortunately, the depth of friction between different ethnic groups in Yuan local society cannot be gauged with accuracy. The evidence is suggestive, but not conclusive.

From the vantage point of the imperial government in Ta-tu, any sort of potentially disruptive conflict in local society was to be prevented. As the documents in Chapter 2 demonstrated, the Yuan emperors, the Central Secretariat, the Censorate, and other organs of government in Ta-tu were overwhelmingly concerned with stamping out corruption, laziness, and duplicity in local government, if only for the sake of facilitating the running of that government. They were also concerned with the livelihoods of the people. *Daruγači*, for instance, were ordered to prevent damage to crops and to prevent harm to the local population by marauding troops.[76] Although such concern may not have emanated from philosophical considerations, yet it reflected the realization that government works more effectively when clerks do not cheat; when local officials suppress, instead of join, uprisings; and when agriculture is promoted. Nonetheless, the gap between imperial directives concerning corruption and the actual activities of the local civilian bureaucracy was never closed at any point in the Yuan period.

In light of the foregoing description of Yuan local government, recent arguments on the issue of centralization versus decentralization in the Yuan administration merit reassessment. Most modern scholarship on Yuan history is based on one of two premises: that the government administration was a centralized, well-integrated entity; or that it was a decentralized and unworkable entity. Thus, John Dardess's *Conquerors and Confucians* assumes the existence of a highly centralized polity, while David Farquhar's more recent article, "Structure and Function in the Yüan Imperial Government," questions this assumption, proposing instead a radically decentralized model.[77] Farquhar's idea that the "central government" (that is, the offices of institutions physically present in the capital, Ta-tu) was viable and significant only to the extent that it was capable of the direct exploitation of the people (and natural resources?) of China does not, after all, "prove" that the Yuan administration was not capable of extending some degree of influence over large parts of China. Indeed, as Ray Huang has queried regarding the Ming dynasty's actual control of local officials: "Could anyone sitting in the

capital really control how these magistrates managed their districts? Of course not." [78]

Even to think in terms of "centralization" in imperial Chinese history is misleading, since transportation, communications, and other technological problems in a large pre-modern empire invariable foiled aspirations for true political centralization.[79] As F. W. Mote has succinctly put it, "the Chinese political ideal was more ambitious than the technical means of its implementation—especially in the field of communications—could sustain."[80] In all periods of Chinese history, attempts at centralization have assumed a restricted area of government influence and strictly delimited government activities, such as collection of taxes. But if one must formulate the question in terms of centralization versus decentralization, then it seems that decentralization was the deliberate policy of the Yuan rulers in civilian government, just as it was the deliberate strategy of the military authorities in the Yuan.[81]

As stated in Chapter 2, concentration of power in one person or one office was not part of traditional Mongolian political culture. The pre-conquest institution of the Quriltai set the pattern for decision-making in a conciliar, not an autocratic, manner in Yuan government. Much the same process of decision-making based on tribal egalitarianism can be detected in the governments of two other dynasties of conquest: the Jurchen government in the Chin dynasty and the Manchu government of the early Ch'ing period.[82]

Government by deliberation was the norm on the local level in Yuan China. As described in Chapter 2, the Yuan system of daily conferences, which all ranked local officials, including the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*, were required to attend, was undoubtedly an outgrowth of the Mongols' conciliar style of decision-making. This style of decision-making was not necessarily the most efficient. The system of dual staffing of offices by which *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* were appointed at each level of regional and local government and the division of authority over the seals of office, for instance, point to an encumbered system in which jurisdictions often overlapped and functions were repetitive.

Yet, Professor Farquhar's description of the regional secretariats (*hsing-sheng*) as "governments of external territories, separate vassal states surrounding a nuclear state, the emperor's domain" seems a bit exaggerated.[83] The notion of autonomous sub-governments not directly responsible to the emperor and the institutions of the central government does not coincide with the evidence presented above in earlier chapters. Even though Yuan local government was subject to a vast array of abuses and inefficiencies, the officials of local government did answer to superiors who ultimately were responsible to the organs of the central government in Ta-tu. This basic fact—the structure of communication and control—cannot be disputed.



The appanages of the imperial princes, however, were indeed semi-autonomous entities. The continuing existence of appanages outside the direct control of the bureaucracy in Ta-tu reflected the Mongols' pre-conquest practice of distributing tribes and peoples as rewards to the worthy and meritorious. Even when the appanage princes engaged in conspiracies and rebellions, the Yuan rulers never abrogated the system of semi-autonomous domains.

While the organizational skills of the Mongols—their recognition and utilization of the know-how of various groups of people and their delegation of authority—were highly developed, the Yuan government per se has never been accorded high marks in traditional Chinese historiography. Undoubtedly, the decentralized mode of governing favored by the Yuan rulers deviated from the standard practices of earlier dynasties. The fragmentation of civilian authority as outlined in the previous chapters does indeed lead one to conclude that the administration was not effectively regulated or supervised. The "ungovernability" of the Yuan local bureaucracy, stemming in part from the Mongols' conciliar style of governing, reflects one aspect of the Mongols' tenacious retention of their own way of doing things. The Mongols were remarkably successful in maintaining many features of their way of life—from culinary and dress customs and language to military organization—throughout the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.[84] It should not then come as a surprise that their resistance to Chinese culture extended to the arena of politics and administration.

It is only in a larger cultural framework of analysis that Mongolian motivations behind the Yuan government policies and practices can be understood. The intent of this book has been to seek cultural explanations for Mongolian political practices; such explanations are not in-

tended as an apologia for the excesses of Mongolian rule in China. Yet, to achieve a more balanced understanding of the dynamics of Sino-Mongolian coexistence in Yuan China, one must question certain accepted wisdoms and see whether they can stand up under reassessment. It is my hope that this book has put certain misconceptions permanently to rest. At the very least, these pages should rekindle important debates in the history of the conquest dynasties and, in particular, the history of Sino-Mongolian relations.

*Appendices*
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# *Appendix A*
## *Chart of Yuan Local Government*



# *Appendix B*
# *Yuan Documents*

In the ideal world of Yuan documentary protocol, the customary procedures were as follows. Exceptions were frequent, however.

| *Document* | *Sent From* | *Sent To* |
|---|---|---|
| *sheng-chih* 聖旨 (imperial decree) | the emperor | inferiors |
| *ling-chih* 令旨 (decree of a prince) | imperial sons | inferiors |
| *cha-fu* 劄付 (a communication) | a superior | an inferior |
| *tzu* 咨 (a communiqué) | an equal or an inferior | an equal or a superior |
| *kuan* 關 (a communication) | an equal | an equal |
| *tieh* 牒 (a report) | an equal | an equal |
| *ch'eng* 呈 (a report) | an equal or an inferior | an equal or a superior |
| *shen* 申 (a report) | an inferior | a superior |
| *pan-sung* 判送 (a communication) | a superior | an inferior |

## *Abbreviations Used in the Notes*

| | |
|---|---|
| SKCSCP | *Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu chen-pen* 四庫全書珍本 |
| SPTK | *Ssu-pu ts'ung-k'an* 四部叢刊 |
| *TCTK* | *T'ung-chih t'iao-ko* 通制條格 |
| *YS* | *Yuan shih* 元史 |
| *YTC* | *Ta-Yuan sheng-cheng kuo-ch'ao tien-chang* 大元聖政國朝典章 |

# Notes

## 1. INTRODUCTION

1. For example, the eminent Chinese historian Ch'ien Mu, in his *Chung-kuo li-tai cheng-chih te-shih,* devoted chapters to the Sung and to the Ming, but not to the Yuan (or to the Liao or Chin, for that matter). The Yuan is mentioned by Ch'ien Mu only insofar as it contributed to the development of "provinces" (*sheng*) from the Yuan administrative units of *hsing-sheng* or *hsing-chung-shu-sheng.* For Ch'ien Mu, the significant dynasties were clearly the Han, T'ang, Sung, Ming, and Ch'ing.
2. I have in mind theories of the growth of despotism in imperial China's political institutions. One of the most influential of these theories is the so-called "Naitō hypothesis," which has been summarized by Hisayuki Miyakawa, "An Outline of the Naitō Hypothesis and Its Effects on Japanese Studies of China." An interesting critique of Karl Wittfogel's theory of "Oriental Despotism" is F. W. Mote's "The Growth of Chinese Despotism." Professor Mote attributes the growth of despotism in early Ming times to the Yuan period's "brutalization of Chinese government."
3. Ch'i-ch'ing Hsiao, *The Military Establishment of the Yuan Dynasty.* Paul Heng-chao Ch'en, *Chinese Legal Tradition under the Mongols: The Code of 1291 as Reconstructed.* David M. Farquhar has addressed the question of centralization in the Yuan bureaucracy. See his "Structure and Function in the Yüan Imperial Government."
4. A. Sh. Kadyrbaev, a Soviet scholar, has addressed the question of the political impact of ethnically Turkic peoples on the Yuan empire: "Tiurki-kangly v imperii Činggis Qan (po kitaqiskim istochnikam)"; "O kul'turnoi adaptatsii tiurkskikh etnicheskikh grupp v imperii Yüan." See also Hsiao Ch'i-ch'ing, *Hsi-yü-jen yü Yuan-ch'u cheng-chih, passim;* and Igor de Rachewiltz, "Turks in China under the Mongols: A Preliminary Investigation of Turco-Mongol Relations in the 13th and 14th Centuries." De Rachewiltz's quantification of Turks in

China serving the Mongols must be viewed with great caution for the following reasons:

(1) The total number of Turks serving the Mongols remains unknown and is probably impossible to ascertain.

(2) de Rachewiltz himself notes that he has *selectively* counted Turks according to the criterion of "power and influence." "To be sure, many more Turks are actually mentioned in our sources, but I have not taken them into account" (p. 287).

(3) Duplication is possible, especially where information on Turkic individuals is limited.

(4) Ethnic origins of Yuan officials, as de Rachewiltz himself writes (p. 302 n. 37), are at times difficult to pinpoint.

(5) de Rachewiltz excludes from his quantification Turks mentioned in Persian sources, but not mentioned in Chinese sources (p. 302, n. 37, p. 293).

(6) de Rachewiltz apparently has not consulted the *Yuan tien-chang*, the *T'ung-chih t'iao-ko*, or local gazetteers (a rich repository of names) in his formulation of the numbers of Turks in important positions.

5. Michael Loewe, *Records of Han Administration*, I, 59; and Hans Bielenstein, *The Bureaucracy of Han Times*, pp. 99–100.
6. Yen Keng-wang, *Chung-kuo ti-fang hsing-cheng chih-tu shih* Part I, II, 358.
7. Bielenstein, p. 99.
8. Yen Keng-wang, *Chung-kuo ti-fang hsing-cheng chih-tu shih*, Part I, II, 390–391.
9. Ibid., II, 357. Translation of Han official nomenclature follows Bielenstein.
10. For a discussion of the language of the Hsien-pei rulers as "essentially Turkish, with a certain admixture of Mongol elements," see Peter A. Boodberg, "The Language of the T'o-Pa Wei."
11. Yen Keng-wang, *Chung-kuo ti-fang hsing-cheng chih-tu shih* Part II, II, 603–604.
12. The history of the *hsing-t'ai* from 257 to 626 has been outlined by Aoyama Kōryō, and the following discussion is based on his article "Rekidai kōdai bō." See also Howard J. Wechsler, "The Founding of the T'ang Dynasty: Kao-tsu (reign 618–26)," pp. 174–175.
13. Ch'ien Mu, *Kuo-shih ta-kang*, I, 303–305.
14. Arthur F. Wright, *The Sui Dynasty*, pp. 98–103; Arthur F. Wright, "The Sui Dynasty (581–617)," pp. 87–93.
15. Wechsler, pp. 174–176; Denis C. Twitchett, "Varied Patterns of Provincial Autonomy in the T'ang Dynasty," pp. 90–92.
16. Twitchett, "Varied Patterns," p. 98; Hino Kaisaburō, *Shina chūsei no gumbatsu*, p. 13. On pages 15–16 of this work there is a chart of the 15 circuits and the prefectures over which they held jurisdiction.
17. C. A. Peterson, "Court and Province in Mid- and late T'ang," pp. 486–497. Hino Kaisaburō's *Shina chūsei no gumbatsu* describes the system of military governors in the T'ang. Yen Keng-wang also has outlined the numerous offices under the jurisdiction of the late T'ang *chieh-tu-shih*. See Yen Keng-wang, "T'ang-tai fang-chen shih-fu liao-tso k'ao," pp. 209–211.
18. Professor Denis Twitchett initially brought the T'ang *ya-ya* to my attention as a possible precursor of the Yuan *daruγači*. As there is no other theory to explain the origins of the term *daruγači* (after all, the Mongols could have chosen any number of designations for this office), the late T'ang *ya-ya* remains an institutional precedent of which the Mongols were possibly aware. On the late T'ang *ya-ya* and *tu-ya-ya*, see Yen Keng-wang, "T'ang-tai fu chou liao-tso k'ao," pp. 103–176, esp. p. 170; and Yen Keng-wang, "T'ang-tai fang-chen shih-fu liao-tso k'ao," pp. 177–236, esp. pp. 228–233.
19. Hino Kaisaburō, pp. 75–79.
20. On the militarization of local governments in the Five Dynasties period, see, for instance, Chao I's comments on "the disaster of staff officials during the Five Dynasties," in his *Nien-erh-shih cha-chi*, 22:294–295. An unpublished paper by Professor Michael C. McGrath, "The Northern Sung Military Intendancy: Emergence and Development of Regional Administration," argues that historians have underestimated the importance of the Northern Sung military's involvement in regional administration, pointing out that the duties of Sung military intendants (*ching-lkueh an-fu shih*) were analogous to those of the T'ang military governors (*chieh-tu-shih*). Sung imperial control over the military, however, was obviously superior to that of the T'ang.
21. The best description of central and local governments in North China during the Five Dynasties is that of Sudō Yoshiyuki, "Gōdai setsudoshi no shihai taisei."
22. See Robert M. Hartwell, "Demographic, Political, and Social Transformations of China, 750–1550." Hartwell assigns great importance to the occasional Sung usage of *hsing* as a prefix attached to administrative posts, i.e., *hsing-hu-pu shih-lang*, *Hu-kuang tsung-ling*, which he translates as "Vice-President of the Board of Revenue on Detached Service as Finance Supervisor for the Hu-kuang Military Command." The use of *hsing-* in Sung administrative parlance appears to have been irregular and far from common, as the *Sung shih* monograph on offical posts (*chih-kuan*) to my knowledge does not list any such offices "on detached service." As noted earlier, the use of *hsing-* was primarily a peculiarity of non-Han dynasties established in North China. Thus, it seems unlikely that, as Professor Hartwell writes, the Sung use of *hsing-* "provided the model for the *hsing-sheng* or detached service secretariats of the Chin and Yuan." The Jurchens and Mongols had earlier precedents upon which to rely. See Hartwell, pp. 397–398. In fact, Mikami Tsugio believes that the early T'ang *Hsing-t'ai shang-shu sheng* was the model for the Chin dynasty *Hsing-t'ai shang-shu-sheng*, despite differences between their respective jurisdictions. See Mikami Tsugio, *Kinshi kenkyū*, p. 489.

23. Brian E. McKnight, *Village and Bureaucracy in Southern Sung China*, p. 8.
24. Fang Hao, *Sung shih*, I, 36.
25. Karl A. Wittfogel and Chia-sheng Feng, *History of Chinese Society: Liao (907–1125)*, p. 44. On the Parhae (Pohai) state, see Denis Twitchett, "Hsüan-tsung (reign 712–56)," pp. 440–443.
26. Wittfogel and Feng: *Liao*, pp. 448–449.
27. *Ta-Yuan sheng-cheng kuo-ch'ao tien-chang* 8:6b, 11:2a. (Hereafter, this source will be cited as *YTC*.)
28. H. F. Schurmann, "Problems of Political Organization during the Yüan Dynasty," pp. 26–30.
29. Jing-shen Tao, *The Jurchen in Twelfth-Century China: A Study of Sinicization*, pp. 9, 27–28, 52.
30. Ibid., pp. 46–47, 53.
31. For a detailed examination of the establishment, organization, and abolition of the Chin dynasty *Hsing-t'ai shang-shu-sheng*, see Mikami Tsugio, pp. 458–494. Mikami, on page 458, writes that the first appearance of the full designation *sing-t'ai shang-shu-sheng* was in early T'ang times. Aoyama Kōryō's 1935 article, "Rekidai kōdai bō," however, gives examples of *hsing-t'ai shang-shu-sheng* in the early Sui dynasty (p. 160). See also Igor de Rachewiltz, "Personnel and Personalities in North China in the Early Mongol Period," pp. 113–114.
32. Tao, *The Jurchen*, pp. 35–35; Jing-shen Tao, "The Influence of Jurchen Rule on Chinese Political Institutions," pp. 125–126.
33. Hsiao, *Military Establishment*, pp. 60–61.
34. On the *hsing-chung-shu-sheng*, see *Yuan shih* (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chü, 1976) 91: 2305–2308. (This source will hereafter be abbreviated as *YS*.) On the *lu*, which were administered by *tsung-kuan-fu*, see *YS* 91: 2316–2317. On the *chou*, see *YS* 91: 2317–2318. On the *fu*, an abbreviation of *san-fu*, see *YS* 91: 2317. On the *hsien*, see *YS* 91: 2318. On the numbers of *lu* and *fu* in Yuan times, see *YS* 58: 1345–1346 ff.
35. For general overviews of the Yuan administrative hierarchy, see also the introductory essay by Ch'ü Shui-yuan in Huang Pen-chi, comp., *Li-tai chih-kuan-piao* (Taipei: Hung-shih ch'u-pan-she, 1976), pp. 43–50; and Charles O. Hucker, *A Dictionary of Official Titles in Imperial China*, pp. 58–69. There has been no attempt to integrate Hucker's translations of Yuan office titles into this work, which, generally speaking, follows the pre-existing terminology in the field as developed by Professors Francis W. Cleaves, Ch'i-ch'ing Hsiao, and others.
36. *YS* 91:2308.
37. Paul Ratchnevsky understands this to mean that the pacification offices were partitioned into circuits. See Ratchnevsky, *Un code des Yuan*, I, 93, n. 1. Actually, the pacification office would govern three of the four circuits under the regional secretariat. See Hsiao, *Military Establishment*, p. 200, n. 324.
38. *Hsing-sheng* is the abbreviation used in Yuan sources for *hsing-chung-shu-sheng*.
39. Ratchnevsky apparently does not take *sheng* as an abbreviation of *hsing-sheng*. See *Un code des Yuan*, I, 93, n. 1.
40. Yeh Tzu-ch'i, *Ts'ao-mu-tzu* 3b:64.
41. Mongolian *tümen*. For a description of Mongolian military-administrative units based on decimals, see Hsiao, *Military Establishment*, pp. 9–10. On the use of these units in thirteenth-century Rus', see Thomas T. Allsen, "Mongol Census Taking in Rus', 1245–1275," pp. 51–52.
42. Mongolian *mingyan*.
43. *Ya-chen* is literally "to press and to garrison." Professor Cleaves has translated *chen* as "to garrison." See Francis Woodman Cleaves, "Daruya and Gerege," p. 245. In the *Secret History of the Mongols*, *daruqu* is glossed as *ya*. See Erich Haenisch, *Wörterbuch zu Manghol un Niuca Tobca'an*, p. 33.
44. See *YS* 91:2307; 58:1382–1383.
45. See John W. Dardess, "From Mongol Empire to Yüan Dynasty–Changing Forms of Imperial Rule in Mongolia and Central Asia," pp. 152, 156.
46. On the impoverishment of those Mongols who remained in the steppe after 1260, see N. Ts. Munkuev, "K voprosy ob ekonomicheskom polozhenii Mongolii i Kitaia v XIII–XIV vv.," and N. Ts. Munkuev, "Novye materialy o polozhenii mongol'skikh aratov v XIII–XIV vv.," pp. 409–446.
47. *YTC*, pp. 7:27a. Makino Shūji apparently takes the *YTC* figures at face value. See his "Gendai shōkan kitei ni tsuite no ichi kōsatsu, toku ni kannanjin rofushūkenkan no baai," p. 56. David Farquhar also accepts the *YTC* figures at face value. See Farquhar, "Structure and Function," p. 40.
48. There were 9 ranks (*p'in*) in the Yuan official hierarchy. Each rank was divided into 2 degrees (*teng*): upper (*cheng*) and lower (*tsung*). Each of the 9 ranks was divided into 2 grades (*chi*). When an official was promoted by 1 degree (*teng*), he passed to the higher grade (*chi*). Thus, altogether it was a system of 18 degrees (*teng*). See Paul Ratchnevsky, *Un code des Yuan*, I, 106, n. 3.
49. The *YTC* figures of 19,895 for those officials appointed outside the metropolitan bureaucracy apparently include many offices not directly connected to the *lu*, *fu*, *chou*, and *hsien* infrastructure. Makino Shūji has charted *ranked* officials in the *lu*, *fu*, *chou*, and *hsien*, and arrived at the figure of 7,085. His chart, however, leaves out the following: (1) *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* at each of those levels of government, which if included would number 2,038; (2) all officials in the *lu-shih-ssu*; (3) the important element of clerical personnel, some of whom had "rank and title." For instance, under the heading of lower subprefecture (*hsia-chou*), he leaves out the *ssu-yü*, with rank of 9b. See Makino Shūji, "Gendai shōkan," pp. 60–61.
50. See Ray Huang, *1587, A Year of No Significance* p. 53, for the Ming figures. He estimates that 10% or 2,000 of the total Ming civil officials held office in the cap-

ital. There is a lack of agreement among Ming historians concerning the total number of civil servants in Ming China. James B. Parsons refers to "some 23,000 officials who held office at various levels of the administration throughout the dynasty." See his "The Ming Dynasty Bureaucracy: Aspects of Background Forces," pp. 175–176. Charles O. Hucker notes that the *Hsu wen-hsien t'ung-kao* gives an exact total of Ming officials as 24,683, but Hucker discounts this figure as probably including military as well as civil officials. He suggests that, in the latter half of the Ming period, the number of civil officials lay between 10,000 and 15,000. See Hucker, "Governmental Organization of the Ming Dynasty," p. 12, n. 20. It is, of course, possible that the *Yuan tien-chang* figure of 26,698 might include military officials, yet the context leads one to infer that only civil offices are being counted. For the Southern Sung figures, as well as the Southern Sung capital-provincial ratio, see McKnight, pp. 7, 8.

51. On the four officially recognized categories of the Yuan population, see Meng Ssu-ming, *Yuan-tai she-hui chieh-chi chih-tu*. There is a division of opinion among scholars over the exact meaning of the Yuan terms Han-jen, Han-min, and Han-erh. Some scholars interpret Han-jen as an ethnic term, referring only to Northern Chinese. See Francis W. Cleaves, "Uighuric Mourning Regulations," p. 77, n. 30, and p. 81, n. 53; Paul Ch'en, p. 7, n. 21; and Hsiao, *Military Establishment*, p. 51. H. F. Schurmann and S. N. Goncharov interpret Han-jen as a geopolitical term, used in Yuan times to refer to the inhabitants of the territory ruled by the former Jurchen Chin dynasty. See Shurmann, *Economic Structure*, p. 105, n. 6; and S. N. Goncharov, "O termine 'Han-erh' v kitaiskikh istochnikakh X–XIII vekov," pp. 131–132. Ch'en Yuan likewise wrote that "the distinction between Han-jen and Southerners was made on the basis of whether they lived under the rule of Chin or Sung." Ch'en Yuan pointed out that Khitans, Jurchens, and Koreans were also known as Han-jen. See Ch'en Yuan, *Western and Central Asians in China under the Mongols*, p. 2.
52. *YTC* 23:5a.
53. This memorial, in *YS* 99:2532, has been translated by Hsiao, *Military Establishment*, p. 102.
54. I am indebted to Professor Ch'i-ch'ing Hsiao for suggesting to me this alternative explanation in his letter of 29 May 1983.
55. *YTC* 8:6b–7a.
56. On the term *ch'ien-chuan*, see Ratchnevsky, *Un code des Yuan*, I, 49, where he translates it as "sont transférés [à un autre office]."
57. The biography of Sangha, the notorious Tibetan official who controlled finances during a part of Qubilai's reign, is in *YS* 205: 4570–4576, under the heading "Evil Ministers" (*chien-ch'en*). See also Luciano Petech, "Sang-ko, a Tibetan Statesman in Yüan China."
58. On the term *tu-p'i*, see Lien-sheng Yang, "Marginalia to the *Yüan tien-chang*," pp. 130–132, and I-lin-chen, "Yuan-tai ying-i kung-tu wen-t'i," p. 166.



59. On the term *ken-chiao*, see Chang Hsiang, *Shih-tz'u ch'ü-yü tz'u-hui-shih*, pp. 682–683. *Yu ken-chiao-ti* is the Mongolian *iǰaγur-tan*, "those possessing origins," i.e., bluebloods. See also Tanaka Kenji "Gentenshō ni okeru Mōbun chokuyakutei no bunshō," pp. 135–139.
60. Farquhar, "Structure and Function," pp. 27–34.
61. On the ranks of local officials and *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*, see *YTC* 7: 3a–20b; *YS* 91: 2316–2318; Yanai Watari, *Yuan-tai Meng Han Se-mu tai-yü k'ao*, pp. 52–53; and Li Tse-fen, *Yuan-shih hsin-chiang*, IV, 530–534. For the number of households needed to constitute an upper route, lower route, etc., see *YS* 91 2316–2318. On the salaries of local officials and *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*, see *YTC* 15: 1b–2a; on lands given to local officials and *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* (*chih-t'ien*), see *T'ung-chih t'iao-ko* 13: 57–364. Hereafter cited as *TCTK*.
62. Cleaves, "Daruγa and Gerege," pp. 237–259. Professor Cleaves has assembled and examined a great number of texts with *daruγa* (*daruγači*). István Vásáry, in an article entitled "The Origin of the Institution of *Basqaqs*," p. 205, has developed a theory on the origins of the Mongolian word *daruγači*, but his theory is unfortunately based on inaccurate information. Believing that the first mention of a *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* (*daruγači*) in Chinese sources occurred in 1221, Vásáry postulates that the Mongols borrowed the term and the office while on campaign between 1219 and 1225 in Transoxiana. "Here they have probably taken over the Turkic institution of *basqaqs* and created a loantranslation [*sic*] in Mongolian: *daruga*." Actually, the first mention of a *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* in Chinese sources occurred as early as 1214, long before the Mongols made contact with the Western Asian territories. See Chapter 2 for further discussion of the earliest mentions of the term *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* in Chinese sources. See also Vásáry, "The Golden Horde Term *Daruga* and its Survival in Russia."
63. Cleaves, "Daruγa and Gerege," p. 249; on the suffix *-γa/-ge* see Nicholas Poppe, "Die Nominalstammbildungssuffixe im Mongolischen," pp. 94–95.
64. Cleaves, "Daruγa and Gerege," p. 250; for definitions of the terms *nomen imperfecti* and *nomen actoris*, see Nicholas Poppe, *Grammar of Written Mongolian*, pp. 93, 94.
65. Cleaves, "Daruγa and Gerege," p. 254; on the suffix *-či* (*-čin*), see Poppe, *Grammar*, pp. 40–41, where he states that the function of this suffix is "to form nouns designating names of vocations." He gives as examples *qonin* (sheep) > *qoničі* (shepherd); *mal* (cattle) > *malčі* (herdsman).
66. Joseph Etienne Kowalewski, *Dictionnaire mongol-russe-français* III, 1671a–1672a; Antoine Mostaert, *Dictionnaire Ordos*, pp. 123b–124a.
67. *Yuan-ch'ao pi-shih* 1: 50a–51a. Cleaves, "Daruγa and Gerege," pp. 224–245.
68. Francis Woodman Cleaves, tr. and ed., *The Secret History of the Mongols*, I, 204.
69. *Yuan-ch'ao pi-shih* Supplementary Chapter 2: 25b–27a; Supplementary Chapter 2: 26b–28a. Cleaves, *Secret History*, pp. 214–215.

70. A. Luvsandendev, ed., *Mongol oros tol',* p. 147; Kh. Luvsanbaldan, ed., *Mongol khelnii toveh tailbar tol',* p. 190a.
71. Igor de Rachewiltz has pointed this out in "Personnel and Personalities," p. 135. See also Paul Pelliot, *Notes sur l'histoire de la Horde d'Or,* pp. 72–73, n. 1.
72. Ratchnevsky, *Un code des Yuan,* I, 33, n. 3; I, 35, n. 4.
73. I am indebted to Professor Francis W. Cleaves for discussing the question of Chinese equivalents of the term *daruγači* on 29 April 1980 and on other occasions. In Chapter 2, sections from the *YTC* on the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* managing the seals of office are translated. Igor de Rachewiltz has found examples in Yuan sources bearing on the possible interchangeability of various Chinese official titles and the title of *daruγači* mainly in the years 1206–1234. Although the lack of a set and ordered system of official nomenclature undoubtedly existed in the decades of the conquest of North China, from Qubilai's reign to the end of the Yuan, the office of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* occupied a well-defined position in civilian local government. See de Rachewiltz, "Personnel and Personalities," p. 135, n. 3.
74. *Chih-yuan i-yü,* p. 9b. On the frequency of the use of *ch'ai* in compounds in Yuan times, see H. F. Schurmann, "Mongolian Tributary Practices of the Thirteenth Century," pp. 319–320. Yao Ts'ung-wu argues that the term *hsuan-ch'ai,* in sources bearing on the period 1206–1259, was always a synonym of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih.* This issue will be discussed in the following section on secondary scholarship on *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* in China. See Yao Ts'ung-wu "Chiu *Yuan shih* chung ta-lu-hua-ch'ih ch'u-ch'i ti pen-i wei hsuan-ch'ai shuo." It is again interesting to note that, as late as 1912, in Inner Mongolia the term *daruγa* was used to refer to the chief of a district, whereas a different term, *elči,* was used to designate the special envoy of a chief. See Ts. Zhamtsarano, "Paizy u mongolov v nastoiashchee vremia."
75. Paul Pelliot, *Notes sur l'histoire de la Horde d'Or,* p. 73, n. 1. See also Schurmann, "Mongolian Tributary Practices of the Thirteenth Century," p. 343, n. 87.
76. See Valentin A. Riasanovsky, *Fundamental Principles of Mongol Law,* p. 272; George Vernadsky, *The Mongols and Russia,* pp. 212–220; G. A. Fedorov-Davydov, *Obshchestvennyi stroi zolotoi ordy,* pp. 30–31. Nineteenth- and twentieth-century Russian scholarly literature on the functions of the *basqaq* has been summarized by István Vásáry, "The Origin of the Institution of *basqaqs,*" pp. 201–202. On the impact the Mongolian-Turkic "hierarchy of tribute collectors" had upon the development of the Russian state, see George L. Yaney, *The Systematization of Russian Government: Social Evolution in the Domestic Administration of Imperial Russia, 1711–1905,* pp. 21–27.
77. Fedorov-Davydov, *Obshchestvennyi stroi,* p. 31; Vásáry, "The Origin of the Institution of *Basqaqs,*" pp. 201–202.
78. John Andrew Boyle, ed. and tr., *The History of the World-Conqueror by 'Alā-ad-Dīn 'Atā-Malik Juvaini,* I, 105.
79. Ibid., I, 105, n. 24; I, 44, n. 3.



80. Gerhard Doerfer, *Türkische und mongolische Elemente im Neupersischen,* Vol. I, *Mongolische Elemente im Neupersischen,* pp. 319–323.
81. V. Minorsky, ed. and tr., *Tadhkirat al-Mulūk, a Manual of Safavid Administration (circa 1137/1725),* p. 141, n. 54.
82. "The Rasulid Hexaglot: A Yemeni Polyglot Dictionary" (Fourteenth-Century Glossaries in Arabic, Persian, Turkic, Mongolian, Greek and Armenian), ed. T. Halasi-Kun, P. B. Golden, L. Ligeti, and E. Schütz, f. 7v A. I am indebted to Peter Golden for kindly bringing this valuable source to my attention.
83. Beatrice Forbes Manz, "The Office of *Darugha* under Tamerlane," p. 65.
84. According to *YS* 209:4635, Qubilai in 1267 did order the ruler of Annam to appoint his own *daruγači,* and tax collection was to be one of the *daruγači*'s duties. This *Yuan shih* passage tells us more about *daruγači* as an instrument of Qubilai's foreign policy, however, than about *daruγači* within China proper. As Professor Thomas Allsen pointed out to me in a correspondence of August 1983, this *Yuan shih* passage was probably the origin of the dubious assertion by various Russian and Soviet scholars that *daruγači* in China collected taxes. See, for example, W. Barthold, *Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion,* p. 401.
85. Chao I, *Nien-erh-shih cha-chi* 29:419.
86. See *Chin shih,* following *chüan* 135:2891–2897. The *Liao shih* also has an appended section entitled *Kuo-yü chieh.* See *Liao shih,* 116:1533–1551.
87. Among Ch'ing scholars who wrote on the Yuan, Ch'ien Ta-hsin (1728–1804), Wang Hui-tsu (1730–1807), Wei Yuan (1794–1856), and T'u Chi (1855–1921) deserve mention. For a brief critical summary of the works of these and other Ch'ing scholars of the Yuan, see Li Ssu-ch'un, *Yuan shih hsueh,* pp. 61–80.
88. Yao Ts'ung-wu, "Chiu *Yuan shih* chung ta-lu-hua-ch'ih"; Cha-ch'i-ssu-ch'in, "Shuo chiu *Yuan shih* chung ti ta-lu-hua-ch'ih."
89. *Chih-yuan i-yü,* p. 9b.
90. de Rachewiltz, "Personnel and Personalities," pp. 134–136.
91. Cha-ch'i-ssu-ch'in, "Shuo chiu *Yuan shih* chung ti tal-lu-hua-ch'ih," p. 308.
92. Ibid., pp. 377–408; de Rachewiltz, "Personnel and Personalities," p. 135, n. 3.
93. See, for instance, VII, 612–615 of Ts'ai Mei-piao et al., *Chung-kuo t'ung-shih* and I, 300–303 of Han Ju-lin, ed., *Yuan-ch'ao shih.*
94. One Japanese article that discusses the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* in general terms is Miyazaki Ichisada, "Genchō chika no Mōkoteki kanshoku o meguru Mō-kan kankei," pp. 430–438. On the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* of the *t'ou-hsia,* see, for example, Iwamura Shinobu, *Mongoru shakai keizaishi no kenkyū,* pp. 432–442.
95. N. Ts. Munkuev, "K voprosy ob ekonomicheskom polozhenii Mongolii i Kitaia v XIII–XIV vv.," pp. 150–151.
96. For instance, the Mongolian scholar Ch. Dalai mentions the office of *daruγači* only in passing on pages 65–66 of his *Yuan gürnii üeiin mongol.* Dalai's work has been translated into Russian under the title, *Mongoliia v XIII–XIV vekakh.*

97. Paul Ch'en, p. 75.
98. Hsiao, *The Military Establishment*, p. 154, n. 105.
99. For background information on the compilation of these two collections, see Paul Ch'en, pp. 28–33.
100. Herbert Franke, "Chinese Historiography under Mongol Rule: The Role of History in Acculturation," p. 16. On the difference between *sheng-chih* and *chao-shu*, see Lien-sheng Yang, "Marginalia to the *Yüan tien-chang*," pp. 126–130.
101. Igor de Rachewiltz, "Some Remarks on the Language Problem in Yüan China," pp. 68–69. For Francis W. Cleaves's comments on the documentary style in the *Yuan tien-chang*, see his "Uighuric Mourning Regulations," p. 65. See also the recent contribution by I-lin-chen, "Yuan-tai ying-i kung-tu wen-t'i," pp. 164–178.
102. Tanaka Kenji, "Gentenshō bunsho no kōsei;" and Tanaka Kenji, "Gentenshō ni okeru Mōbun chokuyakutei no bunshō." See also Yoshikawa Kōjirō, "Gentenshō ni mieta kanbun ritoku no buntai."
103. Weng Tu-chien, "*Yuan tien-chang* i-yü chi-shih," p. 280.
104. Paul Ch'en, pp. 28–31; 101–106.
105. For a discussion of lawmaking in the Ch'ing dynasty, for example, see Thomas A. Metzger, *The Internal Organization of Ch'ing Bureaucracy: Legal, Normative, and Communication Aspects*, pp. 167–171.
106. Yaney, p. 21.

## 2. *The* Ta-lu-hua-ch'ih—*Early History and Official Duties*

1. The secondary literature on the *t'ou-hsia* or hereditary, princely lands of the Yuan period is extensive. That literature will be summarized at the beginning of Chapter 4.
2. See, respectively, Sechin Jagchid (Cha-ch'i-ssu-ch'in), "Shuo chiu *Yuan shih* chung ti ta-lu-hua-ch'ih," pp. 298–300; Yao Ts'ung-wu, "Chiu *Yuan shih* chung ta-lu-hua-ch'ih," p. 2; and Miyazaki Ichisada, "Genchō chika no Mōkoteki kanshoku o meguru Mō-Kan kankei," p. 430. Igor de Rachewiltz speculates that the appointment of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* in China began in 1212 or 1213. He points out that *hsing-sheng* and *chang-kuan* were appointed in the early years of the Mongols' invasion of the Chin, apparently assuming a correlation between these offices and the office of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*. However, the term *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* (and thus the office itself) is unattested before 1214 in China. See de Rachewiltz, "Personnel and Personalities," p. 136, n.1.
3. *YS* 120: 2960–2961. The *Yuan shih* states: "Cha-pa-erh Huo-che was a Sai-i (Sayyid or Muslim). The Sai-i were the heads of tribes in the Western Regions (Hsi-yü), and therefore [Cha-pa-erh] used it as his clan name. Huo-che was his official designation." On the term *Sayyid*, see Paul Pelliot, in *T'oung Pao* 28. 3–5: 427 (1931); and Pelliot, in *T'oung Pao* 29. 1–3: 178 (1932). *Huo-che* is the Chinese transcription of the Mongolian *Qoje*, which in turn is a form of the Persian *Xwāj(a)h* ("lord" or "master"). See Pelliot, *Notes on Marco Polo*, I, 402; Pelliot, in *T'oung Pao* 31: 163 (1934); and Francis Woodman Cleaves, "The Mongolian Documents in the Musée de Téhéran," pp. 104–105, n. 5. Cleaves has transcribed the name Cha-pa-erh Huo-che as Jabar Qoje in his "The Historicity of the Baljuna Covenant," p. 396, n. 230.



4. The *Yuan shih* 1: 17–18 reports that, in the 5th moon of the 9th year of Yuan T'ai-tsu's reign (10 June–8 July 1214), the Chin ruler abandoned Chung-tu for Pien, leaving behind troops as well as the Heir Apparent to guard Chung-tu. In the 6th moon, there was a mutiny among the Chin troops, the commander was killed, and many troops surrendered to the Mongols. The Mongols' siege of Chung-tu began in the 6th moon (9 July–7 August). In the 7th moon, the Chin Heir Apparent fled to Pien. Chung-tu surrendered on 31 May 1215.
5. T'ieh-men Pass (*kuan*) apparently was not far from Chung-tu. See *YS* 120: 2960. Abe Takeo identifies T'ieh-men as Chü-yung. See his *Gendaishi no kenkyū*, p. 374.
6. *YS* 1: 22.
7. See W. Barthold, *Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion*, p. 401, on the *Daruγači* of Almāligh in the valley of the Ili, near present-day Kulja. See also Arthur Waley, *The Travels of an Alchemist: The Journey of the Taoist Ch'ang-ch'un From China to the Hindu Kush at the Summons of Chingiz Khan. Recorded by his Disciple Li Chih-ch'ang*, p. 85.
8. On the common alternation of "m" and "b" in Mongolian, see Francis Woodman Cleaves, "Uighuric Mourning Regulations," p. 90, n. 69. The name Ambaγai is attested in the *Yuan-ch'ao pi-shih* 1: 28b, 1: 32a, and elsewhere.
9. *YS* 122: 3010–3011. The Soviet scholar S. A. Shkoliar, in his study of thirteenth-century artillerymen, calls the *Yuan shih* biography of An-mu-hai the earliest of a Yuan artilleryman. For a discription of the multi-national artillerymen in the early Yuan period, see Shkoliar, "Ob artilleristakh Yüan armii XIII veka," I, 118–125. See also Herbert Franke's article on the technology and methodology of warfare in thirteenth- and fourteenth-century China—Franke, "Siege and Defense of Towns in Medieval China."
10. In the *Cho-keng-lu* there is a list of 72 Mongolian clans and tribes (*shih tsu*). Among the names is one Pa-lu-hu-tai, a variant of the form in the *Yuan shih* text. See T'ao Tsung-i, *Nan-ts'un cho-keng-lu* 1: 12–13. On this particular use of the term Meng-ku as a prefix before tribal names in the *Yuan shih*, see Francis Woodman Cleaves, "The Biography of Bayan of the Bārin in the *Yüan shih*," p. 202, n. 2; and Paul Pelliot and Louis Hambis, *Histoire des campaignes de Gengis Khan: Cheng-wou ts'in-tcheng lou*, p. 6, n. 2.
11. This is a name perhaps derived from the Mongolian term for "rebellion" or "one who has not submitted" (*bulγa*), the opposite of *il*, "one who has submitted."
12. The *fu* ("tablet" or "tally") was synonymous with the Mongolian "tablet of authority": in thirteenth- and fourteenth-century literary Mongolian—*gerege;* in fourteenth-century spoken Mongolian—*ʔbaisa;* Chinese—*p'ai-tzu*. See Cleaves, "Daruγa and Gerege," pp. 255–256; see also N. Ts. Munkuev, "A New Mon-

golian P'ai-tzu from Simferopol," p. 186. In the modern Khalkha dialect of Mongolian the word *paiz* exists and retains something of the original meaning of *p'ai-tzu*, in the sense of a thin strip for recording or registering numbers or names. See Luvsanbaldan, ed., *Mongol khelnii tovch tailbar tol'*, p. 450a.

13. The main biography of Shih-mo Yeh-hsien is in *YS* 150: 3541–3543. The editors of the *Yuan shih* mistakenly gave Shih-mo Yeh-hsien two biographies; a second, less informative biography under the name of Shih-mo A-hsin appears in *YS* 152: 3603. See also T'u Chi, *Meng-wu-erh shih-chi*, 49: 10a–10b.
14. On the powerful Shu-lü family (the later Shih-mo or Hsiao), the Liao imperial consort family, see Wittfogel and Feng, *Liao*, pp. 23, 111, 238, n. 3.
15. The first assault against Tung-ching by the Mongols occurred in the 12th moon of the 7th year of Yuan T'ai-tsu's reign (25 December 1212–23 January 1213) under the Mongolian general Jebe (Che-pieh). It is recorded that he captured the city, but the final submission of the city took place in 1215 when Shih-mo Yeh-hsien's strategy enabled Muqali to enter. *YS* 1:16; *YS* 119: 2931. Jebe is not accorded a biography in the *Yuan shih;* one may be found in K'o Shao-min, *Hsin Yuan shih*, 123: 3a–6a.
16. Muqali attacked Pei-ching, the northern capital of the Chin (modern K'o-la-ch'in, Liaoning province), in the 2nd moon of the 10th year of Yuan T'ai-tsu's reign (2–31 March 1215). *YS* 1: 18.
17. I-tu, in modern Shantung province, was attacked by Muqali in the winter of 1217. *YS* 1: 19; *YS* 119: 2932.
18. *YS* 150: 3543; *Hsin Yuan shih* 135: 8b. Elsewhere, in *YS* 152: 3603, it is stated that Ch'a-la was appointed as *Ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* of Chen-ting route alone.
19. *YS* 124: 3050. Interestingly, Yueh-li T'ieh-mu-erh's son, Ho-la P'u-hua (Qara Puqa ∿ Buqa), served as a *Ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* (of Ning-hai route in modern Chekiang); and *his* son, Hsieh Wen-chih, also served as a *Ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* (of Chi-an route in modern Kiangsi). See *YS* 193: 4386. This is not a case of hereditary transfer of the office of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih;* rather, three generations of a Uiɣur (Hui-hu) family served as *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* in different geographic areas.
20. Meng-ku Pa-erh's Mongolian name may have been Mongɣo[l] Bar ∿ Bars (Tiger). His name is not, as Ch'i-ch'ing Hsiao has written, a "garbled transcription," but is a nickname given to him in his youth. Hsiao, *Military Establishment*, p. 146, n. 285, mentions Meng-ku Pa-erh in passing.
21. See Hu Chih-yü's biography in *YS* 170: 3992–3993. The epitaph, translated in part below, is found in Hu Chih-yü, *Tzu-shan ta-ch'üan-chi*, 15: 19a–23a. For Hu Chih-yü's thoughts on law and imperial authority, see John D. Langlois, Jr., "Law, Statecraft, and *The Spring and Autumn Annals* in Yüan Political Thought," pp. 109–112.
22. *Shen-tao-pei* were epitaphs engraved on stone tablets. A more precise, but perhaps cumbersome, translation would be "Stele on the spirit way." For a discussion of stelae, see Denis Twitchett, "Problems of Chinese Biography," p. 27.



23. This epitaph is apparently the sole source of information on Meng-ku Pa-erh. His biography does not appear in any other Yuan source known to me.
24. The *Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu* edition of this work uses the revised orthography developed under the Ch'ien-lung Emperor of the Ch'ing dynasty. *Ta-lu-ka-ch'i* is the Ch'ien-lung revision of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*. See Francis W. Cleaves, "The Sino-Mongolian Inscription of 1338 in Memory of Jigüntei," p. 20, n. 15.
25. On Huai-meng *lu*, see *YS* 58: 1362–1363. Huai-meng *lu* was renamed Huai-ch'ing *lu* in 1319.
26. Again, *e-lo* is the Ch'ien-lung revision of *ao-lu* (Mongolian: *a'uru*[ɣ]). The *ao-lu* were local military administrations in charge of such affairs as military conscription, provisioning, and the management of military households' fiscal and legal affairs. See Hsiao, *Military Establishment*, pp. 135–136, n. 98.
27. On the similar term, *chen-ya* or *ya-chen*, see Chapter 1, note 43.
28. At the time when Meng-ku Pa-erh was appointed *Ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* of Chang-te route, only 10 routes existed. The 10 were first established in 1229 by Ögödei Qaɣan under the advice of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai. See Igor de Rachewiltz, "Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai (1189–1243): Buddhist Idealist and Confucian Statesman," p. 201. See also *YS* 58: 1360.
29. Presumably, the *cha-sa-k'o-ch'i* was the officer in charge of enforcement of the Jasaɣ (*cha-sa*), the laws and instructions of Činggis Qan. The *Jasaɣ* was formally promulgated in 1229. See Paul Ch'en, pp. xiv, 8–10. It is not wise to attempt a reconstruction of the Mongolian for *cha-sa-k'o-ch'i*, which is the Ch'ien-lung orthography.
30. This may be [Šigi] Quduqu. See de Rachewiltz, "Personnel and Personalities," p. 99, n. 2, for an exhaustive listing of biographical source material on Šigi Quduqu.
31. Huai-chou was the Chin and early Yuan name for the later Huai-ch'ing route. *YS* 58: 1362. It is in present-day Ch'in-yang *hsien*, Honan.
32. A different version of the suppression of this revolt is given in *YS* 123: 3030–3031. The revolt is dated 1239, and primary credit for its suppression is given to Ch'un-chih-hai. See below, pages 33–34.
33. The T'ai-shih kuo-wang was in all likelihood Tas (T'a-ssu), the grandson of Muqali. Muqali's descendants inherited his titles, and Tas was active in battling the Sung in Honan up until his death in 1239. See *YS* 119:2937–2940; and Igor de Rachewiltz, "Muqali, Bōl, Tas and An-t'ung," p. 55.
34. *YS* 58:1356. Wei was one of 11 subprefectures (*chou*) in Chen-ting route in the early Yuan. It later became part of Wei-hui route. Hsiang was also one of the 11 subprefectures in Chen-ting route, but later Hsiang became a part of Chang-te route.
35. Hui-chou was in Wei-hui route. *YS* 58: 1363.
36. Nothing is known of Chu Ko.
37. This place has yet to be identified.

38. There is no information available on Hsieh Chih-ch'üan.
39. This is probably the same Ch'a-han (Čaγan) whose biography appears in *YS* 120: 2955–2957.
40. Li T'an's rebellion was centered in eastern Shan-tung; perhaps Meng-ku Pa-erh caught some of Li T'an's followers as they passed through Chang-te route. See Hsiao, *Military Establishment*, pp. 189–190, n. 210. On Li T'an's rebellion, see also Chou Liang-hsiao, "Li T'an chih luan yü Yuan-ch'u ching-chih."
41. Chung-shan prefecture was in Chen-ting route. *YS* 58: 1356–1357.
42. Ho-chung prefecture was in Chin-ning route. *YS* 58: 1379–1380.
43. Hu Chih-yü, *Tzu-shan ta-ch'üan-chi* 15: 21b–22a. This appointment does not represent a hereditary transfer of the office of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*. Sung-chou was one of 5 subprefectures under Nan-yang prefecture, in the Ho-nan regional secretariat. *YS* 59: 1404–1405.
44. Hu Chih-yü, *Tzu-shan ta-ch'üan-chi* 15: 22a. Ch'i-ch'ing Hsiao, on the basis of the epitaph by Hu Chih-yü, has written that Meng-ku Pa-erh's daughter married Shih Ko. Hsiao, *Military Establishment*, p. 146, n. 285. However, the epitaph states only that she married the Minister of the Right (*Yu-ch'eng*) Shih Hou (the Noble Shih), who was the son of the great minister, his eminence Chung-wu (*Ta ch'eng-hsiang Chung-wu kung*), i.e., Shih T'ien-tse. Shih T'ien-tse had 8 sons, two of whom served as *yu-ch'eng*, Shih Ko and Shih Chiang. Although Shih Ko was the more prominent of these two scions of the Shih family, it has not been established which of the two sons became Meng-ku Pa-erh's son-in-law. See the biographies of Shih T'ien-tse and Shih Ko in *YS* 155: 3657–3665. See also Sun K'o-k'uan's study of the Shih family: *Yuan-tai Han-wen-hua chih huo-tung*, pp. 260–262. Four members of the Shih clan including Shih T'ien-tse defected to the side of the Mongols in 1213. See de Rachewiltz, "Personnel and Personalities," p. 105.
45. Jing-shen Tao has touched upon the Jurchen attempt in the late Chin period to establish an alliance with powerful Chinese families through intermarriage. See his *The Jurchen in Twelfth-Century China*, pp. 96–98. On intermarriages in Yuan times, see Hung Chin-fu, "Yuan-tai Han-jen yü fei-Han-jen t'ung-hun wen-t'i ch'u-t'an."
46. Biographies of Ch'un-chih-hai are found in: *YS* 123: 3030–3031; *Hsin Yuan shih* 129: 9b–10b; *Meng-wu-erh shih-chi* 41: 4a–6a. Professor Francis W. Cleaves suggested to me that *Čuljiγai is the most probable reading of this name. The name is derived from the Mongolian word for "the young of certain animals." See Kowalewski, *Dictionnaire*, III, 2391b; and Mostaert, *Dictionnaire Ordos*, p. 218a.
47. T'u Chi is correct in identifying Ch'un-chih-hai's clan name as Sa-le-chih-wu-t'i (Saljūtai or Salji'ud). See *Meng-wu-erh shih-chi* 4:4a.
48. Ching-chao, later renamed An-hsi *lu* in 1279 and Feng-yuan *lu* in 1312, was in present-day Hsi-an, Shansi province. *YS* 60: 1423.
49. Professor Francis W. Cleaves has proposed Sirbeilün as the reconstruction of this name, based on the Mongolian word *sirbeyi-*, meaning "to stand on end, to bristle." See Kowalewski, *Dictionnaire*, II, 1530b; and Mostaert, *Dictionnaire Ordos*, p. 624a. *-Lun/-lün* is a suffix of female proper names. See Poppe, *Grammar of Written Mongolian*, p. 43.



50. *YS* 123: 3030.
51. *Meng-wu-erh shih-chi* 41:4b; *Hsin Yuan shih* 129:10a–10b. See Pelliot and Hambis, *Histoire des campaignes de Gengis Khan*, p. 64, on Ang'ara < Angγara.
52. See Yü Chi, *Tao-yuan hsueh-ku lu* 41:12a–12b. Huang-t'ou's family history accurately reflects the high level of participation in Yuan government by Tanguts; this topic deserves further exploration.
53. See *Yuan-t'ung yuan-nien chin-shih lu*, in *Sung Yuan k'o-chü san-lu* (1923) A:4a; and Hsiao Ch'i-ch'ing, "Yuan-t'ung yuan-nien chin-shih lu chiao-chu" (Part I) pp. 75, 85, n. 52. As Hsiao Ch'i-ch'ing in his thorough research into the text of the *Yuan-t'ung yuan-nien chin-shih lu* has pointed out (p. 73 of his article), omissions in virtually all categories of information (i.e., personal names, clan names, place names, office titles, etc.) render statistical analysis of this text inappropriate.
54. Biographical material on I-ssu-mai-li may be found in: *YS* 120:2969–2970; *Meng-wu-erh shih-chi* 29:7b–9a; *Hsin Yuan shih* 131:12a–13b; and Wittfogel and Feng, *Liao*, pp. 653–654. The *Yuan shih* text which reads Ho 合 -ssu-mai-li should be amended to read I 伊 -ssu-mai-li (Isma'il). See also E. Bretschneider, *Mediaeval Researches from Eastern Asiatic Sources*, I, 233–234.
55. Paul Buell, in his article "Sino-Khitan Administration in Mongol Bukhara," hypothesizes that the office of *daruγači* originated in Turkestan. This idea, part of an overall emphasis in Buell's work on Khitan and Qara-Khitan precedents for Mongolian institutions, does not proceed from any cogent philological or historical evidence. Buell's hypothesis is based more on similarities than established links. As Buell himself notes, the first *daruγači* appointed by the Mongols were appointed in China. Nonetheless, Buell suggests that "the probable origin of the office of the *daruγači*" derived from Qara-Khitan precedents. Buell writes (p. 133): "As near as can be determined, the office [of *daruγači*] was one of the many institutional borrowings by the Mongols from the Qara-Khitan whose state provided, in many ways, a prototype for the Mongol empire itself." David Morgan in *The Mongols* follows and even exceeds Buell on this point, writing that "there can be little doubt about its [the office of *daruγači*'s] Khitan origins" (p. 109).
56. *YS* 120: 2969.
57. Wittfogel and Feng, in their discussion of the Liao "ordo," write that at the end of the tenth century *ordu* was the name of a Turkic ruler's town of residence. The Turkic idea filtered into Khitan culture, as Yeh-lü Ta-shih, founding the Western Liao, called his new capital Hu-ssu Wo-erh-to (Ghuz-ordo). Another Western Liao transcription of the name of the capital was Ku-ssu O-lu-to. Hu-ssu Ordo was at or near Balāsāghūn, an old Turkic settlement. See Wittfogel and

Feng, *Liao*, pp. 517, 645; *Liao shih* 30:357; and V. M. Nadeliaev, et al., eds., *Drevnetiurkskii slovar'*, p. 475b, where the Turkic forms *Quz* and *Quz ordu* are given. The variant transcription in the *Yuan shih* certainly refers to the capital city. T'u Chi transcribes the name of the capital as Hu-ssu Wo-erh-to. *Meng-wu-erh shih-chi* 29:7b. The *Hsin Yuan shih* 131:12a does the same.

58. *Gurkhan*, transcribed as *Ko-erh-han* in Liao texts, was first adopted as an imperial title by Yeh-lü Ta-shih. It is apparently derived from the title of the Qara-Khānid rulers, *gūr-xan* or *gōr-xān*. See Wittfogel and Feng, *Liao*, p. 431. *K'uo-erh-han* is undoubtedly another transcription of *Gurkhan*. See also Barthold, *Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion*, pp. 366ff.
59. *Pa-ssu-ha* must be understood as the Chinese transcription of the Turkic *basqaq*. Wittfogel and Feng translate *pa-ssu-ha* as "representative or governor." See *Liao*, p. 653, n. 32.
60. Kāsān was in Ferghāna, between Samarqand and Balāsāghūn. See Wittfogel and Feng, *Liao*, p. 666, n. 147; and Barthold, *Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion*, pp. 162–163.
61. On Jebe, see note 15 of this chapter.
62. Ch'ü-ch'u-lü was a Naiman prince who usurped the throne of the Western Liao ruler Chih-lu-ku in 1211. The beheading of Ch'ü-ch'u-lü occurred in 1218. See Wittfogel and Feng, *Liao*, pp. 650–654; and *Liao shih* 30: 358.
63. Ch'i-ch'ing Hsiao has given the correct etymology of *bičēči* (< *bičiʾeči* < *bičigeči*). See *Military Establishment*, p. 151, n. 61. *Bičēči* consists of the root, *bič-* (to write) and the suffix *-geči*, whose function is to form nouns designating vocations. See Poppe, *Grammar of Written Mongolian*, p. 45. Sechin Jagchid has incorrectly transcribed *pi-she-ch'ih* as *bičigči*, based on a mistaken analysis of the components of the word, which he gives as *bič-* plus *-g* plus *-či*. See Cha-ch'i-ssu-ch'in, "Shuo *Yuan shih* chung ti pi-she-ch'ih ping chien-lun Yuan-ch'u ti chung-shu-ling," p. 19.
64. See note 39 in this chapter.
65. T'ieh-mu-tieh-erh awaits positive identification. There is a T'ieh-mu-tieh-erh listed as the *P'ing-chang-cheng-shih* of the Chiang-hsi Regional Secretariat in 1307, but this is obviously a different T'ieh-mu-tieh-erh. See Wu T'ing-hsieh, *Yuan hsing-sheng ch'eng-hsiang p'ing-chang-cheng-shih nien-piao*, p. 14.
66. Mi-li-chi was still *Ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* of Huai-meng in 1261. See his memorial, translated on page 39.
67. *YS* 123: 3032. Professor Francis W. Cleaves suggested to me the reconstruction of the name Chan-ch'e as *Jemče[g] ∿ Jemseg ∿ Jebseg, based on the Mongolian word for arms or armor. See Kowalewski, *Dictionnaire*, III, 2313b. *Bādur* (∿ *bātur*) (< *baʾadur* ∿ *baʾatur*) (< *bayatur*) is a term meaning "valiant." The name Maʾu (< Mayu) means literally "bad." Among the definitions of *mayu* in the *Dictionnaire Ordos* is "terme de tendresse (= chéri)." Mostaert, *Dictionnaire Ordos*, p. 472b.



68. The following information on Chang Chao's life is drawn from *YS* 170: 3997–3998; Hu Chih-yü, *Tzu-shan ta-ch'üan-chi* 15: 9a–12a; and Yü Hsi-lu, *Chih-shun Chen-chiang chih*, 15: 6a.
69. Chi-nan was an upper route (*shang-lu*) in present-day Shantung. *YS* 58: 1372–1373. The Chen-chiang gazetteer, however, lists Chang Chao as being from Chang-te, a lower route (*hsia-lu*) in present-day Honan.
70. Hu Chih-yü, *Tzu-shan ta-ch'üan-chi* 15: 9a–9b.
71. There were two Shou-yang in the Yuan period. One Shou-yang was in An-feng route, in the region called Huai-nan, i.e., the area south of the Huai River. *YS* 59: 1413. The other Shou-yang was a lower county in Chi-ning route in Shantung. *YS* 58: 1377.
72. The *Yuan shih* reports that he was Document Supervisor in the Bureau of the Right (Yu-ssu) of the Chung-shu-sheng; Hu Chih-yü reports that he was Document Supervisor in the Bureau of the Left (Tso-ssu). See Ratchnevsky, *Un code des Yuan*, I, 123ff, on these two Bureaus. See also *YS* 85: 2123.
73. This is the *su-cheng lien-fang-ssu*.
74. Yen-chou was a lower subprefecture in Chi-ning route in present-day Shantung. *YS* 58: 1368.
75. A-t'ai-hai (Ataqai) of the Sun-tu-ssu (Suldus) tribe has a biography in *YS* 129: 3149–3150. Francis W. Cleaves has tentatively reconstructed the name A-t'a-hai as ʔA[γ]taqai, viewing the name as a derivation in *-qai* of *ayta*, "gelding." See his "The Historicity of the Baljuna Covenant," p. 400, n. 260. I would suggest that the name could be reconstructed as Ataqai, a derivative in *-qai* of *ata*, "a gelded camel." See Mostaert, *Dictionnaire Ordos*, p. 34a. In the modern Khalkha dialect of Mongolian, the word *at* (*ata* in its written Mongolian form) exists, meaning "a gelded camel over five years of age." Luvsanbaldan, *Mongol khelnii tovch tailbar tol'*, p. 55b.
76. See *YS* 129: 3149–3150.
77. On the fall of Yang-chou, see the biography of Li T'ing-chih in T'o-t'o et al., *Sung shih* 421: 12602. See also the biography of Li T'ing-chih by D. Schlegel in Herbert Franke, ed., *Sung Biographies*, I, 591–594.
78. Tung-ch'ang was a lower route in modern Shantung Province.
79. See, for instance, John W. Dardess, *Conquerors and Confucians; Aspects of Political Change in Late Yüan China*, pp. 21, 164.
80. Igor de Rachewiltz, "Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai," p. 201.
81. Wang Yun, *Ch'iu-chien hsien-sheng ta-ch'üan-chi*, 82: 7a–7b.
82. On the term Tu-t'ang as an abbreviation for the Chung-shu-sheng, see Ratchnevsky, *Un code des Yuan*, I, 28, n. 1.
83. See Hsu Yuan-jui, *Li-hsueh chih-nan*, p. 93, for the term *kou-chui*.
84. The following is the memorial of the Chung-shu-sheng.
85. *Kuan-min-kuan* is a general category, an umbrella term, often used in reference

to *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* and/or the other senior officials at various levels of the local government. "Officials who govern the people" is Francis W. Cleaves' translation in "The Sino-Mongolian Inscription of 1240," p. 66.

86. The phrase *chun-tz'u* is a later scribal addition, indicating imperial approval of the instructions within the memorial of the Chung-shu-sheng. See Cleaves, "Uighuric Mourning Regulations," p. 93, n. 84, on such formulas.
87. See *YS* 5:89. The imperial decree of 23 January 1263 has been translated by Ch'i-ch'ing Hsiao, *Military Establishment*, p. 184, n. 169.
88. *YS* 155: 3661.
89. *YTC* 11: 2a.
90. *YTC* 8: 6b.
91. On the term *cha-fu*, see *Li-hsueh chih-nan*, p. 22.
92. On the history of the Shang-shu-sheng, see *YS* 85: 2121. The Shang-shu-sheng was first established in 1270, abolished in 1271, reestablished in 1287, abolished in 1292, reestablished in 1309, and in 1311 merged back into the Chung-shu-sheng. The editors of the *Yuan shih* note: "From this time onward following it is not easy." See also Aoyama Kōryō, *Genchō shōshoshō kō*.
93. The identity of Qorči has yet to be ascertained.
94. The biography of Ha-la-tai is in *YS* 132: 3215–3217.
95. The Shang-shu-sheng is here paraphrasing the imperial decree of 1287, translated above.
96. The translation below is from *YTC* 11: 1a. See also Ch'i-ch'ing Hsiao's translation of the relevant passage in *YS* 98, in his *Military Establishment*, p. 81.
97. Ratchnevsky, *Un code des Yuan*, I, 50, n. 3, describes a *chieh-yu* as "un compte rendu de l'exercice de la charge qui sert simultanément de titre pour la nomination à une nouvelle charge." Hsiao Ch'i-ch'ing translates the term as "certificate of discharge." See *Military Establishment*, p. 193, n. 249. See also Paul Ch'en, p. 116. The *Yuan shih* 84: 2094 describes the history of the process by which officials' records were reviewed as follows:

> Ascertaining (*ch'ü-hui*) personal conduct (*hsing-chih*): In the 3rd year of the Chung-t'ung reign period [1262], there was an imperial decree (*chao*) [ordering] the establishment of a record (*pu*) and the setting of a formula (*shih*) to ascertain each official's name, native place (*chi-kuan*), age, and his first and subsequent offices. In the 19th year of the Chih-yuan reign period [1282], all appointed officials (*chih-kuan*) had their certificates of discharge (*chieh-yu*) sent to the Central Secretariat and the Board (Sheng-pu), where their merits and errors were examined, in order to determine their demotions and promotions. In the first year of the Ta-te reign period [1297], officials with non-court appointments (*wai-jen kuan*) had their certificates of discharge sent to the Board of Personnel (Li-pu); then they [the certificates] were sent to the Board of Punishments (Hsing-pu) to be reviewed, where the Board keeps a record of personal conduct (*hsing-chih pu*) of each person [in] his successive appointments, then reviews it (*chien-chao*) and makes a proposal (*ting-i*) [as to demotion or promotion].

98. On the term *ssu-hsien*, see Paul Ch'en, p. 70.
99. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, trs. and eds., *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, p. 196.
100. Ibid., pp. 196–197.
101. *YS* 96:2449.
102. See Endicott-West, "Imperial Governance in Yüan Times."
103. Hsiao, *Military Establishment*, pp. 60–62; Manz, p. 64.
104. The documents on seals of office translated below are in *YTC* 13: 4a–4b. For a physical description of Yuan period seals (*tamγa* ∿ *tamaγa* in Mongolian; *yin* in Chinese), see the reproductions of several princely, official, and personal seals in David M. Farquhar, "Official Seals and Ciphers of the Yüan Period." Yeh Tzu-ch'i, in his *Ts'ao-mu-tzu* 3b: 62–63, gives the following description of Yuan seals and imperial directives:

> In the Yuan dynasty, bureaus of the 1st rank (*i-p'in*) used three gold seals (*yin*). Second rank and 3rd rank [bureaus] used two silver seals. The seals of the other large and small bureaus [i.e., those below 3rd rank] although they were unequal in size all used copper. Their sealed documents all used Mongolian letters which the Imperial Instructor (*Ti-shih*) Pa-ssu-ma (the 'Phags-pa Lama) had invented. Only for the imperial seal (*pao*) for imperial directives (*hsuan-ming*) did they use jade. By means of jade they wrote seal characters. This was their peculiarity [i.e., a practice common only to the Yuan].
>
> For all Yuan imperial directives (*hsuan-ch'ih*), paper was used. [Imperial directives sent to bureaus from] the 1st rank to the 5th rank were *hsuan*, and their color was white; [those sent from bureaus of] the 6th rank to the 9th rank were *ch'ih*, and their color was red. Although different from the imperial directives (*kao-ch'ih*) of antiquity which used woven silk (*chih-ling*), yet they [Yuan imperial directives] were extremely simple and antique, and economical. This can be followed.

A Bureau of Seal-Casting (Chu-yin-chü), with the rank of 8a, was established in 1268 to manage the smelting of metals and casting of seals. See *YS* 85: 2140. That there was a great deal of counterfeiting of official seals of office is attested to by the *Yuan tien-chang* which devotes *Chüan* 52 to regulations concerning "Frauds and Counterfeits" (*Cha-wei*). The punishments range from death (for fraudulently fabricating the Central Secretariat's seal) to beatings (for counterfeiting a county seal). See also *YS* 105: 2667–2670.

105. There is no Chung-t'ung 5. The year 1260 was Chung-t'ung 1; the last year of the Chung-t'ung reign period, Chung-t'ung 4, was 1263. The year 1264 is the first year of the Chih-yuan reign period. If 1264 is the correct year, 26 August is the proper date. However, if Chung-t'ung 4 is meant, the proper date is 7 September

1263. Ratchnevsky, who has translated part of this imperial decree, gives the date as 26 August 1264. *Un code des Yuan*, I, 31.

106. Ratchnevsky, *Un code des Yuan*, I, 31–32, translates *shu-ya* as "il apposera la signature officielle."

107. *Feng* 封 has the idea of "sealing off" something such as a door or "sealing up" a box. *Chi* 記 has the idea of "marking" or "recording." Apparently, when the seal of office was not in use, it was kept in a box that was sealed off with paper and upon which a mark or recording was made—perhaps the date when last used and the name of the most recent user. These ideas were suggested to me by Professor Ruby Lam on 18 April 1980. Ratchnevsky, *Un code des Yuan*, I, 33, translates *feng-chi* as "l'enfermera et notera son emploi."

108. According to *YS* 85: 2126, Quibilai in 1260 formed the Tso-san-pu, made up of the Board of Personnel (Li-pu), the Board of Revenue (Hu-pu), and the Board of Rites (Li-pu). In 1264, the Boards of Personnel and Rites were combined. In 1266. the Tso-san-pu was restored, but, in 1268, the Li-li-pu was again formed, without the Hu-pu. The Tso-san-pu was never again reinstated. See also Ratchnevsky, *Un code des Yuan*, I, 33, n. 5.

109. Yu Hsien joined the Mongols in the early 1230s. See his epitaph in Yao Sui, *Mu-an chi* 22: 1a–9a. See also *YS* 2: 35, 36. Yu Hsien is not given a separate biography in the *Yuan shih*. He has biographies in *Meng-wu-erh shih-chi* 133: 1a; and *Hsin Yuan shih* 167: 1a.

110. For a definition of *k'o-ch'eng*, see *Li-hsueh chih-nan*, pp. 39, 99. According to Schurmann, *Economic Structure*, p. 163, n. 1, *k'o* designated taxes on goods during the Yuan. Paul Ch'en, p. 133, translates *k'o-ch'eng* as "taxes and levies."

111. On the term *ch'ai-fa*, see Schurmann, *Economic Structure*, p. 103, n. 1. Ch'i-ch'ing Hsiao, *Military Establishment*, p. 191, n. 229, regards *ch'ai-fa* as "the household taxes that civilians were supposed to pay." Ratchnevsky, *Un code des Yuan*, I, 34, translates *k'o-ch'eng* as "des impôts" and *ch'ai-fa* as "des corvées."

112. Note the colloquial expression in this report: i.e., a reason for being away from office.

113. In other words, all official business would come to a halt when the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* was away from his office, since two officials, one of whom was a *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*, had to be present to use the seals of office, and two officials had to be in charge of the seals when they were not in use.

114. This may refer to the 26 August 1264 imperial decree, although no exigency plan for expediting official business when the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* is away appears in the earlier decree. That decree outlines a plan of action while a *chang-kuan* is away from office, while this decree refers to the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*'s absence.

115. Thus, in the absence of the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*, two people were still required to be present—the *kuan-min-kuan* and the official next in line to him.

116. On the *ling-shih*, see *YTC* 12: 19a–19b. The *ling-shih* fell into the category of clerks (*li-shu*), and had no rank. See *YS* 85, *passim*.



117. In other words, the Tso-san-pu suggests that a *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* must consent before his departure to this practice by which senior officials closed up the seals of office.

118. Thus, in this 1298 imperial decree, the respective duties of the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* and the senior official (*chang-kuan*) are the opposite of those described in the 1264 decree. In the earlier decree, the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* was to close up and mark the container in which the seals were kept, while the senior official was to keep them in his office. Obviously, the splitting of custodial duty between the two officials is the important feature of these decrees, and not the apparent reversal of duties.

119. In other words, two officials were still required to manage the seals of office, even when the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* was away. In his absence, however, the two officials were from the (usually) Chinese-staffed administration. This procedure matches that described in the 1265 *cha-fu* to cover the absence of a *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*.

120. In the absence of an officially designated post of seal-keeper, *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* and senior officials had simply designated their personal household staff as seal-keepers. Presumably it was considered desirable to create an office of seal-keeper, so that such personal retainers (whose abuses of responsibility follow) would not be allowed to participate in government.

121. For this definition of *tiao-teng*, see *Li-hsueh chih-nan*, p. 91.

122. Presumably it would be inappropriate to investigate these offenses, since the offenders were only slaves and household servants.

123. In other words, temporary permission to use seals, perhaps in senior officials' absences, should not be given to the servants of such officials.

124. This phrase is out of place; probably there is a lacuna in the text.

125. Paul Ch'en, p. 75.

126. Ibid.

127. The documents translated below are from *YTC* 13: 2a–2b.

128. I read 見, as 引見 in this text. This is a common substitution in the *Yuan tien-chang*. Ratchnevsky has translated *ko-li* as "les règles de jurisprudence." *Un code des Yuan*, I, xvii, n. 3.

129. Ratchnevsky, who has translated this section, translates *yuan-tso* as "Après avoir pris siège en assemblée plénière."

130. On the term *kou-tang*, see Francis Woodman Cleaves, "The Sino-Mongolian Inscription of 1240," pp. 66–67, n. 16. As Professor Cleaves points out, *kou-tang* as a substantive is equivalent to the Mongolian *üile*, "matter." Professor Cleaves translates *kou-tang* as it appears in the 1240 inscription as "to manage." Ch'i-ch'ing Hsiao, in *Military Establishment*, pp. 101, 229, n. 200, translates *kou-tang* as "perform the tasks." In every instance in which I have encountered *kou-tang* in Yuan sources, it refers to the managing or conducting of official business by officials.

131. *Hsing-shang-shu-sheng* according to *YS* 91:2305 existed as such in 1287 briefly before being changed back into *hsing-chung-shu-sheng*, and were renamed *hsing-*

*shang-shu-sheng* briefly in 1309. In *TCTK* 2:2a there is a reference to the *hsing-shang-shu-sheng* in 1271.

132. See note 92, above.

133. *YTC* 11:3a. The same text with a few minor differences may be found in *TCTK* 22:4a. Ratchnevsky, *Un code des Yuan*, I, 36, has translated the *YTC* text, although he has incorrectly dated the text 1265 instead of 1264.

134. The *YTC* text reads 旬日各給假 . The *TCTK* text reads 每旬各給假 .

135. Wang Yun, *Ch'iu-chien hsien-sheng ta-ch'üan-chi* 86:19b–20a. On Wang Yun himself, see Herbert Franke, "Wang Yün (1227–1304): A Transmitter of Chinese Values."

136. *Chih-shun Chen-chiang chih* 15:12a–12b.

137. *Hui-chou fu-chih* (compiled in 1502), 4:23b.

138. I have translated the Wang Yun version of this decree: Wang Yun, *Ch'iu-chien hsien-sheng ta-ch'üan-chi* 89:17a–b. The *YTC* version (*YTC* 51:8a) does not specifically mention the conference:

> In the sundry prefectures (*fu*), subprefectures (*chou*), and *ssu-hsien*, when the officials in charge of patrolling and catching thieves apprehend thieves, they forthwith should hand them over to the public office (*kung-t'ing*) of their own county (*hsien*), where [county officials] should conduct an inquiry concerning the facts, and [then] forward [the thieves] to their own subprefecture or prefecture, where [the officials] should again carry out a judicial investigation. Do not specially put clerks or archers (*kung-shou* [i.e., police]) in charge of interrogation.

139. On the archers as police, see Paul Ch'en, pp. 71–72.

140. Chang Yang-hao, *Mu-min chung-kao* A:9b. The history of Chang Yang-hao's handbook is discussed in n. 15 in Chapter 5.

141. Paul Ch'en, pp. 154–155, 166. Strictly speaking, Ch'en's statement, p. 72, that "a wrongdoer . . . was to be tried by the *hsien-yin*" is misleading; the *hsien-yin* could act only in conjunction with his colleagues at conference.

142. Cheng Yü, *Shih-shan wen-chi* 6:5b.

143. This is the Ch'ien-lung revised orthography for *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*
See Chapter 2, n. 24.

144. Yang Wei-chen, *Tung-wei-tzu wen-chi* 4:8a.

145. Ibid.

146. *Nan-t'ai pei-yao*, 26:5a. Dr. Hung Chin-fu kindly brought this passage to my attention.

147. *YTC* 11:1b.

148. *YTC* 11:1b.

149. *TCTK* 16:14b.

150. *Chih-shun Chen-chiang chih* 15: 6b.



151. See Yü Chi, *Tao-yuan hsueh-ku lu* 41:9a.

152. *TCTK* 16: 18a.

153. The Ta-ssu-nung-ssu was first established in 1270. See *YS* 87: 2188–2189; and Schurmann, *Economic Structure*, pp. 43, 47.

154. See note 97 on the *chieh-yu*.

155. Lin-chang county was in Chang-te route, which in turn was under the jurisdiction of the Chung-shu-sheng. *YS* 58: 1360.

156. This Tai Buqa is not identifiable. He is certainly not the Tai Buqa whose biography appears in *YS* 141.

157. Presumably, this refers to the total number of trees that were supposed to be planted by the households in the county.

158. Ratchnevsky, *Un code des Yuan*, I, 199, translates *p'an-shu* as "responsable de la décision," and on page 328 as "chargés de l'expédition des affaires." See also *Li-hsueh chih-nan*, p. 30, on *p'an-shu*.

159. *T'i-tiao-kuan* is here used to differentiate *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* from officials who directly govern the people (*ch'in-min*).

160. *TCTK* 16: 19a–19b; *TCTK* 16: 20b–21a.

161. Ratchnevsky, *Un code des Yuan*, I, lx, translates *yueh-hui* as "convoquait une cour mixte." A mixed court, according to Ratchnevsky, refers to the presence of both a military official (*kuan-chün-kuan*) and a civilian official (*kuan-min-kuan*).

162. Since this term appears in a *sheng-chih* that has been translated from Mongolian into Chinese, we may be fairly certain that *mien-p'i* is a translation of the Mongolian word *niyur*, "face." See Haenisch, p. 117.

163. *YTC* 23: 6a. The decree was issued before 1291, since it refers to the *an-ch'a-ssu* which was abolished in that year; and, since it mentions the community leaders (*she-chang*), first instituted in North China in 1270, the decree was issued between 1270 and 1291. See Schurmann, *Economic Structure*, p. 45; and *TCTK* 16: 3a–3b.

164. *An-ch'a-ssu* is an abbreviation of *t'i-hsing an-ch'a-ssu* which was replaced by the *su-cheng lien-fang-ssu* in 1291. See Paul Ch'en, pp. 73–74.

165. See Chapter 5 for a discussion of this non-salaried position.

166. *Po-lan-hsi* or *pu-lan-hsi* is a transcription of the Mongolian **boralki* or **buralki*, the Chinese synonym of which is *lan-i*. Paul Pelliot translates *po-lan-hsi* as "men (and things) gone astray." See *Notes on Marco Polo*, I, 112–114. See also Ts'ai Mei-piao, *Yuan-tai pai-hua pei-chi-lu*, p. 9, n. 4.

167. Ts'ai Mei-piao, pp. 8, 13.

168. The translated documents are in *YTC* 56: 1a–1b; *YTC* 56: 2b.

169. This group of officials was relieved of the responsibility over the *pu-lan-hsi* on 8 February 1278. The *Yuan shih* records that, on that date, "Yeh-hsien (Esen), K'uo-k'uo-tai (Ködödei), and others, who were the officials in charge of collecting men and things gone astray (*shou-k'uo lan-i kuan*), were tried for treating irresponsibly

official horses and *lan-i* people and cattle . . . " *YS* 10: 197. The identities of P'ei Wen-hsiu, Tou *hsien-sheng*, and A-san/Yeh-hsien (Esen) remain uncertain. Hsiao Hsueh was executed on 29 January 1288 for his involvement in a rebellious plot. *YS* 15: 328.

170. *YS* 11: 224 records that, on 29 June 1280, a Hu-tu-tai-erh was put in charge of keeping the records of *lan-i* people and cattle.

171. The *shang-shu* was the ranking member of the Board of Personnel. The number of *shang-shu* vacillated between 3 and 1. *YS* 85: 2125–2126.

172. The *k'o-sheng-shih* was a middle-level office in the Chung-shu-sheng and the Shu-mi-yuan with the rank of 5a. The Hsuan-cheng-yuan also had a *k'o-sheng-shih* with the rank of 5b. On these offices, see *YTC* 7: 8a, 9b. The Board of Personnel itself did not have such an office; thus the reference to a *k'o-sheng-shih* in this context is unclear.

173. The wording of this 1279 imperial decree is very similar to the wording of an imperial decree of 1295, as it appears in *YTC* 56: 2b, with one slight, but interesting difference. The imperial decree of 1295 has "senior officials who oversee the population" (*kuan-min chang-kuan*), whereas the 1279 decree has "regular officials who oversee the population" (*kuan-min cheng-kuan*). The *Li-hsueh chih-nan*, p. 12, equates the terms *chang-kuan* and *cheng-kuan*, but the *Ts'ao-mu-tzu*, 4b: 82, implies that *chang-kuan* were *daruγači* while *cheng-kuan* were other regular officials. The *Ts'ao-mu-tzu* passage is translated in note 53 in Chapter 5.

174. This refers apparently to the above order that the subprefectures and counties report the number of *pu-lan-hsi* every month, while the *tsung-kuan-fu* should report every quarter.

175. This statement seems to refer to *pu-lan-hsi* collected by the previous officials in charge of them, i.e., by those officials dismissed from office for hiding *pu-lan-hsi*.

176. This Mangγudai is not the same person as the Mang-wu-t'ai (Mangγudai) whose biography appears in *YS* 131: 3186–3190. His identification awaits further research.

177. On the term *ch'ü-k'ou*, see Schurmann, *Economic Structure*, pp. 81–82, n. 8. Ch'i-ch'ing Hsiao translates this term as "captive-slaves," although it seems to have been used to refer to a broader category than just slaves captured during campaigns. *Military Establishment*, p. 18.

178. According to *YS* 87: 2200–2202, among the duties of the Court of Imperial Etiquette (Hsuan-hui-yuan) was "the collection of men and things gone astray (*shou-shou lan-i*)." Under the aegis of the Court of Imperial Etiquette was the "Agency of Men and Things Gone Astray" (Lan-i-chien). According to the *Yuan shih*, this agency "managed *pu-lan-hsi* people, cattle, and things." In 1283, the *lan-i-so* with the rank of 9 was first established. In 1288, the *lan-i-so* was renamed the *lan-i-chien* with the rank of 4a. The rank was changed back and forth between 3rd and 4th in subsequent years. The directors (*chien-ch'eng*) of the rank of 6a were appointed to the *lan-i-chien*. Thus, the Court of Imperial Etiquette had



jurisdiction over unclaimed *pu-lan-hsi*, i.e., such people, cattle, and objects became the property of the Imperial Household.

179. Part of this text appears in *TCTK* 28: 25b.

180. In other words, the Board of Punishments is recommending that the communiqué (*tzu*) of the Central Secretariat be carried out by the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* and other officials. The communiqué contains the imperial decree authorizing the rounding up of *pu-lan-hsi*.

181. *YTC* 56: 4a. There is a similar, more colloquial variant of the 1312 report of the Court of Imperial Etiquette in *TCTK* 28: 25b–26a. In the *TCTK* text, officials who were put in charge of *pu-lan-hsi* were referred to as *pu-lan-hsi-ch'ih*, which would be a hypothetical Mongolian **buralkiči*, a *nomen actoris* in *-či*. Also, a truncated version of the text of the Central Secretariat communiqué appears in *TCTK* 28: 22a–23a, but it is dated the 5th moon (6 June–4 July) of the 1st year of the Huang-ch'ing reign period (1312).

182. The communication of the Chiang-che Regional Secretariat and the communiqué of the Central Secretariat presumably contained the same text.

183. See note 178 on the Lan-i-chien-ch'eng.

184. No biographical information is available for T'ang Shu.

185. The *li-cheng* and the *chu-shou* were two types of unsalaried village elders. See Chapter 5.

186. According to *YS* 86: 2180–2181, the Su-cheng Lien-fang-ssu was under the jurisdiction of the Censorate (Yü-shih-t'ai). At first, this institution was established with the name T'i-hsing an-ch'a-ssu in 4 circuits (*tao*). It was charged with investigating and advising on agricultural affairs. Over the years, it was given jurisdiction over more circuits. In 1291, the T'i-hsing an-ch'a-ssu was changed into the Su-cheng Lien-fang-ssu. As of 1293, the *lien-fang-ssu* was established in 22 circuits altogether. The *lien-fang-ssu* of each circuit, except those of Liang-Kuang and Hai-nan, had 11 ranked officials, and 25 unranked clerical workers. The two circuits of Liang-Kuang and Hai-nan each had 2 fewer ranked officials.

187. See the 1260 decree of Qubilai preserved in the *Ta-Yuan ma-cheng chi* (Records of the horse policy of the great Yuan dynasty), as translated by S. Jagchid and C. R. Bawden, "Some Notes on the Horse-Policy of the Yüan Dynasty," pp. 256–257.

188. Yang Wei-chen, *Tung-wei-tzu wen-chi* 4:8b.

189. See Cheng Yü (1298–1358), *Shih-shan wen-chi* 6:2b–5b; quotation on 6:3b. For another biography (literally an "account of conduct," *hsing-chuang*) of a *wan-hu-fu ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*, see Ch'eng Tuan-li (1271–1345), *Wei-chai chi* 6:12a–17b. For a thorough listing of ranks including those of *daruγači* in the myriarchies, chiliarchies, and centuries (*po-hu*), see Hsiao, *Military Establishment*, p. 171, n. 27.

## 3. *The* Ta-lu-hua-ch'ih – *Appointment to Office and the Nationality Question*

1. Examinations were reinstituted only in 1315, and functioned in a much more limited way than in earlier and later periods. See Chang Chin-chien, *Chung-kuo wen-kuan chih-tu shih,* Chapter 3, Section 3, espec. pp. 80–83.
2. See Makino Shūji, "Gendai shōkan kitei ni tsuite no ichi kōsatsu, toku ni kannanjin rofushūkenkan no baai," *passim.*
3. Wittfogel and Feng, *Liao,* p. 20.
4. Wittfogel and Feng, *Liao,* p. 463; Tao, *The Jurchen,* pp. 55–64.
5. *YS* 83: 2059.
6. The documents are found in *YTC* 8: 12a–12b.
7. *Hsi-kuan* means "belonging to the government," i.e., under the jurisdiction of the metropolitan government, as opposed to *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* who were appointed by the *t'ou-hsia.* See Schurmann, *Economic Structure,* pp. 99, 106, n. 14, on this usage.
8. The *Yuan tien-chang* has the character  which is perhaps an error for . This person is apparently not in the *Yuan shih.*
9. Po-erh does not have a biography in the *Yuan shih.* The Mongolian name Bōl is derived from Bo'ol < Boγol (slave).
10. See Chapter 2, note 41.
11. The term *ch'eng-hsi* commonly was used in reference to military offices, not civilian offices. See *YTC* 8: 16a–17b for examples. In this text, however, it is used synonymously with *ch'eng-yin.* Ratchnevsky, *Un code des Yuan,* I, 99, translates *ch'eng-hsi* as "accès par transmission d'un titre militaire." Ratchnevsky observed the difference between *yin* and *hsi:* "廕 ou 蔭 *yin* désigne la transmission d'un titre de mandarin civil alors que 襲 *si* désigne la transmission d'un titre de mandarin militaire." *Un code des Yuan,* I, 108, n. 2.
12. The Board of Rites and the Board of Personnel were united into one Board, the Li-li-pu, from 1264 to 1266, from 1268 to 1270, and from 1271 to 1276. In 1276, the two boards were separated once and for all. See *YS* 85: 2126.
13. The *Yuan shih* 7: 129 reports that, on 4 May 1270, a decree (*ch'ih*) was issued which stated:

> The sons and younger brothers of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* of the sundry routes, when they inherit office through the *yin* privilege (*yin-hsu*), should fill the office of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* of the prefectures (*san-fu*) or of the sundry subprefectures; the sons and younger brothers of those [*ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*] of the prefectures and sundry subprefectures should fill the office of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* of the sundry counties; the sons and younger brothers [of those *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*] of the sundry counties should fill the office of patrol chief (*hsun-chien*).



See Paul Ch'en, p. 9, n. 30, for an explanation of how decrees (*ch'ih*) evolved into codified standard laws.

14. On the term *ken-chiao,* see Chapter 1, n. 59.
15. The text returns to the communiqué of the Central Secretariat at this point.
16. Hui-hui in Yuan times was used to refer to Turkic Muslims. Earlier, in T'ang times, the term was applied to the Uiγur, who were then Buddhists. Later, when the Turks were Islamicized, the Chinese took the term Hui-hui, originally used for the Uiγur, and generalized it to include all Turkic peoples. I am indebted to Professor Francis W. Cleaves for this philological summary which he provided in his Mongolian History course at Harvard University on 12 December 1979. See also Pelliot's review of Arthur Waley's *The Travels of an Alchemist* in *Toung Pao* 28: 418 (1931). Pelliot writes that, in the thirteenth century, the term Hui-hui could refer to either Uiγur or Muslims, but that, in Chinese texts after the mid-thirteenth century, Uiγur writing was called Wei-wu or Wei-wu-erh, and Hui-hui came to refer to Muslims.
17. *Hsien-ssu* may be an error for *Ssu-hsien.*
18. Ratchnevsky, *Un code des Yuan,* I, 43, translates the term *wen-p'ing* simply as "un certificat."
19. Ratchnevsky, *Un code des Yuan,* I, 132, translates *ch'üan-chu* as "le jugement des candidats et leur inscription pour une charge."
20. The Central Secretariat's communication is in *YTC* 8: 12b–13a; the Board of Personnel's proposals are in *TCTK* 6: 8a, 10a–13a.
21. On the term *pao-shih,* see *Li-hsueh chih-nan,* p. 16, and Ratchnevsky, *Un code des Yuan,* I, xxvi. Professor Ruby Lam has suggested to me the translation "apprentice," in the sense of one who is on probation for a trial period in an office. See the translation below of a 1311 imperial decree (*chao-shu*) which addresses the question of exemption from service as *pao-shih.*
22. Throughout this entry, the term *ch'eng-chi* often is used in reference to the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih,* while the term *ch'eng-yin* often is used in reference to the *kuan-min-kuan.* On page 10a of the *T'ung-chih t'iao-ko* text the term *yin-hsu* is used in reference to officials in general with the same meaning. Ratchnevsky, *Un code des Yuan,* I, 99, translates *ch'eng-chi* as "accès par succession"; he translates *ch'eng-yin-jen* as "la personne qui a reçu par transmission le bénéfice de son titre" (p. 109); and he translates *yin-hsu* as "accès par transmission d'un titre civil" (p. 99).
23. Fu-li refers to the region encompassing Shan-tung, Shan-hsi, and Ho-pei.
24. On the office of *chien-tang,* see Hucker, *Dictionary,* p. 151, for the Sung office, translated as "state monopoly agent."
25. The text at this point reads: 止例前資定奪 . It should be amended to read: 止依前資定奪 . A parallel phrase is on page 10b where 依 appears.
26. See *YTC* 9: 31a–31b on the regulations governing appointment and promotion of *chü-yuan-kuan.*

27. The regulations on the *yuan-wu fu-shih* are found in *YTC* 9: 41a, under the larger heading of *ch'ang-wu-kuan*.
28. The "hierarchy of ranks" (*liu-p'in*) refers to the 18-level official system. See Chapter 1, note 48.
29. The text of this excerpt from an imperial decree can be found also in *YTC* 8: 13a, with a few minor differences in wording, and without a listing of *yin* ranks. While the *TCTK* text is dated the 18th day of the 8th moon of the 4th year of the Ta-te reign period (1300), the *YTC* text is dated the 18th day of the 8th moon of the 8th year of the Ta-te reign period (1304). The correct date is 1300, as *YS* 83: 2060 confirms. The text in *YS* 83: 2060 is a partial version of the *TCTK* text. The *Yuan shih* identifies the text as a proposal of the Central Secretariat, whereas both the *TCTK* and the *YTC* identify the text as an excerpt from an imperial decree.
30. As Professor Francis W. Cleaves has observed, *Shang-wei* refers to a reigning emperor, and is the equivalent of the Mongolian *Degedūs*, a plural in *-s* of *degedū*, "supreme." Cleaves, "Uighuric Mourning Regulations," p. 87, n. 64.
31. This is a construction similar to the one in the following line of the text: *Huang-ti shih-yeh-che*. The latter phrase is a translation of the Mongolian, *Qaγan medetügei*, "Let the Emperor decide." *Mede-* in Mongolian has the sense of "to know" and also the sense of "to decide." See, for instance, Cleaves, "Uighuric Mourning Regulations," p. 77, n. 29.
32. What follows is a continuation of the imperial decree of 1300. Because an abbreviated listing of ranks appears *within* the text of the excerpt from the imperial decree in *YTC* 8: 13a, and because both the *TCTK* and the *YTC* documents end with the same procedure for Mongols, one must take the following as part of the imperial decree. At the end of the *YTC* text there is the scribal notation, "Respect this" (*ch'in-tz'u*), which characteristically closes an imperial quotation. Though *ch'in-tz'u* does not appear at the end of the *TCTK* text, because of the wording of the text and because of a parallel text in *YTC*, the *TCTK* text must be understood as an excerpt from an imperial decree. On the term *chih-kuan*, see Ratchnevsky, *Un code des Yuan*, I, 20, n. 6; he translates this term as "mandarin exerçant des fonctions publiques." This term designates officials who are qualified to exercise the functions of their office, as opposed to officials of nominal rank (*san-kuan*), "mandarins honoraires" in Ratchnevsky's translation. Paul Ch'en, p. 114, translates the term *chih-kuan* as "appointed officials."
33. This is followed by an apparent lacuna in the text, as there is a blank where one would expect "lower degree of the 5th rank . . ."
34. On the term *ch'ien-ku*, see Ratchnevsky, *Un code des Yuan*, I, 75, and *Li-hsueh chih-nan*, p. 100.
35. The *Yuan shih* text has *yin-hsu* 陰敘 in place of the *shou-yin* 受廕 of the *TCTK* text. *YS* 83: 2060.



36. The reading *kuan-min-kuan* would make sense here, since the procedure for receiving office through the *yin* privilege was the same for the Fu-li *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* and the Fu-li *kuan-min-kuan*, according to the report of the Board of Personnel above: "In addition, the sons and grandsons of government *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* who have reached retirement age and/or have died [should be appointed to office] in accordance with the procedure for the Fu-li population overseers (*kuan-min-kuan*)."
37. Collateral in the sense of transmission of office through the *yin* privilege from uncle to nephew, or from elder brother to younger brother. On this usage of the term *p'ang-yin*, see *YS* 83: 2059.
38. The "old procedure" refers to the terms outlined in an imperial decree of 1267. See *YS* 83: 2059.
39. "Pure" in the sense of racially pure Mongols who have not intermarried with Se-mu-jen, Han-jen, or Nan-jen.
40. *Ch'ü* for *ch'ü-yin*.
41. The parallel text in *YTC* 8: 13a ends with the scribal addition of "Respect this" (*ch'in-tz'u*), which does not appear after the *TCTK* text.
42. *YS* 83: 2060. A similar version of this text appears in *YTC* 8: 18a.
43. *Turγaγ* was the Mongolian word for "day guard" and it came to be used for "hostage" in the Yuan period. See Lien-sheng Yang, "Hostages in Chinese History," pp. 53–54; Paul Pelliot, *Notes critiques d'histoire Kalmouke. Texte*, pp. 32, 86, n. 236; and Hsiao, *Military Establishment*, pp. 35, 149, n. 16. In the *Secret History of the Mongols*, *turγaγ* or its plural, *turγa'ud*, is glossed as *pan-tang* (companions), *hu-wei* (bodyguards), and *san-pan* (day guards).
44. *YTC* 8:18b.
45. This text is found in *YS* 83: 2061, with only one minor difference in wording.
46. Patricia Buckley Ebrey, *The Aristocratic Families of Early Imperial China: A Case Study of the Po-ling Ts'ui Family*, pp. 105–107, 151–152, n. 84.
47. E. A. Kracke, Jr., *Civil Service in Early Sung China, 960–1067*, p. 73.
48. David G. Johnson, *The Medieval Chinese Oligarchy*, pp. 149, 209.
49. Kracke, p. 74.
50. The estimate of 6% is made by David Johnson, p. 149.
51. Makino Shūji, "Gendai shōkan kitei ni tsuite no ichi kōsatsu, toku ni kannanjin rofushūkenkan no baai," pp. 58–59. Yao Sui, *Mu-an chi* 4: 10a. See also Meng Ssu-ming, *Yuan-tai she-hui chieh-chi chih-tu*, p. 51.
52. *Chih-shun Chen-chiang chih* 16: 10b; *YS* 131: 3198–3200.
53. Tao Chia-nu lived from 6 September 1268 to 21 December 1339; his tomb inscription (*mu-chih-ming*) is in Huang Chin, *Chin-hua Huang hsien-sheng wen-chi* 37: 25a–26b.
54. *YS* 203: 4544; *Chih-shun Chen-chiang chih* 16: 4b–5a; 16: 11b–12a; 16: 10b–11a. See also Hsiao, *Military Establishment*, p. 200, n. 320; and Morris Rossabi, "The Muslims in the Early Yüan Dynasty," p. 287.

55. *YTC* 11: 6a. This procedure was similar to that followed in the Ming dynasty, when the records of local officials were evaluated once every three years. See Ray Huang, *1587, A Year of No Significance,* p. 58.
56. *YS* 7:129.
57. The Yuan gazetteers that list local officials' terms in office are: the *Chih-shun Chen-chiang chih;* the *Yen-yu Ssu-ming chih;* the *Chih-cheng Ssu-ming hsu-chih;* and the *Chih-cheng Chin-ling hsin-chih.*
58. The following information is from *Chih-shun Chen-chiang chih* 15:2b–9b; 16:2a–3a; 16:4b–5b; 16:7b–8b; 16:10b–11b.
59. Shih Huan apparently is not in the *Yuan shih,* but, since his place of origin is listed as Chen-ting, he may have belonged to the prominent Shih clan which was based in Chen-ting and which had aided the Mongols in their early campaigns in North China. Wang Te-i, in his index to Yuan biographical materials, gives no other information on Shih Huan. See Wang Te-i *Yuan jen chuan-chi tzu-liao so-yin,* I, 229. Shih Huan is not listed at all in Sun K'o-k'uan's study of the Shih clan genealogy. See Sun K'o-k'uan, *Yuan-tai Han-wen-hua chih huo-tung,* p. 260.
60. *Yen-yu Ssu-ming chih* 3:9a; 3:11b.
61. *YTC* 9:1b.
62. *YTC* 6:2b.
63. Wang Yun, *Ch'iu-chien hsien-sheng ta-ch'üan-chi* 92:8b.
64. Hsiao, *Military Establishment,* p. 154, n. 105.
65. Cha-ch'i-ssu-ch'in, "Shuo chiu *Yüan shih* chung ti Ta-lu-hua-ch'ih," pp. 377–408.
66. Ibid., p. 388.
67. The translated documents are from *YS* 6: 106; 6: 118; 10: 216.
68. *YS* 82: 2038.
69. *YS* 91: 2318. This system whereby 6 indigenous chieftains served as local heads responsible to the Yuan government anticipated the beginnings of the "local chieftainships" (*t'u-ssu*) of the Ming and Ch'ing. See Lien-sheng Yang, "Ming Local Administration," pp. 2–3; and Hucker, "Governmental Organization of the Ming Dynasty," p. 20.
70. *Ch'i-tung* (literally, river gorges and caves) were the administrative units of the Man-i people. The term *ch'i-tung* is used in the same manner as *chou-hsien* might be used to refer to the administrative units of the Han Chinese.
71. *YS* 15: 315.
72. *Hui-chou fu-chih* 4: 23b.
73. *Hang-chou fu-chih* (compiled in 1579), 14: 27b. Yuan Hang-chou is present-day Hang-chou.
74. This and the following information are drawn from the *Chih-shun Chen-chiang chih* 15: 2b–9b; 16: 1b–3a; 16: 4b–5b; 16: 7b–8b; 16: 10b–11b. I have grouped together under the heading Western and Central Asians the following nationalities which are listed separately in the gazetteer: Muslims (Hui-hui or Mu-su-man or Mu-su-lu-man), Uiyur (Wei-wu-erh), Christians (Yeh-li-k'o-wen, Erke'ün), Qipčay (Ch'in-ch'a), Qarluy (Ha-erh-lu), Qangli (K'ang-li), and Tanguts (Ho-hsi).
75. Chang Chen, to the best of my knowledge, is not otherwise mentioned in Yuan sources.
76. *Chih-cheng chin-ling hsin-chih* 6:67a–b.
77. *Chih-cheng Ssu-ming hsu-chih* 2:10b–11a.
78. Chao I, *Nien-erh-shih cha-chi* 30: 442–443.
79. Ch'en Yuan, *Western and Central Asians in China under the Mongols,* pp. 226–227.
80. Most of those *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* with assumed Mongolian names seem to have been appointed in the *t'ou-hsia.* Documents pertaining to the *t'ou-hsia ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* are translated in Chapter 4. Such documents may be found in *YS* 21: 458; *YTC* 9: 8a–8b.
81. *YTC* 9: 8a.
82. This term apparently is synonymous with *lien-fang-ssu.* The term *chu lien-fang-fen-ssu-kuan* also appears in *YS* 102: 2617.
83. Nan-ch'eng was an Upper County in Chien-ch'ang route in the Chiang-hsi regional secretariat. *YS* 62: 1514.
84. *YTC* 9: 8a–8b.
85. *YS* 102: 2615; Ratchnevsky, *Un code des Yuan,* I, 113–114.
86. *YTC* 1: 2b; *YS* 6:121.
87. *YTC* 31: 1b.
88. *YTC* 31: 2a.
89. *YS* 13: 266.
90. Boyle, I, 7.
91. Chapter 5 contains an expanded discussion of the role of translators and interpreters.
92. *YS* 81: 2027; *YS* 87: 2191; *YTC* 31: 1a. David M. Farquhar does not mention the fact that the Mongolian National University admitted the sons of Chinese officials. See his "Structure and Function in the Yüan Imperial Government," p. 29.
93. The full title of this work is *Shao-wei t'ung-chien chieh-yao* in 50 plus 4 *chüan.* The compiler was Chiang Chih of the Sung.
94. *YS* 81: 2028.
95. *YTC* 31: 1a.
96. *YS* 81: 2028.
97. *YTC* 12: 18a.
98. *YS* 91: 2317–2318. The *Chih-shun Chen-chiang chih* 13: 39b–41a lists one interpreter and one translator under the office of the general administrator in the route government, but none in the *lu-shih-ssu* or the three counties.
99. *YS* 91: 2316. *YTC* 12: 16b lists both an interpreter and a translator under the regional secretariats.
100. *YS* 39: 839; Dardess, *Conquerors and Confucians,* p. 61.

101. Hsiao, *Military Establishment,* pp. 43–44.
102. Hsiao, *Military Establishment,* pp. 29–30; Munkuev, "Novye materialy o polozhenii mongol'skikh aratov v XIII–XIV vv.," p. 412.
103. Hsiao, *Hsi-yü-jen yü Yuan-ch'ui cheng-chih,* pp. 117–118, n. 8; *YS* 7: 132. Although Hsiao offers these statistics as though they referred to individuals, he evidently meant to refer to the number of households. According to *YS* 58: 1345–1346, in 1270 there were 1,373,781 registered households in North China; after the conquest of the Southern Sung, another 11,840,800 registered households were added to the rolls.
104. Munkuev arrived at his estimate through the following line of reasoning. Rashid ad-Dīn wrote that, in the early years of the thirteenth century, 129,000 purely Mongolian troops were attached to Činggis Qan. To this number, Munkuev added 10,000 Önggüd troops, a figure derived from the *Sheng-wu ch'in-cheng-lu.* Estimating that the relationship between number of troops and general population stood at 1:5, he multiplied 139,000 by a factor of 5, and arrived at a total of 695,000 Mongols in the early thirteenth century. Munkuev notes that 695,000 is a conservative estimate, since not all Mongolian men served directly in the military. On the basis of information in Rashid ad-Dīn, the *Secret History of the Mongols,* and the *Yuan shih,* Munkuev believes that there was a very high birth rate among the Mongols, and he postulates a doubling of the total population of Mongols within a 100-year period. In other words, he estimates that, by the early fourteenth century, Mongols numbered at least 1,390,000 (695,00 x 2), and he suggests the "minimum" of about a million and a half Mongols throughout Eurasia. See Munkuev, "Zametki o drevnikh mongolakh," pp. 394–395, 400–401.
105. At the beginning of 1985, the MPR population stood at 1,866,300, with an estimated annual growth rate of 2.9%. See G. S. Matveeva et al., eds., *Mongol'skaia Narodnaia Respublika. spravochnik,* pp. 23–24.
106. I. J. Schmidt, *Geschichte der Ost-Mongolen und ihres Fürstenhauses verfasst von Ssanang Ssetsen Chungtaidschi der Ordus,* p. 138, lines 1–2.
107. Mostaert, *Dictionnaire Ordos,* p. 746b, defines *ubun čubun* as "se suivant par groupes séparés." In the *Secret History of the Mongols,* the term *ubur subur* appears with the Chinese gloss *lu-hsu,* which Haenisch renders as "nacheinander." Haenisch, *Wörterbuch,* p. 157. See also Cleaves, *Secret History,* p. 30.
108. *Qadquldun* is a *converbum modale* in *-n* of *quadquldu-,* a reciprocal in *-ldu* of *qadqu-.* Among the definitions of this word in Kowalewski, *Dictionnaire,* II, 783–784, are "exciter, stimuler, irriter, chasser." In an earlier passage in Sayang Secen, p. 74, Lines 3–4, a similar construction occurs: *esergü tesergü quadquldun bükü-e.* "At the moment when they were spurring each other on in all directions . . ."
109. Munkuev, "Zametki o drevnikh mongolakh," p. 400.
110. *Chih-shun Chen-chiang chih* 15 and 16: *passim.*



111. Ibid.
112. *YS* 96: 2466; *TCTK* 3: 5a–8b; Niwa Tomosaburō, "Gendai ni okeru kanri no hōroku ni tsuite," *passim.*
113. *Chih-shun Chen-chiang chih* 13: 39b; *YS* 96: 2465; *YTC* 15: 1b–2a.

## 4. *The* Ta-lu-hua-ch'ih *of the Appanages*

1. David M. Farquhar has listed several Chinese and Mongolian terms that may be placed in the broad category of "fiefs" in his article "Structure and Function in the Yüan Imperial Government," p. 46, n. 167. Another recent treatment of the terminology of "fiefs" in Yuan times may be found in Chou Liang-hsiao, "Yuan-tai t'ou-hsia fen-feng chih-tu ch'u-t'an," espec. pp. 53–59.
2. Paul Ratchnevsky, "Zum Ausdruck 't'ouhsia' in der Mongolenzeit," pp. 180–181. Murakami Masatsugu has addressed the question of whether *t'ou-hsia* and *ayimaγ* were synonymous in his "Genchō ni okeru tōka no igi," espec. pp. 210–215. In modern Khalkha, the most common meaning of the word *aimag* is an administrative unit on the scale of a province (there are 18 *aimag* in the Mongolian People's Republic), although "tribe" is a secondary meaning. Luvsandendev, *Mongol Oros tol',* p. 27.
3. *YTC* 8: 15b. The passage is translated below on pages 100–101.
4. Abe Takeo, "Gendai tōka no gogen kō," in his *Gendaishi no kenkyū,* p. 233; Murakami Masatsugu, p. 172.
5. This has been pointed out by Abe Takeo, "Gendai tōka no gogen kō," p. 236; and Farquhar, "Structure and Function in the Yüan Imperial Government," p. 46, n. 167.
6. Wittfogel and Feng, *Liao,* p. 65, n. 29; Abe Takeo, "Gendai tōka no gogen kō," pp. 235–236ff.
7. See H. F. Schurmann, "Mongolian Tributary Practices of the Thirteenth Century," pp. 304–305. In the *Secret History of the Mongols,* the Chinese gloss of the term *qubi* is *fen-tzu.* See Haenisch, *Wörterbuch,* p. 69. Ch'i-ch'ing Hsiao translates *qubi* as "appanages." See *Military Establishment,* pp. 11, 132, n. 66.
8. de Rachewiltz, "Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai," pp. 204–205. Schurmann, *Economic Structure,* pp. 88–93.
9. Households under the jurisdiction of the appanages were referred to as "five-households silk households," a term derived from their taxation category. See Schurmann, *Economic Structure,* pp. 90–91, 94.
10. Abe Takeo, "Gendai tōka no gogen kō," pp. 233–251; Ebisawa Tetsuo, "Mongoru–Genjidai no go tōka ni tsuite"; pp. 63–72; Iwamura Shinobu, *Mogoru shakai keizaishi no kenkyū,* pp. 401–469; Murakami Masatsugu, pp. 169–216.
11. Iwamura Shinobu, p. 433.
12. *YS* 2:35; de Rachewiltz, "Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai," pp. 204–205.

13. *YS* 4: 70. See also Chao I's discussion of the practice of removing people from the state's tax rolls and forcing them into a kind of bondage. *Nien-erh-shih cha-chi* 30: 443–444.
14. *TCTK* 2: 20a–20b.
15. *Ta-shu* is an abbreviated form of *ta-shu-mu*, one of the two major social-fiscal categories of population in the Yuan period. See Schurmann, *Economic Structure*, p. 67. *Ta-shu-mu* or "great majority" households were directly subordinate, and paid taxes, to the imperial government. The other major category of population was the "five-households silk households" (*wu-hu ssu-hu*), whose fiscal obligations were to both the Imperial Government and the appanages. Murakami Masatsugu, p. 208, n. 2, has pointed out that, in the *T'ung-chih t'iao-ko*, when *ta-shu* appears by itself, it is an abbreviated form of *ta-shu-mu*.
16. The content of these decrees is not included here.
17. *TCTK* 2: 2a–2b. The same text with a few minor, but important, differences in wording is in *YTC* 17: 1b.
18. According to *YS* 91: 2305, in 1287 the *hsing-chung-shu-sheng* were changed into *hsing-shang-shu-sheng*, but were then changed back into *hsing-chung-shu-sheng*. In 1309, they were changed to *hsing-shang-shu-sheng*, but in the same year were made *hsing-chung-shu-sheng*. The reference to *hsing-shang-shu-sheng* in 1252 is puzzling.
19. The text has *k'ou-shu* 口數, which is evidently an error for *hu-shu* 戶數. *YTC* 17: 1b has *hu-shu*.
20. On the term *ch'ai-fa*, see Schurmann, *Economic Structure*, p. 103, n. 1.
21. The *TCTK* text reads: 再不添額. The *YTC* text reads: 再行添額. Thus the question of whether the quota was or was not raised is unclear.
22. This is, apparently, a reference to a completely different memorial concerning the so-called "auxiliary households," the *hsieh-chi-hu*. On the term *hsieh-chi*, see Schurmann, *Economic Structure*, p. 69. The *hsieh-chi-hu*, one of four household categories, was made up of the very old or very young who could not pay the full tax rate and thus were granted a special one-third rate.
23. *YS* 5: 100. No explanation is given for the abolition of the office of *t'ou-hsia ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*.
24. *YS* 82: 2051–2052. The *Yuan shih* text here is drawn directly from the very brief section in the *Ching-shih ta-tien* on the *t'ou-hsia*. See Su T'ien-chueh, *Yuan wen-lei* 40: 12b.
25. *Tang-mu-i* is a Chinese term, apparently with no Mongolian equivalent, which refers to imperially bestowed appanages.
26. *YS* 11: 223. The request was made on 28 May 1280 by Chih-pi T'ieh-mu-erh (*Jibi[g] Temür), a son of Ködön (K'uo-tuan), who was himself a son of Ögödei. See *YS* 107: 2716–2717; and Louis Hambis, *Le chapitre CVII du Yuan che. Les généalogies impériales mongoles dans l'histoire chinoise officielle de la dynastie mongole*, pp. 74–75. Hambis has reconstructed the Mongolian name of Chih-pi T'ieh-mu-erh as *Jibi[k]-Tämür.



27. *YS* 11: 229.
28. *YS* 12: 241; *YS* 82: 2052.
29. *YS* 82: 2052. *YS* 6: 118 records the dismissal of Jurchens, Khitans, and Han-jen from the office of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* on the *ting-ch'ou* day of the 3rd moon of Chih-yuan 5 (9 May 1268).
30. *YS* 82: 2052.
31. *YTC* 9: 7a.
32. *YS* 21: 458. A more detailed version of this decree, in the colloquial language of the period, is found in *YTC* 9: 7b. The imperial decree incorporated the suggestions of the Censorate, which had reported the following: "There are Northern Chinese (Han-erh), Jurchens, and Khitans with Mongolian (Ta-ta) nicknames (*hsiao-ming*) who are serving as *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*. From this time onward, in the various *t'ou-hsia* and the various branches (*chih-erh*), let it be decided that they should select Mongols and appoint them. As for those Northern Chinese, Jurchens, and Khitans with Mongolian nicknames who are serving as *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*, it would be appropriate to dismiss them all." *Chih-erh* or "branches" may refer to "tribes," or may be synonymous with *t'ou-hsia*.
33. *YTC* 9: 8b.
34. Murakami Masatsugu, pp. 202–203; *YS* 121: 2988.
35. *YS* 87: 2187–2188; Paul Ch'en, p. 153, n. 145.
36. The same text is found in *TCTK* 2: 14a and *YTC* 17: 6a.
37. *YS* 24: 547.
38. *YS* 25: 572. Murakami Masatsugu, p. 204. The Prince of Chin (Chin-wang) was enfeoffed in 1302. *YS* 108: 2736. On his usurpation and imperial reign, see Dardess, *Conquerors and Confucians*, pp. 37–38.
39. *YS* 25: 572. The Prince of Chou (Chou-wang) was enfeoffed by the Emperor Jen-tsung in 1315. *YS* 108: 2741; *YS* 25: 571. Dardess views the enfeoffment of Qošila as Prince of Chou as an attempt by the Emperor Jen-tsung "to remove Qoshila from the political scene." Undoubtedly the Emperor was aware of the potential threat of rebellion—and Qošila did rebel unsuccessfully in 1316—yet the granting of an appanage may possibly have served to fuel rather than to defuse Qošila's imperial ambitions. See Dardess, *Conquerors and Confucians*, pp. 18–19.
40. Ibid., p. 37.
41. Temüder's biography in the *Yuan shih* is placed in the category of "villainous ministers" (*chien-ch'en*), alongside biographies of Ahmad and Sangha. *YS* 205: 4576–4581. See Dardess, *Conquerors and Confucians*, pp. 37–38, for a brief summary of Temüder's career under the Emperor Jen-tsung.
42. *YS* 95: 2412ff; Iwamura Shinobu, pp. 458–461.
43. *YTC* 9: 9a–10a. Iwamura Shinobu writes that this *Yuan tien-chang* passage is

extremely difficult to decipher and that it contains several omissions. He has summarized the passage in his *Mongoru shakai keizaishi no kenkyū*, p. 435.

44. According to the *Secret History of the Mongols*, Temüjin (Činggis Qan) was the eldest son of Yesügei Ba'atur and Hö'elün Üjin. His three younger brothers were Qasar, Qači'un, and Temüge. Such a discussion among the brothers is not described in the *Secret History*.
45. This is the equivalent of the Mongolian *tula* ("on account of," or "for the sake of"), a postposition which governs the genitive.
46. Both Murakami Masatsugu (p. 201) and Iwamura Shinobu (p. 435) understand *tz'u-erh-kuan* to mean vice-*ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* (*fu ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*). The vice-*ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* were appointed for a brief period while Temüder's policy was in force. See below, pages 99–100.
47. The text reads: 交做付達魯花赤 . As Iwamura Shinobu notes (p. 433), *tso*做 is an error for *wei* 委 .
48. *Ta-shu-mu* refers to officials from households directly subordinate to the Imperial Government. See above, note 15. In other words, the government has usurped the princes' right to appoint *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih*.
49. This is To-lieh-na (Dörēne) who was originally enfeoffed as the Prince of Chi (Chi-wang) in 1307, and whose title was changed to Prince of Wu (Wu-wang), in 1312. *YS* 108: 2738, 2741. See also Hambis, *Le chapitre CVII du Yuan che*, pp. 29, 30–31, n. 5.
50. *YS* 25: 573–574.
51. *YTC* 9: 9a.
52. If I have understood this passage, this is a reference to *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* appointed in the Kesig. The office of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* is not listed among Kesig functionaries in the *Yuan shih*, however. See Hsiao, *Military Establishment*, pp. 93–94. Perhaps this is a reference to *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* being selected from qualified persons in the Kesig.
53. On the term *ch'ang-hsüan*, see Ratchnevsky, *Un code des Yuan*, I, 123; Murakami Masatsugu points out that the term *ch'ang-husan-kuan* (officials appointed by the regular means of selection) means officials of the imperial government, as opposed to officials of the appanages.
54. *YTC* 15: 6b–7a.
55. *YS* 26: 579. This date corresponds to the date given in *YTC* 9: 9b.
56. *YTC* 8: 15b. This passage inadvertently equates the terms *t'ou-hsia* and *ayimay*.
57. See Dardess, *Conquerors and Confucians*, Chapter 2, "The Restoration of 1328," on the events that surrounded the succession struggle.
58. Ibid., p. 41.
59. On the name Badma Irgelbu, which is probably the Tibetan *Padma-rgyal-po, see Hambis, *Le chapitre CVII du Yuan che*, p. 139, n. 2.
60. The *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* were dismissed on 17 November 1328, a few days after the surrender of Aragibag on 14 November 1328. *YS* 32: 715, 716. T'o-t'o had been enfeoffed as Liao-wang in 1316. See *YS* 108: 2742; and Dardess, *Conquerors and Confucians*, p. 185, n. 35. For an explanation of the transcription of Aragibag's name, which appears in the *Yuan shih* as A-su-chi-pa, see Hambis, *Le chapitre CVII du Yuan che*, p. 139, n. 1.



61. His memorial is dated 29 December 1328. *YS* 32: 721. The biography of El Temür is in *YS* 138: 3326–3334. See also Dardess, *Conquerors and Confucians*, Chapter 2, for the background of political events at court in 1328.
62. *YS* 32: 722.
63. *YS* 33: 733.
64. For the name Sertegei, cf. the Mongolian *serteng*, for which see Kowalewski, *Dictionnaire*, III, 1374a; and Mostaert, *Dictionnaire Ordos*, p. 575b.
65. The texts of the Central Secretariat memorial and the censor's document are in *TCTK* 6: 32a–32b. Pa-pu-sha, a descendant of Joči Qasar, second son of Yesügei Ba'atur, was enfeoffed as Prince of Ch'i (Ch'i-wang) in 1307. See *YS* 108: 2738; and Hambis, *Le chapitre CVII du Yuan che*, pp. 24, 26, n. 7.
66. Iwamura Shinobu, p. 468.
67. See Hucker, "Governmental Organization of the Ming Dynasty," pp. 8–10.
68. Chou Liang-hsiao, "Yuan-tai t'ou-hsia fen-feng chih-tu ch'u-t'an," pp. 75–76.

## 5. *Yuan Local Government and Society*

1. Brian E. McKnight has written of the intermediary position of non-official personnel in villages in the Sung dynasty. See his *Village and Bureaucracy in Southern Sung China*, pp. 9–10. On the salaries and the regulations governing clerks in the Yuan, see *YS* 84:*passim*; and *YTC* 12:*passim*. Clerks who received salaries, such as the *ssu-li*, should be differentiated from a lower order of clerks and attendants who received no salary of any kind. Among those in the latter category were so-called writers' assistants (*t'ieh-shu*), doorkeepers (*tien-li*), and attendants (*chih-hou*). For example, the General Administration (Tsung-kuan-fu) of Chen-chiang route made use of the services of 50 writers' assistants, and the office of the *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* of the General Administration had assigned to it 8 attendants. See *Chih-shun Chen-chiang chih* 13:43a ff. On the category of clerks called *t'ieh-shu*, see Makino Shūji, *Gendai kōtōkan no taikeiteki kenkyū*, pp. 6–29. On the salaried *ssu-li*, see ibid., pp. 31–70. Charts of the many levels of clerkly office appear in ibid., pp. 198, 199, and 200.
2. James T. C. Liu has pointed out that, under alien dynasties of conquest such as the Liao, Chin, and Yuan, clerks experienced greater upward mobility. See Liu, "The Sung Views on the Control of Government Clerks," p. 341. See also Hsiao, *Military Establishment*, p. 199, n. 316; and Paul Ch'en, pp. 88–89.
3. Paul Ch'en, pp. 88–98.
4. Ibid., pp. 97–98.
5. Liu, p. 342.

6. Yeh Tzu-ch'i, *Tz'ao-mu-tzu* 4B: 81.
7. Ibid., 4B: 82.
8. That is, from the 1330s. Bayan was designated Prince of Ch'in in 1333. *YS* 38: 819.
9. For an explanation of the term *chai-shuai*, see Michael T. Dalby, "Court Politics in Late T'ang Times," p. 599.
10. The quotation comes from the Year 2 of Duke Huan (709 B.C.), in the context of the story of the Earl Tsang Ai admonishing his ruler for receiving the stolen Kao tripod into his state, thereby setting a bad example for the officials. This passage is translated by Legge as: "The ruin of States and clans takes its rise from the corruption of the officers. Officers lose their virtue, when the fondness for bribes *on the part of their ruler is displayed to them.*" (Legge's italics). See James Legge, *The Chinese Classics.* Vol. V. *The Ch'un Ts'ew with the Tso Chuen*, p. 40.
11. On the four Kesig, see Hsiao, *Military Establishment*, pp. 92–94.
12. K'ung Ch'i, *Ching-chai chih-cheng chih-chi* 3:19a–19b.
13. Ibid., 3:19a.
14. Hu Chih-yü, *Tzu-shan ta-ch'üan-chi* 21:36a.
15. *Mu-min chung-kao* is actually the first of three parts of Chang Yang-hao's *San-shih chung-kao*, a work which has the alternate title of *Wei-cheng chung-kao*. The two other parts consist of the *Feng-hsien chung-kao* (1 *chüan*), written while Chang was a censor; and the *Miao-t'ang chung-kao* (1 *chüan*), written while he held office in the Central Secretariat. I have used the *SPTK* edition (Shanghai, 1936) entitled *Wei-cheng chung-kao*, while also consulting an 1868 edition of the *Mu-min chung-kao* for variant readings. See Chang Yang-hao's biography in *YS* 175: 4090–4092. Chang Yang-hao is also known for composing numerous "song-poems" (*san-ch'ü*). On this topic, see J. I. Crump, *Songs from Xanadu: Studies in Mongol-Dynasty Song-Poetry (San-ch'ü)*, pp. 47–77.
16. Chang Yang-hao, *Mu-min chung-kao* in *Wei-cheng chung-kao*, A: 10b–11b.
17. Ibid., A: 11b.
18. Ibid., A: 13a.
19. See, for instance, Sun K'o-k'uan's article, "Yü Chi and Southern Taoism during the Yüan Period," pp. 219–220. Yan-shuan Lao has described posts in government educational institutions as "the only reliable and respectable route to officialdom for most southern literati" before 1315. See Lao, "Southern Chinese Scholars and Educational Institutions in Early Yüan: Some Preliminary Remarks," p. 111.
20. See John D. Langlois, Jr., "Political Thought in Chin-hua under Mongol Rule."
21. See F. W. Mote, "Confucian Eremitism in the Yüan Period," espec. p. 205.
22. Langlois, "Political Thought in Chin-hua," p. 140.
23. Farquhar, "Structure and Function in the Yüan Imperial Government," p. 44.
24. Allsen, pp. 45–46.



25. On the frequency of local revolts throughout the Yuan period, see, for example, Huang Ch'ing-lien, "Yuan-ch'u Chiang-nan ti p'an-luan (1276–1294)"; and Hsiao, *Military Establishment*, pp. 57, 63.
26. Charles J. Halperin has pointed out the fundamental contrast between how the Mongols ruled Russia and how they ruled China and Iran in his article "Russia in the Mongol Empire in Comparative Perspective," espec. pp. 247–250. While emphasizing the geographical isolation of the Mongols from the conquered Russian principalities and the Mongols' retention of "primitive" nomadism and military superiority, Halperin does not address the issue of efficiency in exploitation per se. In his recent book *Russia and the Golden Horde*, Halperin offers an explicitly economic interpretation of Mongolian motives for remaining detached from Rus': "Russia was simply peripheral to the Golden Horde's interests . . . The profits would not have offset the expenses of direct administration. The Mongols wanted to extract maximum benefit at minimum cost; any interpretation of their actions that does not proceed from this assumption is probably misguided." Trade and commerce in and through Rus' were not deemed profitable by the Mongols, according to Halperin. See Charles J. Halperin, *Russia and the Golden Horde: The Mongol Impact on Medieval Russian History*, p. 30.
27. See, for one example among several, §185 of the *Secret History of the Mongols*, in which Činggis Qan praises one Qadaγ Ba'atur for fighting so valiantly for his own qan against Činggis' forces. Činggis spared his life.
28. Sechin Jagchid and Paul Hyer, *Mongolia's Culture and Society*, p. 145.
29. Langlois, "Political Thought in Chin-hua," p. 185.
30. Wang Chieh, *Wang Wen-chung kung-chi* 4: 7a–9a.
31. Wang Yun, 90: 15b–16a.
32. See, for example, Chang Yang-hao, *Mu-min chung-kao* B:12b–14a.
33. Hu Chih-yü, *Tzu-shan ta-ch'üan-chi* 22: 31a.
34. Ibid., 21: 34a.
35. John D. Langlois, Jr., "Introduction," to *China under Mongol Rule*, p. 16.
36. Paul Ch'en, p. 80.
37. Ibid., p. 75.
38. Ratchnevsky, *Un code des Yuan*, I, 39, n. 7.
39. Hsiao, *Military Establishment*, pp. 85, 199, n. 316.
40. See, for example, *YS* 85: 2134, 2137, 2138.
41. *Chih-shun Chen-chiang chih* 15:12b.
42. Cheng Yü, 3:6a–6b.
43. *Chih-shun Chen-chiang chih* 13:40b–43a.
44. Ibid., 13: 39b
45. Ibid., 13: 39b ff.
46. *YTC* 9: 44a.
47. According to the *Li-hsueh chih-nan*, p. 78, a dispute over an offense is called *yü*,

while a dispute over property or wealth is called *sung*.

48. Wang Yun, 91: 5b–6a.
49. Yao Ts'ung-wu, "Liao Chin Yuan shih-ch'i t'ung-shih k'ao." See also Igor de Rachewiltz, "Some Remarks on the Language Problem in Yüan China," pp. 65–80.
50. *YTC* 12: 28a.
51. *YTC* 12: 28a.
52. *YS* 144: 3438.
53. Paul Pelliot wrote a note on this term which he transcribed as *kālāmāči* in his article, "Les mots mongols dans le 高麗史 Korye sǎ, p. 258. A vocabulary dating from Yuan times, the *Chih-yuan i-yü*, 9b, has *t'ung-shih* (interpreter) as an entry with the Mongolian equivalent *ch'i-li-mi-ch'ih*. See also Yao Ts'ung-wu, "Liao Chin Yuan shih-ch'i t'ung-shih k'ao," p. 207. Yeh Tzu-ch'i, in a derogatory anecdote about illiteracy among Mongolian officials, wrote the following (*Ts'ao-mu-tzu* 4B: 82–83):

    > The Northern people (Pei-jen) [i.e., the Mongols] are illiterate. When they were employed as senior officials (*chang-kuan*) [i.e., *daruγači*] or in vacant positions as principal officials (*cheng-kuan*) [i.e., as other regular officials], whenever they added their comments on administrative documents, as well as when they wrote dates, the hook of the character "7" (*ch'i*) did not curve following the right (七) but curved following the left (才). Those who saw this laughed. They established *ch'ieh-li-ma-ch'ih* (*kelimači*). They were translators (*i-shih*). As for understanding Chinese and foreign spoken languages and written scripts, Shih-tsu once asked what kind of person Confucius was. Someone answered, saying, "He was heaven's *ch'ieh-li-ma-ch'ih*." Shih-tsu was greatly pleased by this. Thus on the analogy to things he understood he was enabled to comprehend. He profoundly gained the epitome by his own powers of perception.

54. On the selection of the *she-chang*, see *YTC* 23:2a, and Ratchnevsky, *Un code des Yuan*, I, 91, n. 1. On the selection of the *li-cheng*, see Paul Ch'en, p. 121.
55. On the duties of the *she-chang*, see *YTC* 23:2a–3a; *YS* 93:2354–2355; Schurmann, *Economic Structure*, pp. 51–52; and Paul Ch'en, pp. 93–94. On the tax-collecting function of the *li-cheng*, see *Chih-shun Chen-chiang chih* 2:10b; Paul Ch'en, pp. 121–122; and Schurmann, *Economic Structure*, pp. 79–80.
56. *YTC* 23:2a; Ratchnevsky, *Un code des Yuan*, I, 91, n. 1. On the pre- and post-Yuan *she* in China, see Kung-chuan Hsiao, *Rural China: Imperial Control in the Nineteenth Century*, pp. 37–39. Japanese scholars have expressed an ongoing interest in the *she* institution. See, for example, Matsumoto Yoshimi, "Gendai ni okeru shasei no sōritsu"; Inosaki Takaoki, "Gendai shasei no seiji no kōsatsu"; and Ōta Yaichirō, "Gendai shasei no seikaku."
57. Schurmann, *Economic Structure*, p. 43.
58. Ibid., 47.



59. The following information is from *Chih-shun Chen-chiang chih* 3:16b–18a; 13:43b–45a.
60. Hu Chih-yü, *Tzu-shan ta'ch'üan-chi* 22:36a–36b.
61. Chang Yang-hao, *Mu-min chuang-kao* A: 14b.
62. Schurmann, *Economic Structure*, p. 52.
63. Ibid., 52; Paul Ch'en, pp. 121–122; *YTC* 23:2a–2b.
64. See Chapter 2, page 58.
65. See Chapter 2, pages 29–32.
66. See Francis Woodman Cleaves, "The Sino-Mongolian Inscription of 1348," p. 82.
67. See Wu Ch'eng, *Wu Wen-cheng chi* 9:8b–9b.
68. See Cheng Yü, *Shih-shan wen-chi* 6:11a–13b.
69. See Hsiao Ch'i-ch'ing, "Yuan-tai Meng-ku-jen ti Han-hsueh." On the question of imperial proficiency, see Herbert Franke, "Could the Mongol Emperors Read and Write Chinese?"
70. This point has been supported by Hung Chin-fu, "Yuan-tai Han-jen yü fei-Han-jen t'ung-hun wen-t'i ch'u-t'an," Part I, pp. 648–649; by Ch'i-ch'ing Hsiao, *Military Establishment*, p. 31; and by Huang Ch'ing-lien, *Yuan-tai hu-chi chih-tu yen-chiu*, p. 111.
71. Hung Chin-fu, Part I, p. 649. For a study of Mongolian-Korean imperial marriage relations during the Yuan, see Hsiao Ch'i-ch'ing, "Yuan-Li kuan-hsi-chung ti wang-shih hun-yin yü ch'iang-ch'üan cheng-chih," in Hsiao Ch'i-ch'ing, *Yuan-tai-shih hsin-t'an*, pp. 231–262.
72. Hung Chin-fu, "Yuan-tai Han-jen yü fei-Han-jen t'ung-hun wen-t'i ch'u-t'an," Part I, p. 652.
73. *TCTK* 27:11a.
74. *TCTK* 28:28b–29a.
75. In a document dated 11 November–5 December 1279, the Central Secretariat reported that Mongolian officials traveling on official business often were not offered either food or housing by commoners in the areas through which they traveled. Commoners were ordered to offer provisions and housing. Mongolian officials were cautioned "not to use this as a pretext to disturb the people inappropriately." *TCTK* 28: 34a.
76. See Chapter 2, pages 57–58.
77. Dardess, *Conquerors and Confucians*, pp. 21, 164; Farquhar, "Structure and Function in the Yüan Imperial Government," pp. 25–55.
78. Ray Huang, *1587, A Year of No Significance*, p. 50.
79. Ray Huang has articulated this idea in his article "Institutions," pp. 6–9.
80. F. W. Mote, "Political Structure," p. 49.
81. Ch'i-ch'ing Hsiao has convincingly outlined the decentralized structure of the Yuan military in his *Military Establishment*, pp. 60–62.
82. On the non-hierarchical mode of government of the Jurchen Chin dynasty, see

Herbert Franke, "The Chin Dynasty." On the Manchus' cultural borrowings from the Mongols, see David M. Farquhar, "Mongolian versus Chinese Elements in the Early Manchu State"; and Farquhar, "The Origins of the Manchus' Mongolian Policy." On the Manchus' deliberative institutions, see Robert B. Oxnam, *Ruling From Horseback: Manchu Politics in the Oboi Regency, 1661-1669*, pp. 66-76.

83. Farquhar, "Structure and Function in the Yüan Imperial Government," p. 52.

84. On the Mongols' feasting and eating habits, see Frederick W. Mote, "Yüan and Ming." Henry Serruys has written extensively on the topic of the post-Yuan remnants of Mongolian culture in China. See, for instance, his "Remains of Mongol Customs in China During the Early Ming Period."

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# *Glossary*

A-lao-wa-ting ('Alā-al-Dīn) 阿老瓦丁

A-san (Asan) 阿散

A-su-chi-pa (Aragibag)阿速吉八

A-t'a-hai (Ataqai) 阿塔海

*ai-ma (ayima[γ])* (tribe[s])愛馬

*an-ch'a-ssu* (surveillance bureaus) 按察司

*an-fu* (a military commission)安撫

An-mu-hai (*Ammuγai ~ Ambaγai) 唵木海

Ang-a-la (Ang'ara, son of Ch'un-chih-hai) 昂阿剌

*ao-lu (a'uru[γ])* (military household) 奧魯

*cha-fu* (communication)劄付

*cha-lu-hu-ch'ih (jaryučі)* (judge) 扎魯忽赤

*cha-lu-huo-ch'ih (jaryočі)* (judge) 扎魯火赤

Cha-pa-erh Huo-che (Lord Jabar) 札八兒火者

*cha-sa-k'o-ch'i (Jasaγ* official) 扎薩克齊

*cha-wei* (frauds and counterfeit[s]) 詐僞

*ch'a-ch'ih* (discrepancy) 差池

Ch'a-han (Čaγan) (General) 察罕

Ch'a-la (son of Shih-mo Yeh-hsien) 查剌

*chai-shuai* ("generals in debt") 債帥

*ch'ai-fa* (household taxes) 差發

*ch'ai-she* (to be appointed) 差設

Chan-ch'e Pa-tu-erh (*Jemče[g] Bādur) 苫徹拔都兒

*chang* (chief) 長

Chang Chao 張炤

Chang Chen 張振

*chang-kuan* (senior official) 長官

*chang-p'an* (take responsibility) 掌判

*chang-ts'e* (account books)帳冊
*chang-yin-kuan* (official who manages the seal of office) 掌印官
*ch'ang-hsuan* (to appoint by the regular means of selection) 常選
*ch'ang-wu-kuan* (production site [tax] offical [in relation to government monopolies such as tea and salt]) 場務官
*chao* (imperial decree) 詔
*chao-fu* (to convict) 招伏
*chao-lueh* (to undergo a review) 照略
*chao-min* (to impress people into service) 招民
*chao-shu* (imperial decree)詔書
*ch'ao-kuan* (court office) 朝官
*ch'ao-sheng* (government)朝省
*ch'ao-shu-tao min-hu* (registered civilian household)抄數到民户
*chao-t'ao* (a military commission) 招討
Ch'ao-t'ing (the Court) 朝廷
Che-pieh, Che-po (Jebe) (Mongolian general)遮別/者別/哲伯
*chen-chiang* (defense commander) 鎮將
*chen-ju* (authentic scholars) 真儒
*chen-shou-kuan-ming* (title of an official who defends and governs) 鎮守官名
*chen-shou-ti* ("he who defends and governs") 鎮守的
*chen-ya* (to garrison) 鎮壓
*cheng* (upper [in reference to degree in rank]) 正
*cheng-kuan* (regular official) 正官
*cheng* Meng-ku *jen-yuan* (pure Mongols) 正蒙古人員
*cheng-ssu-ch'ien* (to levy private revenues) 徵私錢
*cheng-tz'u* (discrepancy) 爭差
*ch'eng* (report) 呈
*ch'eng* (assistant) 丞
*ch'eng-chi* (succession to office) 承繼
*ch'eng-hsi* (hereditary transmission of office) 承襲
*ch'eng-hsi-che* (those who attain office through hereditary privilege) 承襲者
*ch'eng-hsi kou-tang* (to attain office through hereditary transmission) 承襲勾當
*ch'eng-kai* (excerpt of a report)呈該
*ch'eng-yin* (to receive office through the *yin* privilege) 承廕
*chi* (to mark or record) 記
*chi* (a register) 籍
*chi* (grade [of rank]) 級
*chi* (to succeed to office) 繼
*Chi-chuan* (Annals and Biographies) 紀傳



*chi-kang* (fundamental principles) 紀綱
*chi-ping chia-ku* (to be on leave because of illness)疾病假故
*chi-ping tsai-chia* (sick leave) 疾病在假
Chi-wang (Prince of Chi) 濟王
*ch'i hsing-men* ("open lucky doors") 啟倖門
*ch'i-i* (to move) 起移
*ch'i-li-mi-ch'ih* (interpreter) 乞里覓赤
*ch'i-tung* (administrative units)溪洞
Ch'i-wang (Prince of Ch'i) 齊王
*chia-ku* (excuses for leaves of absence) 假故
Chiang Chih 江贄
*chiang-chiu* (discussion) 講究
*chiang-hsu* (to reduce the *yin* ranks) 降敘
Chiang-huai (South-Central China) 江淮
*chiang-kuan* (official[s] in charge of artisans) 匠官
*chieh* (degree [of rank]) 階
*chieh-an* (to arrive, lit. "leave the saddle") 解鞍
*chieh-fu i pei chao-shua* (to bring up to date for preparation of future review)結附以備照刷
Ch'ieh-hsieh-tai [Kesigdei] (member of the Imperial Guard) 怯薛歹
*chieh-kai* (excerpt) 節該
*chieh-tu-shih* (military governor) 節度使
*chieh-yu* (certificate of discharge) 解由
*ch'ieh-li-ma-ch'ih (kelimači)* (interpreter) 怯里馬赤
*chien* (concurrently fulfil) 兼
*chien-ch'a-mei* (investigating censors) 監察每
*chien-ch'a-yü-shih* (investigating censors) 監察御史
*chien-chao* (to review) 檢照
*chien-ch'en* (evil minister[s]) 姦臣
*chien-ch'eng* (directors) 監丞
*chien-tang* (state monopoly agent) 監當
*ch'ien-chai* (debts) 錢債
*ch'ien-chuan* (to transfer in office) 遷轉
*ch'ien-chuan kuan-yuan* (official transferred to another post) 遷轉官員
*ch'ien-hu (mingyan)* (chiliarchy)千户
*ch'ien-hu-so* (chiliarchy) 千户所
*ch'ien-ku-kuan* (office of collector of trade and agrarian taxes) 錢穀官
Ch'ien Ta-hsin 錢大昕
*ch'ien-ya* (to exercise control)鈐壓
*chih-chou* (subprefect) 知州

*chih-chung* (assistant administrator) 治中
*chih-erh* (branches) 枝兒
*chih-fu* (prefect) 知府
*chih . . . fu shih* (administrator of the affairs of X prefecture in the Sung period) 知...府事
*chih-hou* (attendant[s]) 祇候
*chi-kuan* (native place) 籍貫
*chih-kuan* (appointed official[s], official post[s]) 職官
*chih-ling* (woven silk) 織綾
Chih-lu-ku, Qarā-Khitāy Emperor 直魯古
Chih-pi T'ieh-mu-erh (*Jibi[g] Temür) 只必帖木兒
*chih-shih* (administrative assistant) 知事
*chih-shih* (to decide) 知識
*chih-shih shen-ku* (to reach retirement age or die) 致仕身故
*chih-shu-mi-yuan-shih* (administrator of the Privy Council) 知樞密院事
Chih-ta reign period 至大
*chih-t'ien* (office lands) 職田
*chih-yin* (seal keeper) 知印
Chih-yuan reign period 至元
*ch'ih* (decree) 敕
*chin-chih* (to prohibit and punish) 禁治
*chin-fu* (golden tablet) 金符
*chin-hsia* (lower level [of an office]) 近下
*chin-shang* (upper level [of an office]) 近上
*chin-shih* ("advanced scholar" degree) 進士
*chin-wang* (regulations) 禁網
Chin-wang (Prince of Chin) 晉王
*chin-yueh* (to regulate) 禁約
*Ch'in-ch'a (Qipčay)* 欽察
*ch'in-min* (directly govern the people) 親民
*ch'in-tz'u* ("respect this") 欽此
Ch'in-wang (Prince of Ch'in) 秦王
*ching-kuan* (capital office) 京官
*ching-li* (registrar[s]) 經歷
*ching-lueh an-fu shih* (military intendant[s] [Sung]) 經略安撫使
*ch'ing* (land measure, approx. 16 acres) 頃
*ch'ing-feng ssu-li* (salaried clerks) 請俸司史
*Ch'ing-ming* (holiday) 清明
*ch'iu-shih* (to request an official appointment) 求仕
*cho-chung* (middle level [of an office]) 酌中
*chou* (subprefecture[s]) 州
*chou-hsien* (subprefectures and counties) 州縣
Chou-wang (Prince of Chou) 周王



*chu chih-kuan* (the sundry appointed officials) 諸職官
*chu-chün e-lo (A'uru[γ]* administrator of all the armies) 諸軍鄂勒
*chu-hou* (feudatory vassals) 諸候
*chu-jen* (owner[s]) 主人
Chu Ko (a bandit) 朱葛
*chu-k'uan* (item by item) 逐款
*chu-pu* (record keeper) 主簿
*chu-se* (all categories of people) 諸色
*chu-se jen-teng* (all categories of people) 諸色人等
*chu-shou* (control chief[s]) 主首
*chu-wang* (imperial prince[s]) 諸王
Chu-yin-chü (Bureau of Seal-Casting) 鑄印局
*ch'u-shih jen-yuan* (official emissaries) 出使人員
*chü-yuan-kuan* (agency and court [tax] official [in relation to government monopolies such as tea and salt]) 局院官
*ch'ü* (to receive) 取
Ch'ü-ch'u-lü (Küčülüg) 曲出律
*ch'ü-hui* (to ascertain) 取會
*ch'ü-k'ou* (slaves) 軀口
*ch'ü mien-p'i* (to do a favor [lit. "examine a face"]) 覷面皮
*chü-shou* (to collect) 拘收
*chü-shua* (to register) 拘刷
*ch'ü-yin* (to obtain office through the *yin* privilege) 取蔭
Chuan-yun-shih-ssu ts'an-i (consultant to the Bureau of Salt Distribution) 轉運使司參議
*chüan* (volume) 卷
*ch'üan* (certificate) 券
*ch'üan* (evaluation for office) 銓
*ch'üan-chu* (to be examined and registered for office) 銓注
*ch'üan-i* (to propose tentatively) 權擬
*ch'uang-ch'ai* (to be commissioned) 創差
*chueh* (to sentence) 決
*chui-shou-ch'ih-tieh* (to confiscate a patent of office) 追收勅牒
*chun-tsou* (approve the memorial) 准奏
*chun-tz'u* ("approve this") 准此
*chün* (prefecture during the Han period) 郡
*chün-hsien* (subordinate localities) 郡縣
*chün-hsien chih shou-ling* (heads of prefectures and counties) 郡縣之守令
*chün-hu* (military household) 軍户
*chün-i* (prefecture[s] and districts[s]) 郡邑
*chün-jen* (military personnel) 軍人
*chün-ma* (troops) 軍馬

Ch'un-chih-hai ("Čuljiyai)純只海
*chung-chou* (middle subprefecture) 中州
*chung-hsien* (middle county) 中縣
Chung-shu-sheng (Central Secretariat) 中書省
*chung-ssu* (unanimous opinion) 衆思
Chung-t'ung reign period 中統

*fa* (to fine) 罰
*fa-tu* (system of laws) 法度
*fan-jen* (transgressor) 犯人
*fang* (metropolitan quarters) 坊
Fang-chia jih-t'ou t'i-li ("Regulations Concerning the Granting of Leaves of Absence for Days") 放假日頭体例
*fen-ti* (allotted territories) 分地
*fen-tzu (qubi)* (appanages) 分子
*feng* (to seal off) 封
*feng chang yin-hsin* (to seal up and to manage the seals of office) 封掌印信
*feng-chi* (to seal up and mark) 封記
*feng-ya* (to seal up and use [a seal]) 封押
*fu (gerege)* (tablet) 符
*fu* (prefecture) 府
*fu-chang-kuan* (vice-senior official) 副長官
*fu-hsueh* (prefectural school) 府學
Fu-li (North China) 腹裏
*fu-ma* (imperial sons-in-law) 駙馬

Ha-erh-lu (Qarluγ) 哈兒魯
Ha-la-tai (Qaradai) 哈剌歹
Hai-ling Wang (Chin ruler 1149–1161) 海陵王
Han-erh (Northern Chinese and other subjects of the Jurchen Chin dynasty) 漢兒
Han-jen (Northern Chinese, Khitans, Jurchens, and Koreans) 漢人
Han-shih (the day before the Ch'ing-ming holiday) 寒食
Ho-han Huang-ti (The Qaγan and Emperor) 合罕皇帝
Ho-hsi (Tanguts) 河西
Ho-la P'u-hua (Qara Puqa ~ Buqa) 合剌普華
Ho-shih-la (Qošila) 和世㻋
*hou-fei* (empress[es]) 后妃
*hsi-kuan* (governmental) 係官
Hsi-la-han 昔剌罕
Hsi-li-po-lun (Sirbeilün) 喜禮伯倫
Hsi-nan i (Southwestern Tribes) 西南夷
Hsi-yü (Western Regions) 西域
*hsia-chou* (lower subprefecture[s]) 下州
*hsia-hsien* (lower county) 下縣
*hsia-lu* (lower route[s]) 下路



*hsia-ts'un* (to go down to villages) 下村
*hsiang* (minister) 相
*hsiang-chang* (village elder[s]) 鄉長
*hsiang-tu* (to deliberate) 相度
Hsiao Hsueh (Se'üse) 小薛
*hsiao-li* (petty clerks) 小吏
*hsiao-ming* (nickname[s]) 小名
*hsiao-shun* (submit) 效順
*hsiao-tzu* (nickname) 小字
*hsieh-chi-[hu]* (auxiliary [households(s)]) 協濟户
*hsieh-ch'i-jen* (contract clerk) 寫契人
Hsieh Chih-ch'üan (a bandit) 薛志全
Hsieh Wen-chih 偰文質
*hsien* (county) 縣
*hsien-ch'eng* (magistrate) 縣丞
*hsien-hsing ko-li* (temporarily enacted provisions of codes) 見行格例
Hsien-pei (Turkic rulers of the Northern Wei) 鮮卑
*hsien-ssu* (surveillance bureaus) 憲司
*hsien-t'ai* (censorate) 憲臺
Hsien-tsung, Emperor (Möngke) 憲宗
*hsien-wei* (police commissioner) 縣尉
*hsien-yin* (county magistrate) 縣尹
*hsing* (family name) 姓
Hsing Chi 星吉
*hsing-chih* (personal conduct) 行止
*hsing-chuan* ("account of conduct," i.e., biography) 行狀
*hsing-chung-shu-sheng* (regional secretariat) 行中書省
*hsing-hu-pu shih-lang* (vice-president of the Board of Revenue on detached service as finance supervisor) 行户部侍郎
Hsing-pu (Board of Punishments) 刑部
*hsing-shang-shu-sheng* (regional presidential council in the Chin period; regional secretariats in the Yuan period) 行尚書省
*hsing-sheng* (regional administration; regional secretariat) 行省
*hsing-shu-mi-yuan* (regional privy council) 行樞密院
*hsing-t'ai* (regional administration or administrator; regional censorate) 行臺
*hsing-t'ai shang-shu-sheng* (regional presidential council) 行臺尚書省
*hsing-yü-shih-t'ai* (regional censorates) 行御史臺
*hsu* (to be nominated to) 敘又
*hsu-yung* (to be appointed) 敘用

*hsuan-ch'ai* (commissioner)宣差
*hsuan-chao* (imperial decree)宣詔
Hsuan-cheng-yuan (Bureau of Tibetan and Buddhist Affairs) 宣政院
*hsuan-ch'ih* (imperial directives; imperial patent of appointment) 宣勅
*hsuan-fu* (a military commission) 宣撫
*hsuan-fu-ssu* (pacification bureau) 宣撫司
Hsuan-hui-yuan (Court of Imperial Etiquette) 宣徽院
*hsuan-ming* (imperial appointment[s]; imperial directive[s]) 宣命
*hsuan-wei-ssu* (pacification office) 宣慰司
*hsuan-wei-ssu yuan-shuai* (pacification office military commander) 宣慰司元帥
Hsueh-ch'ih (son of Po-erh)哈赤
Hsueh-erh-t'ieh-kai (Sertegei) 薛兒帖該
*hsun-chien* (patrol chief[s]) 巡檢
*hu-chi* (household registers) 户計
*hu-hun* (civilian marriages) 户婚
Hu-pu (Board of Revenue) 户部
*hu-shu* (household registers) 户數
Hu-tu-ta-erh (Qududar) (son of T'e-mu-t'ai-erh) 忽都答兒
Hu-t'u-k'o ([Šigi]Quduqu) 呼圖克
*hu-wei* (bodyguard[s]) 護衛
Huang-ch'ing reign period 皇慶
*huang-ti shih-yeh-che* (Qaγan medetügei) (let the Emperor decide) 皇帝識也者
Huang-t'ou (a Tangut *Daruγači*) 黄頭
Hui-hu (Uiγur) 回鶻
Hui-hui (Muslim) 回回
*Huo-che (Qoje)* (lord or master)火者
Huo-erh-ch'ih (Qorči) 火兒赤

*i* (propose) 擬
*i Ching i Shih* (one Classic, one History) 一經一史
I-hei-mi-shih (Yīγmīš) 亦黑迷失
*i-liang* (public grains) 義粮
*i-mien* (on one's own authority) 一面
*i-p'in* (first rank) 一品
*i-shih* (translator[s]) 譯史
I-ssu-mai-li (Isma'il) 易思麥里
*i-te* (to deliberate and conclude) 議得

*jen-chiang* (artisan[s]) 人匠
*jen-li* (petty clerk) 人吏
Jen-tsung (Ayurbarwada) (Emperor) 仁宗



*ju-li* (scholarly clerk[s])儒吏

*k'ai-ch'e* (break open) 開拆
K'ang-li (Qangli) 康里
*kao-ch'ih* (imperial directives)誥勅
*kao-hsu-yung* (to request appointment) 告叙用
*kao-jen* (informant) 告人
*kao-yin-jen* (people who claim the *yin* privilege) 告蔭人
*kao-yü* (proclaim) 告諭
*ken-chiao* ([aristocratic] origins) 根脚
*ko-chü-yuan chang nei* (heads of various bureaus and departments) 各局院長内
Ko-erh-han (Gurkhan) 葛兒罕
*ko-ko ti-hsiung-mei* (older and younger brothers)哥哥弟兄每

*ko-li* (provisions of codes)格例
*k'o-ch'eng* (impositions on monopolized goods)課程
*k'o-ch'ü ch'ai-i* (to exact taxes and corvée labor) 科取差役
*k'o-ch'ueh* (vacancy) 窠闕
*k'o-po ch'ai-shui* (to assess and allocate levies and taxes) 科撥差税
K'o-sheng-shih (Visitors Bureau Commissioner) 客省使

*kou-chui* (to summon and question) 勾追
*kou-she min-sung* (to manage civil lawsuits) 勾攝民訟
*kou-tang (üile)* (to conduct [official] affairs; to assume office) 勾當
*k'ou-shu* (individual registers) 口數
Ku-tse-Wo-erh-to (Hu-ssu Ordo) 谷則斡兒朶
K'u-lu-man (Son of Ch'a-la)庫禄滿
*k'u-tzu* (treasurer[s]) 庫子
*kuan* (communication) 關
*kuan-chiang-kuan* (overseer[s] of artisan population)管匠官
*kuan-chiang kuan-yuan* (overseer[s] of the artisan population) 管匠官員
*kuan-chün-kuan* (military overseer) 管軍官
*kuan-ling* (manage affairs) 管領
*kuan-min chang-kuan* (senior civil official; senior population overseer) 管民長官
*kuan-min cheng-kuan* (regular officials who oversee the population) 管民正官
*kuan-min-kuan ssu* (the offices of the population overseers)管民官司
*kuan-ssu* (the authorities) 官司
*kuan-ya-jen* (broker[s]) 官牙人

*kuei-fu kuan-yuan* (surrendered officials) 歸附官員
*kuei-i* (to support the dynasty) 歸義
*kung-ch'en* (meritorious officials) 功臣
*kung-chu* (imperial daughters) 公主
*kung-ch'u* (to go away on official business) 公出
*kung-ku* (craftsmen and merchants) 工賈
*kung-shih* (public affair) 公事
*kung-shou-jen* (archers [i.e. police]) 弓手人
*kung-t'ien* (public lands) 公田
*kung-t'ing* (public office[s]) 公廳
*kung-tso wen-pu* (official conference register) 公座文簿
*kung-t'ung* (publicly and together) 公同
Kuo-wang Muqali (Mu-hua-li) (Prince of the Realm Muqali) 國王(木華黎)
"Kuo-yü chieh" (A chapter in the *Chin shih* that explains the Jurchen language) 國語解
K'uo-erh-han (*Gurkhan*, Western Liao imperial title) 闊兒罕
K'uo-k'uo-tai (Köködei) 闊闊歹
K'uo-tuan (Ködön) 闊端
*lan-i* (men and things gone astray) 闌遺
Lan-i-chien-ch'eng (Minister of the Agency of Men and Things Gone Astray) 闌遺監丞
*lei-chiang* (to promulgate successively) 累降
*li* (provision[s], procedure[s], regulations[s], precedent[s]) 例
*li* (measure of distance: approximately 1/3 mile) 里
*li-cheng* (village head[s]) 里正
*li-jen kou-tang* (to be appointed to and assume office) 禮任勾當
Li-li-pu (Joint Board of Personnel and Rites) 吏禮部
Li-pu (Board of Personnel) 吏部
Li-pu (Board of Rites) 禮部
*li-shih* (clerks' affairs) 吏事
*li-shu* (clerks) 吏屬
Li T'an (a rebel) 李璮
Li T'ing-chih, General 李庭芝
Liao (people) 獠
Liao-wang (Prince of Liao) 遼王
*lien-fang-fen-ssu* (surveillance branch bureau) 廉訪分司
*lien-fang-ssu* (surveillance bureau[s]) 廉訪司
*ling* (Han dynasty prefect; directive) 令



*ling-chih* (decree[s] of imperial princes) 令旨
*ling-shih* (clerical employees) 令史
*liu-kuan* (officials within the current) 流官
*liu-p'in* (hierarchy of ranks) 流品
*liu-shou* (defense commandant) 留守
Liu-ts'ao (the Six Bureaus) 六曹
*liu-wai* (irregular posts) 流外
*lu* (route) 路
*lu-hsu (ubur subur)* (one after another) 陸續
*lu-p'an* (commissioner of records) 錄判
*lu-shih-ssu* (districts under direct jurisdiction of routes and prefectures) 錄事司
*lü* (statutes) 律
"Lun Chi-nan Lu so-hsia ta-lu-hua-ch'ih ho ch'ien-chuan shih-chuang" ("a discussion of the circumstances of *ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* under the jurisdiction of Chi-nan route for whom it is appropriate to be transferred in office," by Wang Yun) 論濟南路所轄達魯花赤合遷轉事狀
Ma-wu (Ma'u) (grandson of Chan-ch'e Pa-tu-erh) 麻兀
Mai-chu (a Tangut *Daruγači*) 買住
Man-i (people) 蠻夷
Mang-ku-tai (Mangγudai) 忙古歹
Mang-wu-t'ai (Mangγudai) 忙兀台
*meng-an* (Jurchen military unit of thousands) 猛安
Meng-ku kuo-tzu-hsueh (the Mongolian National University) 蒙古國子學
Meng-ku Pa-erh (Mongγo[l] Bar ~ Bars[Tiger]) 蒙古巴爾
Meng-ku tzu-hsueh (Mongolian Language Schools) 蒙古字學
Mi-li-chi (son of I-ssu-mai-li) 密里吉
*mien-p'i (niγur)* (face) 面皮
*min chiang* (civilian and artisans) 民匠
*min-hu* (civil household) 民户
*min-kuan* (civil officials) 民官
*min-sung* (civil lawsuits) 民訟
*ming* (given name[s]) 名
*Ming-wei chiang-chün* (Luminous and August General) 明威將軍
*ming-wen* (document of instruction) 明文
*mou-k'e* (Jurchen military unit of hundreds) 謀克
*mu* (staff) 幕
*mu-chih-ming* (tomb inscription) 墓誌銘
*mu-kuan* (secretarial official) 幕官

Mu-sa-fei 木撒飛
Mu-su-lu-man, Mu-su-man (Muslims) 木速魯蠻, 木速蠻

*na-pan-(hsing) che (teyin bolurai)* ("Let it be that way.") 那般行者
Nai-man 乃蠻
Nan-jen ("Southerners") 南人
*nei-wai* (inner [court] and outer [non-court] [bureaus]) 內外
Nieh-chih-pi (son of I-ssu-mai-li) 捏只必
*nung-shih* (agricultural affairs) 農事

Pa-la-hu-tai (Barγudai) clan 八剌忽解
Pa-pu-sha (*Babuša) 八不沙
*pa-ssu-ha (basqaq)* 八思哈
Pa-ssu-ma (the 'Phags-pa Lama) 八思麻
Pa-ti-ma I-erh-chien-pu (Badma Irgelbu) 八的麻亦兒間卜
*pai-hsing-mei* (common people) 百姓每
*pai-hua* (colloquial language) 白話
Pai-yen (Bayan) 伯顏
*p'ai-tzu (gerege, ?baisa)* (tablet) 牌子
*pan-tang (turγay, turγa'ud)* (companion[s]) 伴當
*p'an-kuan* (commissioner of records) 判官
*p'an-shu kuan-li* (responsible officials) 判署官吏
*p'an-sung* (communication) 判送
*pang-wen* (placard) 榜文
*p'ang-yin* (collateral transmission of the *yin* privilege) 傍蔭
*pao* (imperial seal) 寶
*pao-shih* (apprentice[s]) 僕使
*p'ao* catapult 砲
*p'ao-shih* (catapult bombs) 砲石
*p'ao-shou* (catapult operator) 砲手
Pei-jen (Northern people) 北人
Pei Wen-hsiu 北文秀
Pen-chi (the Basic Annals) 本紀
*pi-she-ch'ih (bičeči)* (clerk or secretary) 必闍赤
*pieh-le* (to depart from) 別了
*p'in* (rank[s]) 品
*p'in-chi* (official rank and title) 品級
*ping-ping* (handle of military power) 兵柄
Ping-pu (Board of War) 兵部
Po-erh (Bōl) 博兒
Po-ho-ch'u (*Bol[l]γaču) (Father of An-mu-hai) 孛合出
*po-hu* (century[ies]) 百户
*po-lan-hsi (*boralki)* (men and things gone astray) 孛蘭奚
Pu (the Boards) 部
*pu* (record [n.]) 簿



*pu-fang pen-chih* (not interfere with one's original duties) 不妨本職

*pu-lan-hsi (*buralki)* (men and things gone astray) 不蘭奚
*pu-lan-hsi-ch'ih (*buralkiči)* (officials in charge of slaves, animals and material goods gone astray) 不闌奚赤

Sa-le-chih-wu-t'i (Saljūtai or Salji'ud) 撒勒只兀惕
Sai-i (Sayyid or Muslim) 賽夷
*san-ch'ü* (song-poems[s]) 散曲
*san-fu* (prefecture[s]) 散府
*san-kuan* (officials of nominal rank) 散官
San-kuo Wei dynasty 三國魏
*san-pan* (day guard[s]) 散班
Sang-ko (Sangha) (Tibetan official under Qubilai) 桑哥
*sao-jao* (to cause a disturbance) 搔擾
Se-mu (Western and Central Asians) 色目
*shan* (on one's own authority) 擅
*shan-huo* (to stir up agitation) 扇惑
*shang-chou* (upper subprefecture) 上州
*shang-hsien* (upper county) 上縣
*shang-lu* (upper route) 上路
*shang-shu* (ranking member of the Board of Personnel) 尚書
Shang-shu-sheng (Presidential Council) 尚書省
Shang-wei, Emperor 上位
*Shao-wei t'ung-chien chieh-yao* 少微通鑑節要
*she* (community) 社
*she-chang* (community leader[s]) 社長
*shen* (report) 申
*shen-chung* (important) 深重
*shen-tao-pei* (epitaph) 神道碑
*sheng* (province[s]) 省
*sheng-chih* (imperial decree) 聖旨
Sheng-p'an (a communication of the Central Secretariat) 省判
Sheng-pu (Central Secretariat and Board) 省部
*sheng-shou* (to suffer) 生受
*sheng-ts'ai* (imperial decision) 聖裁
*sheng-yuan* (licentiate[s]) 生員
*shih* (formula) 式
*shih-ch'en* (messenger) 使臣
Shih Chiang 史杠
Shih Hou 史侯
*shih-hsing* (to put into effect) 施行
Shih Huan 史桓
*shih-i* (intent) 事意
Shih Ko 史格
Shih-mo A-hsin 石抹阿辛

Shih-mo Shan-te-na (brother of Shih-mo Yeh-hsien)石抹闍德納
Shih-mo Yeh-hsien 石抹也先
Shih T'ien-tse 史天澤
*shih-tsu* (clan[s] and tribe[s])氏族
Shih-tsu, Emperor (Qubilai)世祖
*shou-chang* (to keep [in one's office]) 收掌
*shou-kuan* (to keep and guard) 收管
*shou-ling-kuan* (document-router) 首領官
*shou-yin* (to receive office through the *yin* privilege) 受蔭
*shu-cheng* (administration) 庶政
Shu-lü 述律
Shu-mi-yuan (Privy Council)樞密院
*shu-ya* (to affix one's official signature and seal[s]) 署押
*shua-hui* (to register) 刷會
*ssu-chi chih jen* (intimate friends) 私己之人
*ssu-ch'iu* (criminals sentenced to death) 死囚
*ssu-hsien* (counties and *lu-shih-ssu*) 司縣
*ssu-jen* (personal retainers) 私人
*ssu-li* (clerks) 司吏
*ssu-yü* (prison superintendant) 司獄
*su-cheng lien-fang-ssu-kuan* (officials of the surveillance bureaus) 肅政廉訪司官
Su-wei (The Imperial Guard)宿衛
Sun-tu-ssu (Suldus) tribe 速都思
*sung* (a dispute over property)訟

Ta ch'eng-hsiang Chung-wu Kung 大丞相忠武公
*ta hsiao ya-men* (large and small bureaus) 大小衙門
*ta-i* (general meaning) 大義
*ta-ken-chiao ch'u-shen* (great [aristocratic] origins and status) 大根脚出身
*ta-lu-hua-ch'ih* (*daruγači*)達魯花赤
*ta-lu-ka-ch'i* (*daruγači*)達嚕噶齊
*ta-shu-mu* (great majority)大數目
Ta-ssu-nung-ssu (Grand Bureau of Agriculture) 大司農司
Ta-ta-jen-mei (Mongols)達達人每
Ta-te reign period 大德
*ta-tu-tu-fu yuan-wai-lang* (vice-director of a grand military commission) 大都督府員外郎
*ta-wang* (prince[s]) 大王
Ta-Yuan ku Huai-yuan ta-chiang-chün (Great Yuan deceased Huai-yuan General) 大元故懷遠大將軍
T'a-ssu (Tas) 塔思
T'ai Pu-hua (Tai Buqa)太不花
T'ai-shih Kuo-wang (Grand Preceptor and Prince of the Realm) 太師國王
*t'ai-shou* (commandery administrator) 太守



T'ai-ting Emperor 泰定
T'ai-tsu, Emperor (Činggis Qan) 太祖
T'ai-tsung, Emperor (Ögödei)太宗
*tan* (volume measure) 石
T'an Ch'eng 覃澄
*tang ch'ai-fa* (to undertake civilian household taxes) 當差發
*t'ang-mu-i* (livelihood lands; imperially bestowed appanages) 湯沐邑
T'ang Shu 湯淑
T'ang-wu (Tangut) 唐兀
*tao* (circuit) 道
Tao Chia-nu 道家奴
*t'e-chih* (a special imperial decree) 特旨
T'e-mu-t'ai-erh (Temütär ~ Temüter) (son of An-mu-hai) 忒木台兒
*teng* (degree [of rank]) 等
*ti-shang-t'ou* (Mongolian *tula*) (on account of) 的上頭
Ti-shih (Imperial Instructor)帝師
*t'i-ch'a* (to investigate) 體察
*t'i-hsing an-ch'a-ssu* (surveillance bureaus) 提刑按察司
*t'i-k'ung-an-tu* (document supervisor) 提控案牘
*t'i-k'ung an-tu chien chao-mo ch'eng-fa chia-ko* (document supervisors concurrently serving as heads of document despatching and filing in the Records Office) 提控案牘兼照磨
*t'i-li* (regulation) 體例
*t'i-tiao* (to supervise; to account for; to inspect) 提調
*t'i-tiao-kuan* (inspection officials)提調官
*t'i-tien nung sang shui-li kuan-yuan jen-teng* (officials who inspect agriculture, sericulture, and irrigation) 提點農桑水利官員人等
*tiao-teng* (to delay and hinder)刁蹬
*t'iao-hua* (rules) 條畫
*t'iao-hua shih-li* (items of the rules) 條畫事理
*tieh* (notification; report) 牒
T'ieh-mu-tieh-erh (Temüder) 帖木迭兒
*t'ieh-shu* (writers' assistant[s])貼書
*tien-k'an* (to audit) 點勘
*tien-li* (doorkeeper[s]) 典吏
*t'ien-hsia* (the empire) 天下
*t'ien-shou* (imperial birthday)天壽
*t'ien-shou-chieh* (imperial birthday) 天壽節
*tien-shih* (record-keeper) 典史
*teng* (degree [in rank])
*ting-i* (to make a proposal) 定擬
*ting-li* (established procedure)定例
*t'ing-tuan* (decide a case) 聽斷

To-lieh-na, To-liu-nieh (Dörēne) 朶列納 . 朶劉捏
T'o-t'o (To[γ]to) 脫脫
Tou Hsien-sheng 竇先生
*t'ou-hsia* (appanage[s]) 投下
*t'ou-hsia chün-chou* ("entrusted commandery-prefectures") 投下軍州
*t'ou-mu* (military officials; chiefs) 頭目
*t'ou-p'i* (cattle) 頭疋
*tsa-chih* (subaltern[s]) 雜職
*ts'an-hsiang* (to investigate) 參詳
*ts'an-tso* (subordinate officials) 參佐
*tsen-sheng (yambar)* (How would it be?) 怎生
Tso-ch'eng-hsiang (Minister of the Left) 左丞相
Tso-san-pu (the Three Boards of the Left) 左三部
Tso-ssu (Bureau of the Left) 左司
*tsou-mu* (titles of memorials) 奏目
*ts'ui-tu* (to expedite and oversee) 催督
*tsung* (lower [in reference to degree in rank]) 從
Tsung-cheng-fu (Imperial Clan Administration) 宗正府
*tsung-kuan* (general administrator) 總管
*tsung-kuan-fu* (general administration) 總管府
*tu-p'i* (bribe[s]) 肚皮
Tu-sheng (the Central Secretariat) 都省
Tu-t'ang (the Central Secretariat) 都堂
*tu-tu-fu* (governments-general) 都督府
*tu-ya-ya* (high-level military administrator in the late T'ang) 都押衙
*tu-yü-hou* (staff office of military governor in the late T'ang) 都虞候
*tu-yuan-shuai-fu* (head office of the military command) 都元帥府
*t'u-jen* (indigenous people) 土人
*t'u-li* (local clerks) 土吏
*t'u-lu-hua (turγa[γ])* (hostage[s]) 禿魯花
*t'u-ssu* (local chieftainship[s]) 土司
*tuan-shih-kuan* (*jarγuči*) (judge) 斷事官
*t'ui-kuan* (judicial officer) 推官
*t'ung-chih* (associate administrator) 同知
*t'ung-li* (comprehensive precedent[s]) 通例
*t'ung-p'an* (general controller in the Sung period) 通判
*t'ung-shih* (interpreter[s]) 通事
*tzu* (communiqué) 咨
*tzu* (courtesy name[s]) 字
*tzu-i* (in an unrestrained manner) 恣意



*tzu-kai* (excerpt of a communiqué) 咨該
*tzu-p'in* (qualifications and rank[s]) 資品
*tz'u-erh-kuan* (second-ranking officials) 次二官
*tz'u-kuan* (next-ranking official) 次官
*tz'u-shih* (inspector) 刺史
*tz'u-shou* (prefect) 刺守
*tz'u-sung* (legal cases) 詞訟

*wai-jen [kuan]* (offices appointed outside the metropolitan bureaucracy) 外任官
*wan-hu-fu (tümen)* (myriarchy) 萬户府
*wang-hao* (princely title) 王號
Wang Hui-tsu 汪輝祖
Wang Jung (Huai-chou Prefect) 王榮
*wang-kuo* (fiefs or kingdoms [in Han dynasty]) 王國
*wang-shih* (imperial army) 王師
*wei* (commandant) 尉
*wei-t'ou* (head [adj.]) 為頭
Wei-wu-erh (Uiyur) 畏吾兒
Wei Yuan 魏源
*wen-chi* (literary collections) 文集
*wen-p'ing* (certification for office) 文憑
*wen-shu* (document; letter) 文書
*wen-ts'e* (documents) 文冊
*wen-tsou* (to memorialize) 聞奏
Wen-tsung, Emperor (Tuγ Temür) 文宗
*wen-tzu* (document; text) 文字
*wen-tzu chang-kuan* (senior civil officials) 文資長官
*wu-hu-ssu-hu* ("five-households silk households") 五户絲户
Wu-wang (Prince of Wu) 吳王
*ya* (to affix a seal) 押
*ya-chen* (to garrison) 壓鎮
*ya-men* (bureau) 衙門
*ya-ya* (high-level military administrator in the late T'ang) 押衙
*yao* (sparrow-hawk) 鷂
*yao tu-p'i* (to take bribes) 要肚皮
Yeh-hsien (Esen) 也先
Yeh-li-k'o-wen (Christian[s]) 也里可温
Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai 耶律楚材
Yeh-lü Ta-shih 耶律大石
Yeh-sun T'ieh-mu-erh (Yesün Temür) 也孫帖木兒
*yen* (to say) 言
*yen-chia* (strictly) 嚴加
Yen T'ieh-mu-erh (El Temür) 燕鐵木兒
Yen-yu reign period 延祐
*yin (tamγa, tamaγa)* (seal[s]) 印
*yin-hsin* (seal of office) 印信
*yin-hsu* (to gain access to office through the *yin* privilege) 蔭叙

*yin-yung* (to appoint through the *yin* privilege) 廕用
*ying* (falcon) 鷹
*ying-chai* (military barracks) 營寨
*ying-yin chih-jen* (people for whom the *yin* privilege is appropriate) 應廕之人
Yu-ch'eng-hsiang (Minister of the Right) 右丞相
*yu ch'ien-tzu* (to have seniority) 有前資
Yu Hsien 游顯
*yu-i-teng* (one degree higher) 優壹等
*yu-ken-chiao-ti (ijaγur-tan)* (to possess [aristocratic] origins) 有根脚的
*yu-shih-ku pu-tsai pen-chia* (to have a reason to be away from home) 有事故不在本家
*yu-ssu* (the authorities) 有司
Yu-ssu (Bureau of the Right) 右司
*yü* (a dispute over an offense) 獄
Yü-shih-t'ai (the Censorate) 御史臺
*yü-sung* (lawsuits) 獄訟
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*yuan-ch'ien* (to sign jointly in conference) 圓簽
*yuan-i* (to discuss in conference) 圓議
*yuan-shuai-fu* (military command) 元帥府
*yuan-tso* (to sit in conference [lit. "sit in the round"]) 圓坐
*yuan-wu fu-shih* (assistant [tax] official in charge of courts and bureaus [in relation to government monopolies such as tea and salt]) 院務副使
*yuan-tso t'ing-shih* (conference room) 圓坐廳事
*yuan-ya* (to sign [documents] jointly in conference) 圓押
*yueh-hui* (a hearing; a mixed court) 約會
*yueh-jih* (term[s] in office) 月日
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